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This thesis offers a critical analysis of the underlying logic of Britain’s counter-extremism in schools 
strategy. It begins with a foundational concern regarding the emphasis placed on countering ideology in 
countering extremism, and the challenge facing educationalists to both promote a consensus around 
moderate values, while also promoting value diversity and pluralism. The thesis finds the strategy contested 
and contradictory - how can a school develop critical thinking while also promoting a fixed set of values? 
The thesis deconstructs these contradictory components of counter-extremism education, in order to 
critically examine the political realms of extremism and counter-extremism: what is the world after 
extremism that the strategy is hoping to bring about? Through exploring the lessons plans, PowerPoint 
presentations and worksheets used in classrooms, and deploying a method of critical discourse analysis, 
this thesis asks: how do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education 
manifest in the teaching materials designed to fulfil the strategy? Adopting a deconstructionist, discourse 
analysis approach, and through the lenses of ideograph theory, securitisation theory, critical race theory, 
and the theory of agonism, this analysis uncovers what I term a ‘siege mentality’. The moderate centre is 
painted as being threatened and under attack from a poorly-defined notion of extremism, and must be 
defended at all costs. This securitisation of education, tasked with securing the moderate centre from attack, 
leads to a realm of exceptional politics in which the very values that are being defended - those of liberal 
democracy - are being suspended for their own protection. Values that stray too far from a moderate 
consensus are portrayed as ‘extreme’, and the modes of subjectivity deemed permissible within the 
‘moderate’ are narrow, restrictive and racialised. The thesis finishes by asking how else this siege mentality 
could be conceptualised. Through replacing the consensus central to current conceptualisations of counter-
extremism (that once everyone agrees with the moderate, there will be no extremism), with a pluralistic 
acceptance of diversity and conflict, the thesis sets out how a conceptual framework of agonism can offer 
new ways of, not countering, but encountering extremism. 
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Men of Harlech, march to glory, 
Victory is hov'ring o'er ye, 
Bright-eyed freedom stands before ye, 
Hear ye not her call? 
At your sloth she seems to wonder; 
Rend the sluggish bonds asunder, 
Let the war-cry's deaf'ning thunder 
Every foe appall. 
John Oxenford (1873) 
 
The defiant, stony remains of Harlech Castle dominate the coast of the Welsh county of Gwynedd, 
overlooking the Irish sea. Built over twelve years between 1283 and 1295, it is of little surprise that this 
sturdy castle remains to this day. The castle is so strongly fortified that the siege of Harlech Castle lasted 
seven years until 1468 before the Lancastrians within surrendered to the Yorkists without. The siege, set in 
cultural memory in the song, Men of Harlech, would go on to become a rallying cry for Welsh and British 
vigilance under attack. Famously sung in defiant defeat in the 1964 film Zulu, the song remains a popular 
march of Welsh regiments of the British Armed Forces. Britain’s pride is strongest, it seems, when under 
siege. 
 
Life under siege is hard, and it is boring. Between intermittent fighting, a siege serves the purpose of a 
waiting game. Will those inside the castle walls, or the encamped attacking armies run out of food, water 
and willpower first? As important as tactics of combat were in both conducting and defending a siege, a 
primary mode of attack was in the form of blockade, starving those inside the castle of precious resources. 
 x 
A vital mode of defence was, as Bachrach (1994) notes, ‘stripping the countryside to deprive the besiegers 
of the opportunity to forage’. It is a grinding, attritional mode of warfare.  
 
While siege warfare these days is rare, siege mentalities abound. A siege mentality is a constructed 
psychological siege - the walls built in the mind, not out of stone. As Bar-Tal and Antebi define it, a siege 
mentality is a ‘mental state in which members of a group hold a central belief that the rest of the world has 
highly negative behavioural intentions towards them’ (1992, p. 634). Yet, its effects can be as profound, 
and as long lasting, as any castle siege. The besieged builds boundaries between themselves and the 
attacker. Bar-Tal and Antebi define certain common characteristics of a siege mentality, including a belief 
that ‘there is a threat to their existence’ and ‘that all means are justified for group defense’ (ibid.). Violence 
plagues the besieged mind, whether hiding behind figurative walls or ones made of stone.  
 
The virtue of a siege mentality is that while the siege itself can be as attritional, bloody and brutal as a 
physical siege, the castle under a siege mentality is more akin to the sand castle built with buckets and 
spades, than to the stony remains which attract visitors to Harlech. A sand castle resembles a castle, but 
never loses the traces of what is really is: a human-constructed image, a manufactured shape. A sand castle 
is fragile, malleable and temporary. While Harlech’s walls last 800 years, a sand castle rarely outlives the 
change in the tides. While still a distinct and profound challenge, the castle of a siege mentality can be 
reshaped and rebuilt.  
 
And so Castles made of sand, 
Fall in the sea, eventually. 




Liberal Education and Ideological Counter-Extremism 
 
 
I can still remember where I was when I first heard about the 2001 attacks in the US. I was ten years old. I 
had just finished an after-school sports session. With a more serious face than usual, our coach left the gym 
with the mysterious words: ‘Now go home and watch the news’. Confused by this apparent politicisation 
of our sports coach, I headed out to the car where my Mum told me what had happened that day. The ride 
home was full of uncertainty, questions, confusion and intrigue. Opening the front door, I could hear the 
TV was on, and my Dad’s eyes were glued to it. 
 
For the next weeks and months this event took over our school. It was, like for so many teachers around the 
world, a ‘teachable moment’ (Hess & Stoddard, 2011, p. 175). We talked about it in class, we held a vigil 
in our school chapel, and the art students memorialised the attacks in paint. These paintings hung in the 
school chapel in September 2002, when we commemorated the attacks one year on. That this event should 
be something to be tackled in school appeared the right thing to do. The world seemed to radically transform 
overnight, and it was vital that, as a school community, we came together to reflect upon it. As examined 
throughout this thesis, this idea that school classrooms and assembly halls should tackle the issues of 
terrorism and extremism has remained to this day.  
 
These weeks were not just full of quiet reflection, moments of silence, and classroom discussion, but of 
seismic shifts in political agendas too. The fresh and hopeful face of Tony Blair, elected to lead a New 
Labour government in a wave of optimism in 1997, was increasingly replaced by a more serious, statesman-
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like figure. Blair would, having already sent British troops to Kosovo, Iraq and Sierra Leone, support two 
controversial wars, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. For Blair, the question was not one of quiet 
reflection, but of urgent need for justice, and the need to point the finger of blame. Speaking at the Labour 
party conference, less than a month after the attacks, Blair said: 
  
It was the events of September 11 that marked a turning point in history, where we confront the 
dangers of the future and assess the choices facing humankind. It was a tragedy. An act of evil… 
Be in no doubt: Bin Laden and his people organised this atrocity. The Taliban aid and abet him. He 
will not desist from further acts of terror. They will not stop helping him. (Blair, Oct. 2, 2001) 
  
Here, Blair sets out quite clearly the threat facing the world. He isolates the threatening group: ‘Bin Laden 
and his people’. This focus on Bin Laden catalysed Operation Enduring Freedom, the invasion of 
Afghanistan, overthrowing the Taliban and driving Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to retreat towards the 
mountains along the Pakistan border. Yet, as the Global War on Terror continued, and as Britain itself was 
attacked in 2005, this focus on Bin Laden and on foreign threats took a noticeable back seat. In a speech 
after the attacks in London in July 2005, Blair suggests that the threat this time is different. This time the 
threat is a set of ideas: 
  
The greatest danger is that we fail to face up to the nature of the threat we are dealing with… What 
we are confronting here is an evil ideology… It is a global struggle and it is a battle of ideas, hearts 
and minds. (Blair, Jul. 16, 2005) 
 
It is this shift to a focus on ideologies, hearts, and minds that presents the focus of examination within this 
thesis. The promotion of a moderate ideology to protect those vulnerable to extremist ideologies presents a 
novel approach to countering political violence that has transformed Britain’s security approach over the 
past thirteen years. This thesis asks what the implications might be of a counter-extremism strategy that 
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seeks to place boundaries on the realms of permissible moderate opinion, and demands that schools play a 
key role in these boundaries’ curation. This introductory chapter seeks to locate the discussion of the thesis 
through exploring the issues and questions guiding the thesis, the approach taken, its location within 
existing literature, and the central findings. 
 
Countering Extremism in Schools 
While many sectors of social life have been impacted by various counter-extremism measures since 2001 
– from getting on a train, to visiting your doctor – the education sector has been particularly impacted. As 
it stands, Britain’s schools have an extraordinary level of responsibility and regulation regarding countering 
extremism and radicalization in schools. In 2015, what is known as the ‘Prevent Duty’ came into force; a 
statutory obligation for teachers and other education professionals to be trained in how to spot ‘signs of 
radicalisation’. The ‘Channel Programme’ offers an opportunity for those deemed ‘vulnerable’ to 
radicalisation to be ‘de-radicalised’, and monitored. Alongside this, teachers and schools must promote 
what are termed ‘fundamental British values’, while also developing critical thinking skills and teaching 
young people about the threats and dangers of extremism and terrorism. Already, reports from human rights 
organisations amongst others are revealing shocking (if not altogether unsurprising) results (e.g. Open 
Society Justice Initiative, 2016; JUST Yorkshire, 2017). Young Muslim students are far more likely to be 
considered ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation than any other students. In particular, the combination of political 
activism and Islamic identity appears a toxic cocktail ripe for the securitisation of a young person’s identity.  
 
This thesis begins with a desire to better understand the implications of such a counter-extremism strategy. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the growing body of literature offering critical approaches to the current 
counter-extremism in schools strategy (see Martin, 2018; Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Ford, 2017a; Miah, 
2017; O’Donnell, 2017; 2016; Arthur, 2015). O’Donnell (2016), for example, has explored the negative 
consequences of this securitisation of the classroom space under the Prevent duty. Miah (2017), amongst 
others, has built a solid critique around the promotion of fundamental British values and inclusion in the 
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context of the fallout from the ‘Trojan Horse Scandal’. The novel approach of this thesis entails not just 
examining each element of the strategy in isolation, but instead in combination. Adopting a holistic 
approach to the strategy seen as a whole, this thesis examines the wider questions as to the nature of 
extremism and counter-extremism engendered within the counter-extremism in schools strategy.  
 
Crucially, the counter-extremism in schools strategy is riddled with tension, antagonism and contradiction. 
Chapter two of the thesis builds a picture of the existing scholarship on extremism and radicalisation. Such 
subjective terms can be understood in myriad ways, and as such, differing understandings of extremism 
will lead to different pathways to counter such extremism. The counter-extremism in schools strategy 
operates as an embodiment of such a lack of coherence surrounding the very concept the strategy seeks to 
counter. The study isolates three educational components to the strategy, alongside the surveillance aspect 
of the Prevent duty, and argues that each component is contested and contradictory. They are contested in 
that they sit atop an unstable body of research, awash in assumption and lacking in evidence. They are 
contradictory in that each component seeks to achieve a competing outcome.  
 
The first component asks teachers to disseminate knowledge to students regarding the threat and dangers 
of extremism and radicalisation. How a teacher should do so, when the UK government itself cannot find 
a coherent, legally-useful definition of extremism (JCHR, 2016, p. 32) is a question educationalists must 
face. This thesis is located within the field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). As chapter four explains, 
CTS grew out of a frustration with more ‘orthodox’ terrorism studies, which were embedded within state-
centric practices that did not seek to challenge the scale of legitimated state violence in the context of the 
Global War on Terror of the new millennium (Gunning, 2007; Jackson 2007a). This thesis builds on the 
back of this body of literature, and wider literature that has critically deconstructed and undermined the 
very logics on which counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategies are based (e.g. Jackson 2005, 
2007; Kundnani, 2015; Ford, 2017a). It seeks to understand how teachers navigate their way through such 
boggy terrain, producing an understanding of extremism with which students can engage.  
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The second component demands schools promote Fundamental British values. Scholarship has to date 
profoundly critiqued these values, and particularly the impact that an ethnocentrically white understanding 
of what ‘British’ entails would have on ethnic minorities in schools (Keddie, 2014; Farrell, 2016; Maylor, 
2016; Miah, 2017). A key question to examine is how the strategy promotes a particular notion of 
Britishness to students. The third component explores the development of critical thinking skills. Studies 
have struggled to offer any positive correlation between an increase in education and a reduction in 
extremism (e.g. Krueger & Maleckova, 2003), and yet teaching critical thinking skills remains a core 
component of tackling the problem. Importantly, little scholarship has yet examined what is here termed 
‘the weaponization of critical thinking’, within the context of deploying critical thinking to counter 
extremism.  
 
As mentioned above, the thesis builds on this wide-ranging body of critical scholarship through exploring 
not just the contestation surrounding this strategy, but the contradiction. How can a teacher promote critical 
thinking alongside a fixed set of fundamental values? How can a teacher promote the value of tolerance 
and inclusion when scholars have clearly demonstrated that the body of knowledge surrounding extremism 
and radicalisation is divisive and securitises Muslim communities? The research project at the heart of this 
thesis examines these contradictions in the strategy, exploring how they emerge across a large set of 
teaching materials that have been produced to fulfil the strategy’s objectives. 
 
Research Question, Method and Approach 
This thesis is built around the following research question: 
 
How do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in the 
teaching materials designed to fulfil the strategy? 
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Teachers, educational charities, police forces and local councils around the country have produced dozens 
of materials for schools to help them fulfil their counter-extremism objectives. The materials offer rich data 
to examine how the counter-extremism strategy has, in quite a literal sense, materialised in the classroom. 
These resources offer narratives regarding historical instances of terrorism, label certain groups as meriting 
a critical thinking approach, and delineate between those groups who are dangerous and threatening, and 
those who are not. Through examining these PowerPoint presentations, worksheets and lesson plans, the 
study was able to capture a sense of the realms of extremism and counter-extremism envisioned within. 
 
The study adopts a deconstructionist, critical discourse theory approach, building on the work of Laclau 
and Mouffe (2001) in particular. Through examining text as a contributor to knowledge and discourse, the 
research seeks to examine the political realm that is envisioned within the texts used to teach students about 
extremism. The thesis explores each component in turn: the dissemination of knowledge regarding 
extremism, the promotion of fundamental British values, and the development of critical thinking skills. 
Through such an examination, how the extreme are defined, how the moderate are conceived, and how the 
two should relate to one another can be explored, and an image of the world conceived within counter-
extremism discourses can be constructed. 
 
In essence, the thesis compiles three concurrent discourse analyses, one examining each component of the 
strategy in turn. In so doing, a wider, more holistic picture of the machinations of the strategy can be 
developed. The thesis builds a picture of the ‘siege mentality’ that governs the counter-extremism strategy. 
The extremists are painted as a looming threat encircling the castle walls. Inside the castle, citizens are 
governed through narrow modes of permissible Britishness. Pluralism, though a value at the heart of 
democracy, is put on hold while the threat of the looming extremist is managed. Finally, like arrows shot 
from the battlements, critical thinking is weaponised into a tool of defence, defending the included inside 
the castle, from the excluded outside.  
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To achieve analytical depth in illustrating this analogous castle under siege, each discourse analysis draws 
on a wide range of social and political theories, reflecting on the wide range of scholarly and political issues 
that this study both draws from, and contributes to. When examining the construction of a universalised 
threat of extremism, the analysis draws from securitisation theory as well as Carol Winkler’s (2006) work 
on ideographs to explore the engendering exceptional politics. When discussing both the discourse 
surrounding tolerance as a British value, as well as exploring why Islamophobia is so heavily leant on as a 
realm in which to critically think, the broad field of critical race theory is investigated and utilised. 
Scholarship critical of liberal notions of tolerance and multiculturalism (e.g. Hage, 2000; Lorde, 2010; 
hooks 2014) is deployed to expose uncomfortable power dynamics between those already considered to be 
British and the diverse Other offered narrow modes of permitted Britishness in service to that original white 
British subjectivity. Theories of the post-racial (e.g. Sian, 2015) and New Racism (e.g. Saeed, 2007) offer 
valuable contributions to explore how emphasis placed on countering Islamophobia in one arena, serves to 
shield and perpetuate structural Islamophobia within the counter-extremism strategy itself. 
 
Lastly, in building its arguments, the thesis relies heavily on the work of Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe’s (2005) 
concept of the ‘post-political’ is emblematic of the problematic consensus that emerges around the virtues 
of liberal democracy within the resources. Mouffe offers stern warnings regarding the erosion of democratic 
debate around the virtues of liberal democratic mechanisms and offers, through her theory of agonism 
(Mouffe, 2005), a way forward. The thesis explores this theory to examine this dynamic at the heart of the 
counter-extremism strategy: a reliance on consensus: once everyone agrees with the moderate, there will 
be no more extremism. Mouffe’s theory reveals such an assumption to be doomed to fail. Not only can 
there never be a state in which everyone sits within the realm of the included moderate, but such an approach 
renders extremist violence more, not less, likely. Importantly, agonism, a theory predicated on transforming 
conventional exclusionary approaches to political differences into inclusive approaches, offers a way 
forward to reshape the problem of extremism.   
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Research orientation and social justice 
Mouffe’s theory of agonism thus offers an opportunity to develop a constructive alternative out of a 
deconstructive research project. Such an opportunity sits well with the research orientation and social justice 
approach adopted by the thesis, and of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) in particular. As well as offering 
methodological frameworks, and a substantial body of literature on which to construct a thesis, CTS entails 
an ethical approach centered on Critical Theory’s conceptualisation of ‘emancipation’, understood here to 
refer to the deployment of research in service to maximising human freedom and well-being (Jackson, 2007, 
p. 249). Within this broad notion of emancipation, CTS aims to deploy research as a contribution to social 
change and social justice. While key to this thesis, as well as to CTS more broadly, emancipation is 
evidently a diffuse and contested term. This thesis supplements an understanding of emancipation with an 
approach derived from Peace Studies to set out its ethical stance and emancipatory approach. 
 
The work of Peace Studies, and its understandings of peace and violence, can offer a conceptual 
contribution to the critical and emancipatory approach of CTS. As Lindahl (2017) notes, peace can be 
defined as more than just the cessation of hostilities and direct violence. Galtung (1969) delineated between 
positive and negative peace, the latter being the cessation of direct violence, the former being the cessation 
of structural violence too. Structural violence, according to Galtung, refers to the harm caused not directly 
by an actor, but harm caused that has no agentic actor or cause. Galtung’s example is that of starvation 
caused by poverty (ibid.). Engendering positive peace entails the removal of all forms of violence and 
bringing about what Galtung referred to as social justice - a key overlap with the emancipatory agenda of 
critical scholarship. 
 
As such, the emancipatory agenda of CTS can be framed as the rendering visible of multiple forms of 
violence. While this approach has brought about a significant body of work within CTS that has exposed 
the very many ways in which counter-terrorism practices have engendered injustices and human rights 
abuses, Jackson (2017) has also noted that CTS has yet to engage fully in a project of replacing such violent 
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approaches to counter terrorism with nonviolent alternatives. This thesis seeks in part to take this criticism 
forward, exploring approaches to extremism that can engender a more positive peace.  
 
Yet, more recent peace scholarship has however highlighted the dangers of imposing particular forms of 
peace onto a population (Cremin, 2016; Shinko, 2008). Imposing a peace can involve the violence of 
enforcing certain hegemonic structures and euro-centric ontologies (Gur-Ze’ev, 2001). As chapter eight 
examines, through the inclusion of the concept of agonistic peace (Shinko, 2008), this danger of an 
emancipatory approach is mitigated. Agonism seeks not to enforce a particular peace onto a population, but 
to value pluralism at the heart of any peaceful future. This thesis is emancipatory in that it seeks to highlight 
the ways in which British counter-extremism approaches may contribute to structural and direct violence, 
and seeks to promote ways in which a more emancipatory or human security-focused counter-extremism 
could occur.  
 
Outline of the Thesis 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two examines research that explores questions regarding the 
nature of extremism, and the importance of education in countering extremism. It explores the uncertainty 
and contestation in definitions of extremism, and raises questions regarding the nature of counter-
extremism. If, as many definitions do, ideology is placed at the heart of extremism, then must counter-
extremism itself be a counter-ideological project? How might this counter-ideology sit with other aspects 
to countering extremism, such as the promotion of democratic pluralism in the face of anti-democratic 
fundamentalism?  
 
Chapter three examines these debates and challenges at the level of school counter-extremism strategy. It 
isolates three core components to the strategy: developing skills of critical thinking, promoting fundamental 
British values, and disseminating knowledge regarding extremism, terrorism and more legitimate forms of 
political participation. The chapter argues that each is contested, in that scholarship has profoundly 
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challenged the assumptions on which the strategy rests, and contradictory in that the counter-extremism in 
schools strategy appears to want to achieve contradictory objectives. Noting these contestations and 
contradictions, this thesis sets out to examine the political and social world constructed within teaching 
materials designed to fulfil schools’ responsibilities regarding countering extremism. Through exploring 
teaching materials designed to introduce students to the problem of extremism, and to develop the skills 
and values required to build resilience to extremism, the conceptualisation of the realms of the ‘extreme’ 
and the ‘moderate’ can be examined. The thesis centres around the following investigative research 
question: How do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in 
the teaching materials designed to fulfil the strategy? 
 
Chapter four sets out the methodological and ontological approach taken within the thesis. The chapter 
builds a method of critical discourse analysis with which to tackle the corpus of teaching materials analysed 
in the thesis. The following three chapters aim to do just that. In so doing, they depict how this mode of 
countering extremism constructs moderate Britain as a metaphorical castle under siege, facing attack from 
extremism(s) threatening its walls. Such a depiction of the problem of extremism, it is argued, is not only 
a threat to the welfare of pluralist democracy, but produces a realm of insecurity for individuals caught in 
the web of being ‘extreme’.  
 
In chapter five, the nature of that extremist threat is explored. Through exploring the vast array of examples 
of extremism - from graffiti to genocide, from anti-abortion to anti-fracking - the chapter examines how the 
threat of extremism appears to come from all directions. In so doing, the threat of extremism is 
universalised; it is seen as a threat that comes from all angles. This then places the moderate in a defensive 
mindset. This produces a securitisation of the education system: a process of threat construction which 
engenders exceptional politics to manage such a problem (Abrahamsen, 2005). In so doing, counter-
extremism constructs a securitised politics in which certain values (and democracy in particular) must be 
suspended for their own protection. 
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Chapter six explores that which is threatened and vulnerable, namely, the moderate centre. It examines the 
discourse around each of the ‘fundamental British values’: democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, 
and tolerance and mutual respect. This chapter examines the modes of subjectivity that are permitted (or 
excluded) within the moderate centre, and the practices of power that work to shape those subjectivities in 
particular ways. Three such subjects emerge. Through exploring the fixed and narrow modes of permissible 
political participation based within incontestable bureaucratic mechanisms of liberal democracy, here the 
‘post-political subject’ emerges. Secondly, the ‘entrepreneurial subject’ is examined. Here, the discourse 
of individual liberty is critiqued, exploring the embeddedness of neoliberal modes of being within counter-
extremism. Lastly, the ‘racialised subject’ is explored. This explores the discourses of tolerance and mutual 
respect, exploring how two particular subjects emerge: an originary British subject, and a diverse, racialised 
Other which is challenging that subject. Such a depiction of tolerance and diversity thus serves to create 
particularly narrow channels through which diversity can be permitted, and a problematic power dynamic 
in which the diverse Other is placed in service to the originary British subject. 
 
Chapter seven examines how the skills of critical thinking have become ‘weaponised’ within counter-
extremism education. While students are encouraged to develop these skills of critical thought, these skills 
are always deployed ‘outwards’: critically examining the problems of extremism, but never turning those 
critical thinking skills back onto the self or the moderate. As such, this chapter strives to emphasise the 
problematic consequences of such mono-directional critical thinking, and in particular, the way it masks, 
and perpetuates, certain discriminatory practices at the heart of counter-extremism itself.  
 
This thesis argues that the political and social realm engendered in the counter-extremism discourses of 
teaching materials designed for students to learn how to counter extremism is a violent, defensive, and 
securitised realm. It is one that is designed with a protective, defensive mode of thinking at its core. The 
consequences of such defensive thinking are grave. For those within the narrow walls of the moderate 
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castle, governmentalities function to limit modes of political expression and being; ironically, such 
governmentalities serve to undermine the very values which are being defended. For those outside the walls, 
the violence of this exclusionary strategy engenders a space of profound insecurity.  
 
While education has been deployed as a tool of defence, this thesis posits that, in fact, an educational 
approach to extremism could be quite different. Chapter nine contextualises this siege mentality through 
exploring the need for counter-extremism to achieve consensus: once everyone agrees with the moderate 
centre, there will be no extremism. Through exploring agonism as a theory of pluralist democracy which 
challenges such consensus-based logic, an alternative mode of deploying education in the context of 
extremism – encountering extremism – can be constructed.  
 
As such, this thesis presents a profound critique of contemporary framings of the problem of extremism. It 
problematizes the reification of ideology in understanding why non-state political violence emerges, and 
asks searching questions of the centrality of consensus to understanding the world desired after extremism 







 The ideological emphasis of counter-extremism 
 
‘extremism is a lot to do with having views which doesn’t [sic] actually represent the majority of society’  
 
‘extremism to me is where you have a belief, either a political belief or a religious belief, in a cause, 
which consumes you to the point where all you think about is a mission to change your world or society 
for your beliefs even to the point of using violence’  
 
‘extremism for me is when somebody goes too far, because of something that they believe in’ 
 
‘I believe extremism is an intolerant belief that affects other people, or harms them in some kind of 
negative way’ 
 
(The Respect Programme, Sept. 11, 2018) 
 
What is extremism? That is the question to which the above individuals responded, and it is one with no 
easy answer. It is a term that seems to mean different things to different people. After all, it is a subjective 
term - what might seem ‘extreme’ to one person might seem perfectly normal to another. Extremism, also, 
appears more than simply taking things to extremes. No government has yet developed a policy against 
extreme sports, or extreme ironing, though they do have policies for extreme weather and extreme poverty. 
Extremism, then, perhaps refers to beliefs taken to extremes. But are they always a bad thing? Is not the 
liberty to hold onto unusual, fundamentalist, or unpopular ideas and beliefs a fundamental human right? 
Alternatively, does extremism imply acting on those beliefs and harming others? But what then might 
distinguish extremism from violent extremism? 
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Despite these profoundly challenging questions, countering extremism and countering violent extremism 
(CVE) in particular, are emphasised around the globe as vital priorities for governments to tackle. Kundnani 
and Hayes (2018, p. 2) identify CVE policies ‘from Finland to the Philippines’. In 2015, the UN Secretary 
General introduced a ‘Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism’ (UN General Assembly, 2015), which 
included encouraging member states to incorporate educational strategies within national prevention 
policies (UNESCO, 2017). Britain sets itself apart from other states however, in developing a strategy that 
counters not only violent extremism, but extremism more broadly, defined in the Prevent strategy as 
‘opposition to fundamental British values’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 107). The definition of extremism 
as a set of values - beliefs rather than actions - radically transforms the nature of work to counter such an 
apparent threat. What happens for instance, when a state mandates the ‘normal’ from which extreme views 
should be measured?  
 
It is from this departure point that the investigation of this thesis begins. This chapter starts by asking two 
foundational questions: how is counter-extremism defined, and why is education seen to be a legitimate 
venue in which counter-extremism should take place?  
 
The chapter notes the lack of a comprehensive definition of counter-extremism within academic literature, 
and explores how extremism and radicalisation are defined in governmental and academic literatures, in 
order to define their opposites, counter-extremism and counter-radicalisation. As such, the chapter argues 
that counter-extremism has three intentions: the promotion of hegemonic values; a promotion of pluralism 
in the face of fundamentalism; and the promotion of non-violent methods of political engagement. The 
chapter notes the immediate antagonisms within these definitions of counter-extremism, and in particular, 
the tension between promoting consensus around moderate values, and promoting pluralism. Furthermore, 
through examining both how central the concept of ideology is to understandings of radicalisation, and the 
discursive linkage between ideology and violence, the chapter examines how diverse ideas are constructed 
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as being threatening. Moreover, the chapter notes how narratives of vulnerability to radicalisation transform 
young people and Muslims in particular into ‘risky subjects’.  
 
Lastly, the chapter examines the problematic relationship between extremism and education. While 
education is presented as a panacea to extremism, no correlation between a lack of education and extremism 
exists. Moreover, through painting a picture in which education prevents extremism, young people are 
problematically conceptualised as both helpless victims of threatening propaganda requiring an education 
that will ‘safeguard’ them, and as threatening idealists ready to resort to violence to change their world. 
 
Overall, the chapter presents a critique of the emphasis made within countering extremism on limiting the 
realm of permissible ideas, suggesting that such a counter-ideological understanding of counter-extremism 
appears to sit at odds with core tenets of education and liberalism, such as the freedom of ideas. The chapter 
exposes the need to critically examine the foundational contradictions and paradoxes at the heart of current 
conceptualisations of counter-extremism education, and how such core antagonisms translate into the 
teaching delivered to students. Through presenting the notion of a counter-extremist educational strategy 
as contested and problematic, the chapter provides the conceptual groundwork from which a critique of the 
UK’s current counter-extremism in schools strategy can begin. 
 
Defining Extremism to Define Counter-Extremism 
The exploration begins by attempting to define counter-extremism. Aside from the tautological response 
that counter-extremism counters extremism, there are three core concepts that must be distinguished from 
one another: counter-extremism, countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism 
(PVE).  
 
Differentiating CVE and PVE tends to be achieved through distinguishing between responding to 
immediate threats of violent extremism, and from developing societies in which violent extremism is less 
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likely to arise. As the UNESCO report Youth Waging Peace suggests, ‘The CVE measures that institutions 
or governments undertake respond to specific threats, violent actors or organisations, and known quantities. 
Conversely, PVE is concerned with changing the course of events to prevent the violent actor from 
emerging in the first place’ (Nash & Nesterova, 2017, p. 45). The German civic education organisation, 
ufuq.de, makes a similar distinction: ‘Prevention is “education in democracy”. It is proactively directed at 
“completely normal” youths and young adults in schools and youth centers, for example, to make them 
resilient to ideologisation and radicalisation’ (ufuq.de, 2016, p. 17). Nordburch (2016), writing for the EU 
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), makes the distinction also between generic prevention (here 
focusing on developing citizenship skills and so on) and secondary prevention (deploying schools as 
locations for recognising early signs of radicalisation). CVE might also be considered a more overarching 
term, within which PVE plays a component part. Harris-Hogan et al. (2016), for instance, deploy a model 
translated from a public health context, and explore how CVE can be conceived of in three contexts: 
primary, secondary and tertiary. Such a trifurcation delineates between those strategies that physically 
intervene to stop acts of violent extremism (tertiary), those that target ‘at risk’ communities (secondary), 
and those strategies directed towards the general population (primary). CVE here encompasses everything 
from preventative citizenship education (PVE) through to counter-terrorism operations. 
 
CVE and PVE both frame the problem they wish to solve in terms of violent extremism. Kundnani and 
Hayes trace the emergence of the term ‘violent extremism’ back to 2005. This was a time when the US 
needed to respond to the failure of regime change as a central tactic within the Global War on Terror, and 
broadened its focus: ‘In doing so, the “shock and awe” that had failed in Iraq would be complemented by 
new programmes aimed at winning “hearts and minds”... the “battle of ideas” would be engaged alongside 
the battle for territory’ (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 4). Strategists therefore acknowledged that ideas and 
ideologies were as important in the war on terror as any other form of counter-terrorism. In so doing, certain 
conceptual issues were created that are yet to be ironed out. While ‘violent extremism’ acknowledges the 
ideological component to terrorist violence, how are scholars and policy-makers alike to distinguish 
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between terrorism and violent extremism? As Kundnani and Hayes lament, ‘Today, the terms 
“radicalisation”, “extremism” and “violent extremism” are bandied about with such frequency and abandon 
that they have become synonymous with terrorism itself, despite their quite different meanings, and the 
lack of clarity as to how these concepts relate to one another’ (2018, p. 2).  
 
UNESCO offers one solution to this dilemma, stating that ‘the conceptual core of violent extremism is that 
it is an ideologically motivated resort to the use of violence’ (2017, p. 19), while defining terrorism as ‘a 
particular strategy adopted to achieve a political goal, which is singularly the deliberate creation and 
exploitation of fear’ (ibid.). The organisation attempts to cement its distinction: ‘While terrorism is a form 
of violent extremism, and terrorism is also often motivated ideologically, the conceptual underpinning of 
terrorism that distinguishes it from violent extremism is the creation of fear or terror as a means to an end’ 
(ibid.). As such, UNESCO suggest that terrorism is one tool in a toolkit available to violent extremists that 
might perhaps include non-terroristic tactics too, though it is hard to think of many forms of ‘ideologically-
motivated violence’ that exclude the use or exploitation of fear. Nor does this definition escape from a 
problem, as explored blow, that scholars remain unsure about what relationship there might be between 
ideology and violence, or if there is even one at all. 
 
Definitions of violent extremism are far from stable. Harris-Hogan et al. concede: ‘many CVE approaches 
cannot define the specifics of what they are preventing, let alone how or whether they have prevented it’ 
(Harris-Hogan et al., 2016, p. 6). The challenge becomes even more complex when, as in the British case, 
it is not just violent extremism, but extremism more broadly that is being countered. When you take away 
the violence of violent extremism, what is left? As the JCHR concluded in a recent evaluation of Britain’s 
counter-extremism strategy: ‘it is far from clear that there is an accepted definition of what constitutes 
extremism, let alone what legal powers there should be, if any, to combat it’ (JCHR, 2016, p. 4). To 
understand what countering extremism might entail, one first must examine the nature of extremism itself.  
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That one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter might be clichéd. Yet, such an adage clarifies the 
central contestation surrounding extremism: extremism refers to attitudes or actions that appear at a distance 
from one’s own (UNESCO, 2017, p. 19) and, as such, the term is definitively subjective. The parallels to 
Sageman’s remarks on terrorism are pertinent: ‘of course, most people know what they mean by terrorism, 
but it is a little like obscenity: people believe they know it when they see it, but cannot define it’ (Sageman, 
2008, p. 15). Sara Khan, the UK’s Lead Commissioner for Countering Extremism made a similar argument: 
‘People know extremism when they see it – and they want it to stop’ (Khan, Sept. 12, 2018). The challenge 
of building a strategy as a nation-state to counter such a subjective concept is immense indeed, as it requires 
negotiating a hegemonic position at the centre of the compass from which the extremes will be measured.  
 
Definitions of extremism are, however, more nuanced than this singular definition. Three understandings 
of extremism dominate the literature: one that focuses on non-hegemonic values, another on absolutism, 
and a third on violence (Ford, 2017a; forthcoming). While these three definitions or interpretations of 
extremism can be isolated from one another, in practice, these definitions are often deployed in conjunction 
with one another. For example, Schmid deploys all three definitions of extremism when trying to distinguish 
extremism from radicalism: ‘While both stand at some distance from mainstream political thinking, the first 
[radicalism] tends to be open-minded, while the second [extremism] manifests a closed mind and a distinct 
willingness to use violence against civilians’ (Schmid, 2013, p. iv). Interestingly, when one then attempts 
to build a foundational definition of counter-extremism from such understandings of extremism, a number 
of challenges and antagonisms emerge, as each definition seeks to achieve diverging goals. 
 
The first definition of extremism labels the attitudes or behaviours of extremists as ‘deviations from the 
norm’ (Borum, 2011a, p. 9). Lake describes extremism in terms of a bell curve: ‘extremists hold political 
preferences that, in any distribution of opinion, lie in one of the “tails”’ (Lake, 2002, p. 18). Bartlett and 
Miller suggest that extremism ‘expresses significant dissent from prevailing norms,’ adding, interestingly, 
‘It is not necessarily a bad thing’ (Bartlett & Miller, 2010, p. 21). Backes examines how ‘the idea of the 
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political extreme is rooted in the ancient Greek ethics of moderation’ (Backes, 2010, p. 175). In my own 
research, I argue that ‘such an understanding of extremism cements hegemonic liberal attitudes at the centre 
of understandings of what constitute legitimate attitudes’ (Ford, 2017b, p. 128). Or, as Kundnani puts it, 
‘Extremism is a term peculiarly amenable to naturalising the status quo’ (2015, p. 68). Extremism, in this 
first iteration, thus comprises those values beyond a boundary of hegemonic attitudes. Stray too far from 
the moderate centre and you become extreme. Some authors are concerned that this definition of extremism 
is in danger of becoming so broad as to include all alternative political visions outside of liberal democratic 
norms as threatening (Ford, Jul. 26, 2017; W. Jackson, 2012).  
 
The distinction between the extreme and the moderate is developed through the deployment of the term 
‘ideology’. Indeed, as William Jackson notes, the fight between liberalism and extremism has been depicted 
as one between liberal values and extremist ideology (W. Jackson, 2012). This is particularly the case when 
one examines understandings of extremism as deployed by the UK government.  As the then Prime Minister 
David Cameron said in 2015, ‘It begins – it must begin – by understanding the threat we face and why we 
face it. What we are fighting, in Islamist extremism, is an ideology. It is an extreme doctrine’ (Cameron, 
Jul. 20, 2015). Moreover, eight years earlier, when he was Prime Minister, Tony Blair wrote in an article 
entitled A Battle for Global Values, ‘We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we did not. 
We chose values… we knew that you cannot defeat a fanatical ideology just by imprisoning or killing its 
leaders; you have to defeat its ideas’ (Blair, 2007, p. 79). As the previous chapter examined, the 2011 review 
of the Prevent strategy set out the core definition of extremism as the antithesis of ‘fundamental British 
values’ (HM Government, 2011a). While extremists are governed by ideology, liberalism denotes a set of 
values. Radicalisation, explored in depth later, is the process of becoming drawn towards the extreme 
ideology, and losing faith in liberal values. As Lindekilde argues: ‘if spelled out, modern conceptions of 
radicalisation typically refer to core Western liberal values as the benchmark of radicalisation’ (Lindekilde, 
2016, p. 249; see also Elshimi, 2015).  
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Turning this definition of extremism on its head, one can begin to uncover what a counter-extremism 
strategy might entail: the promotion of the hegemonic moderate values, and the policing of the borders 
between the moderate and the extreme. Such an idea of counter-extremism seems to antagonise the 
centrality of pluralism to ‘moderate’ values, and challenges the open-mindedness that characterises the 
moderate in contrast to the fundamentalist extremist. 
 
The second definition of extremism argues that extremism relates not to the values themselves but, 
somewhat synonymously to a definition of fundamentalism, to the way one holds onto those values. An 
extremist is absolutist or fundamentalist, whereas a more moderate voice is open to new ideas (Davies, 
2008). Interestingly, in adopting this understanding of extremism, Davies dismisses the first iteration of 
counter-extremism, the promotion of moderate values: ‘The answer to extremism is not moderation, but 
highly critical and informed idealism’ (Davies, 2016, p. 16). In a debate on extremism, Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu argued, ‘extremism is when I think you do not allow for a different point of view, and when 
you hold your view as being quite exclusive, when you don’t allow for the possibility of difference’ (Tutu, 
2006, cited in Davies, 2008, p. 4). Robert Kennedy wrote: ‘What is objectionable, what is dangerous, about 
extremists is not that they are extreme, but that they are intolerant. The evil is not what they say about their 
cause, but what they say about their opponents’ (Kennedy, 1965, pp. 68-69). Davies mirrors this argument, 
describing extremism as an ‘uncritical acceptance of single truths’ (Davies, 2008, p. 2). Moreover, Liht et 
al. contrast liberal value-pluralism with the extremist value-monism (Liht, Savage & Williams, 2013). 
Lastly, the head of MI5, the UK’s intelligence service argued in a speech: ‘The ideology underlying Al 
Qaida and other violent groups is extreme. It does not accept the legitimacy of other viewpoints. It is 
intolerant, and it believes in a form of government which is explicitly anti-democratic’ (Evans, Nov. 5, 
2007).  
 
Yet, whether such ‘moderates’ are in fact open-minded is questionable. For example, Aly and Green note 
that ‘moderate Islam’ entails ‘a preferred form of Islamic practice that does not challenge the hegemony of 
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the nation state’ (Aly & Green, 2008, p. 1), suggesting a more closed and uncritical mind than an open one. 
Furthermore, it is evident that this moderate pluralism does not extend to a toleration of the extremes. How 
should this definition of extremism sit with the one above which is characterised through a policing of the 
borders of that which is permissible?  
 
Lastly, the third definition views extremism as concerning political violence. As Kundnani and Hayes 
(2018) make clear, extremism is often deployed as a synonym of terrorism. Oftentimes, in the contemporary 
context of the threat posed by organisations such as so-called Islamic state, the ‘battle’ against extremism 
is illustrated as one between moderates and extremists. This is certainly the case in the context of so-called 
‘Islamic extremism’ being depicted as between moderate Islam and extremist Islam. As Rabasa describes, 
this binary presents ‘a spectrum that has, at one end, moderates who advocate democracy and tolerance and 
reject violence as a means to attain political goals and, at the other end, radicals who oppose democratic 
and pluralistic values and embrace violence’ (Rabasa, 2005, p. 2).  
 
These theories of extremism that equate extremism with violence do so because of a belief in the inherently 
violent and threatening nature of the ideas behind an extremist movement. David Cameron argued in a 
speech during his time as Prime Minister, when addressing the grievances of extremists:  
 
Now let me be clear, I am not saying these issues [grievances] aren’t important. But let’s not delude 
ourselves. We could deal with all these issues – and some people in our country and elsewhere 
would still be drawn to Islamist extremism. No – we must be clear. The root cause of the threat we 
face is the extremist ideology itself. (Cameron, Jul. 20. 2015) 
 
Cameron here indicates that even if all grievances were addressed, the ideology of Islamist extremism 
would remain a threat. The ideology itself threatens. 
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Such an argument - that extremists are inherently violent and threatening - ignores a large volume of work 
on political violence. Selma Gregg, for instance, delineates three groups of theories behind what she terms 
religious violence: social movement theory, fundamentalism and apocalyptic war (Selma Gregg, 2016). 
Social movement theorists focus on inter-group dynamics as a catalyst of violence, not ideology. Della 
Porta, for example, explores the impact of group dynamics on violence amongst left wing militant 
organisations in Europe in the 1960s (Della Porta, 1992). Sageman’s network-oriented approach also 
emphasises interpersonal relationships in exploring how violence becomes more legitimised within 
extremist groups (Sageman, 2004; 2008). Fundamentalists, Selma Gregg argues, perceive their faith or way 
of life to be at risk, and deploy violence instrumentally (Selma Gregg, 2016). Research by Neumayer and 
Plumper (2011) and by McCormick (2003) contributes to this idea, examining rational and strategic 
explanations behind the use of non-state violence respectively, both of which conceptualise violence as a 
means not as an end. It is only the third category of apocalyptic warriors who attempt to express violence 
as an end in itself (Selma Gregg, 2016). As such, arguing that extremists pose an inherently violent threat 
appears narrow-minded in ignoring other explanations.  
 
The inherent violence of extremism is furthermore embedded through the conceptual distinction between 
violent and non-violent extremism, the former concerning ideologically-motivated violent behaviour, and 
the latter, a set of ideas which do not in themselves threaten violence. There is substantial debate regarding 
whether non-violent extremism is benign or threatening. Some scholars argue that non-violent extremism 
is not always problematic (Bartlett & Miller, 2012), while others, including Lowe (2017), and indeed the 
current UK government (HM Government, 2011a), suggest that non-violent extremism is very problematic 
indeed due to the role non-violent extremism plays in inciting violence in others. 
 
The argument that non-violent extremism is threatening relies on a conviction in the role non-violent 
extremists play in inciting others to engage in violence. This understanding of 'non-violent extremism' was 
particularly emphasised in the 2011 review of the Prevent strategy, in which the policy to work with non-
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violent extremist organisations was overturned (HM Government, 2011a). Earlier iterations of the Prevent 
strategy saw non-violent extremist groups in terms which Schmid characterises as a ‘firewall’ (Schmid, 
2014, p. 2) against extremism – that by supporting groups that might disagree with hegemonic attitudes or 
ideologies but who do so through non-violent means would disincentivise those who might be considering 
joining violent organisations.  
 
The decision to refuse to work with non-violent extremist organisations was heavily influenced by the 
report, Choosing our friends wisely, written by the centre-right think tank Policy Exchange, which 
challenged the ‘firewall’ argument, arguing that non-violent extremists play a key role in radicalising others 
towards violence (Maher & Frampton, 2009). The 2011 Prevent strategy notes ‘the way in which some 
terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused by apparently non-violent 
organisations very often operating within the law’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 50). The notion of a non-
violent ideological support network on which violent extremists rely builds on scholarship within the 
extremism and radicalisation literature. Malthaner and Waldmann describe this support network as a 
‘radical milieu’ (2014, p. 979; see also Kundnani, 2012). Della Porta strengthens this idea of a support 
network, noting how ‘future terrorists can be described as small minorities within larger political 
subcultures or countercultures’ (Della Porta, 1992, p. 12). Such an assertion presents a crucial conceptual 
shift. Non-violent extremism therefore does not refer to groups who hold onto extreme views but who reject 
violence. Instead, it refers to groups who do not actively engage in violence themselves.  
 
Yet, when it comes to countering non-violent extremism, such a definition provokes further questions and 
uncertainty. For one, it seems to suggest that any ‘extreme’ idea (and here one could refer back to the UK 
Government’s definition of any idea that challenges ‘fundamental British values’), threatens violence, 
because someone at some point could deploy violence to further that idea. Suggesting that diverse values 
might therefore threaten potential violence seems to promote a crackdown on the diversity of ideas in the 
name of security. Such tensions between countering extremism and democracy are noted more widely 
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within the literature. Neumann notes the logic that ‘democracy is fragile, and that it needs to be defended 
long before its enemies break laws or resort to violence’ (Neumann, 2013, p. 887). There is a clear 
antagonism here, acknowledged by the Prevent strategy, between the democratic values and freedoms 
celebrated by the UK, and its desire to tackle radicalisation at as early a stage as possible: ‘We remain 
absolutely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But preventing terrorism will mean 
challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology’ (HM Government, 
2011a, p. 23). 
 
Acknowledging this confusion, Lowe has suggested making a distinction between ‘non-violent extremism 
and not-violent activism’ (2017, p. 923). Here, Lowe attempts to divorce the baggage of the term extremism 
from the alternative political ideals of activists. In so doing, Lowe reasserts his conviction in the threat of 
non-violent extremism: ‘justifying violence of extremist groups by glorifying their actions, promotes hatred 
and division, encourages isolation, offers alternative systems of law and rejects the democratic system’ 
(Lowe, 2017, p. 923). This distinction appears to suggest therefore that while activism that might wish to 
make more incremental change is permissible, more radical change should be seen as a threat. 
 
Non-violent extremism, a set of ideas that could always possibly be taken up by violent actors, thus presents 
a perpetual future risk of violence. One wonders of course whether violent actors could not also take up 
non-extreme ideas, values or ideologies. Should any idea that could conceivably be promoted through 
political violence (neoliberal regime change, for instance) be considered a violent, or extreme, threat? It is 
important to note that the legitimacy of violence is itself not an extreme idea. Nation states have militaries, 
and engage in acts of violence - often to counter the violence of extremists. This very fact presents one 
challenge to understanding what counter-extremism should entail. If extremists are violent, then countering 
extremism would entail promoting nonviolence. Yet, nonviolence itself is not in fact a moderate value. As 
I have argued elsewhere, nonviolence, and in particular pacifism, are in fact extreme ideas themselves, due 
to their rejection of the legitimacy of state violence (Ford, forthcoming). 
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This definition of non-violent extremism as providing the supporting foundations for violent extremism has 
faced criticism from scholars too. Schmid (2014) notes the confusion, suggesting that if extremism is 
inherently violent, then non-violent extremism is a contradiction in terms (see also Richards, 2015). 
Furthermore, if extremism equates to the holding of violent-legitimising attitudes, counter-extremism must 
go right to the core of the ideology. Richards (2015) challenges this, arguing that getting an extremist to no 
longer see the legitimacy in employing violence is a far easier task than getting an extremist to no longer 
hold onto their particular ideology or set of values. Furthermore, the distinction between non-violent 
extremism and violent extremism, when applied to real world examples, is rarely clear or distinct. Baran’s 
description of Hizb ut-Tahrir, described by Baran as ‘Sunni Islamism’s ideological vanguard’ (2005, p. 68), 
is a case in point. Baran argues Hizb ut-Tahrir ‘occupies a grey zone of militancy, with its activities 
involving more than mere expression of opinion but less than terrorism, regulating its activities poses a 
unique challenge to liberal democracies’ (2005, p. 70).  
 
Thus far, this section of the chapter has delineated three core groups of definitions within the literature on 
extremism: one that emphasises non-hegemonic values, a second that emphasises absolutism, and a third 
that emphasises violence.  While these understandings of extremism are widely disseminated across society, 
they provide a profound challenge for conceptualising counter-extremism. I would argue that in fact, 
countering the three separate components of extremism would entail a contradictory and antagonistic 






The first definition (promoting hegemonic values) builds discursive fences at the boundaries of legitimate 
opinion, which appears to endanger the open-mindedness of liberalism, as extreme ideas themselves cannot 
be tolerated. This open-mindedness is also questioned, particularly if one wanted to bring into question the 
hegemony of liberal democratic norms. Moreover, the emphasis of violence within extremism would 
suggest counter-extremism should promote nonviolence, yet the legitimacy of violence is something that 
appears to be shared by moderates and extremists alike. Counter-extremism appears torn between 
fundamentally contrasting objectives.  
 
The following section examining scholarship on the specific issue of radicalisation explores how theories 
of radicalisation compound this uncertain link between extremist thought and violence. As will be explored 
below, the emphasis in radicalisation literature on the 'process' of radicalisation intensifies this securitisation 
27 
of diverse belief, as extremist attitudes appear to signify a distinct threat of future violence. Moreover, the 
impact that narratives of radicalisation have on Muslim communities in particular raises questions of how 
counter-radicalisation education might impact different communities in different ways.  
 
Stages of Radicalisation 
In the aftermath of the attacks in the US in September 2001, explanations for why terrorists commit their 
atrocities were relatively few and far between. Some theorists even worried that seeking explanations for 
terrorism was synonymous with seeking justifications for the attacks (Neumann, 2008; see also HM 
Government, 2006, p. 10). Dutch Intelligence agents were the first to develop a theory of radicalisation as 
early as 2002 (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 5). In a UK context, the term ‘radicalisation’ emerged in 
particular after the 2005 bombings in London, offering theorists an opportunity to explore the explanation 
of terrorist attacks in a language devoid of any risk of justification (Sedgwick, 2010). Radicalisation 
theorists conceptualise radicalisation as the process by which someone becomes more extreme (e.g. 
Sieckelinck, Sikkens, van San, Kotnis & de Winter, 2017; Borum, 2011a). However, beyond such a simple 
position of consensus on the idea of process, there is little agreement as to what radicalisation entails. 
Schmid lists thirteen definitions of radicalisation, each different from the next (Schmid, 2013); Baker-Beall 
et al. argue radicalisation ‘can be identified as an “essentially contested concept” in the sense that the term 
generates such debate about its actual meaning that no objective or neutral definition is possible’ (Baker-
Beall, Heath-Kelly & Jarvis, 2015, p. 6). Hoskins and O’Loughlin even go so far as to dismiss radicalisation 
as a ‘myth’ (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2009).  
 
In brief, scholars have typically drawn the process of radicalisation into various shapes or models: 
Moghaddam (2005) speaks of a staircase; Leuprecht et al. (2010), and McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) 
write about pyramids; Baran (2005) employs the metaphor of a conveyor belt; and Borum (2011a) talks of 
‘action pathways’. Such models have certain homogeneous features – in particular, there is linearity to the 
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process, and there is a reduction in population size as one goes 'along' the process (this is particularly clear 
when the model is illustrated as a pyramid, with the 'terrorist' population at its apex).1  
 
The location of violence in the radicalisation process is contested, contributing to the wider debate about 
the role of violence in conceptualisations of extremism. For example, Sedgwick claims, ‘“Radicalisation” 
is at present the standard term used to describe “what goes on before the bomb goes off”’ (Sedgwick, 2010, 
p. 479). Sedgwick, therefore, infers that violence – in this case, a bomb explosion – is a necessary 
component of radicalisation (see also Della Porta & LaFree, 2012). Yet, Borum contrarily defines 
radicalisation as ‘the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs’ (Borum, 2011a, p. 9). Cragin 
acknowledges this complexity thus: 
 
Most experts understand radicalisation as a process through which individuals become persuaded 
that violent activity is justified and eventually determine to engage in violence themselves. 
Radicalisation, in this sense, encompasses both mindset and action. (2014, p. 338) 
 
To address this question of ideology or action, some scholars argue there are different stages or types of 
radicalisation. Neumann (2013) offers perhaps the clearest description of these stages of radicalisation, 
dividing radicalisation into two processes: cognitive radicalisation – the adoption of extremist beliefs; and 
behavioural radicalisation – the adoption of violent extremist behaviour, to bring such beliefs into reality. 
Moreover, Neumann argues that cognitive radicalisation is a necessary component of behavioural 
radicalisation. Borum (2011a) dismisses this claim arguing that many terrorists are not as ideologically (and 
here Borum infers theologically) literate as theories of cognitive radicalisation would imply. Moreover, 
Sageman's social network approach to radicalisation leads him to argue that ‘social bonds came before any 
                                               
1 Theories of radicalisation are certainly numerous. Christmann’s (2012) report for the Youth Justice Board cited the 
above studies along with six further studies: four that discuss radicalisation processes (Sageman, 2007; Silber & 
Bhatt, 2007; Taarnby, 2005; Wiktorowicz, 2004), one that discusses a pyramid (Audit Commission, 2008), and one 
that characterises radicalisation as a multi-dimensional process (Gill, 2007).  
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ideological commitment’ (Sageman, 2008, p. 70), rather than the other way around. Despite this opposition 
however, the majority of the academic and practitioner community adopt Neumann’s perspective (e.g. 
Bartlett & Miller, 2010), drawing a two-stage process: an ideological or belief radicalisation occurring as a 
prior and necessary component of a secondary radicalisation to violent extremism. As the 2006 UK 
Countering International Terrorism strategy notes: ‘It is important to see this as a two stage process. An 
alienated individual who has become highly radicalised is not necessarily a terrorist. Only a tiny minority 
of radicalised individuals actually cross over to become terrorists’ (HM Government, 2006, p. 10).  
 
A question remains however as to what ‘cognitive radicalisation’ might entail. Cragin, cited above, 
describes it as being ‘persuaded that violent activity is justified’ (2014, p. 338). Yet, a key tension is evident 
here, namely, that in common speak, one would not describe a belief in the legitimacy of state military 
violence (the just war theory, for example) as evidence of radicalisation. Radicalisation therefore appears 
to be a theory isolated to the realm of non-state violence. Could radicalisation be better characterised as a 
shifting away from a ‘moderate’ understanding of the legitimacy of state violence and the illegitimacy of 
all other violence? However, here a tension emerges in that counter-radicalisation, rather than being a 
process of promoting nonviolence, instead appears to be little more than a claim for hegemony on whose 
violence is permissible. Yet, to add further confusion, in the 2018 review of Britain’s counter-terrorism 
strategy, extremist behaviour is characterised as more than just acts of violence, but ‘the wider social harms 
beyond terrorism caused by extremism. This includes tackling the promotion of hatred, the erosion of 
women’s rights, the spread of intolerance, and the isolation of communities’ (HM Government, 2018, p. 
23). It is unclear as to whether one must be ‘radicalised’ in order to promote such ‘extreme’ behaviours, as 
radicalisation literatures appear far more focussed on terrorism and violence, than these broader forms of 
extremism (Christmann, 2012).    
 
What is more certain is that the result of this delineation of two radicalisation processes, and the perception 
of a requisite a priori ideological component in committing acts of violence, is a reification of the centrality 
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of ideology in the context of radicalisation. The head of MI5, the UK’s intelligence service, Jonathan Evans 
argued: ‘The violence directed against us is the product of a much wider extremist ideology, whose basic 
tenets are inimical to the tolerance and liberty which form the basis of our democracy’ (Evans, Nov. 5, 
2007). Ideology, and its sister construct, narrative, are core components of understanding the threat of 
radicalisation. This extremist narrative is depicted as manipulative, persuasive and attractive. Bartlett and 
Miller describe the ‘vitriolic and engaging narrative based on the notion of Muslims under attack all around 
the world from evil, scheming Western interests’ (Bartlett & Miller, 2012, p. 13). Schmid isolates three 
core elements of extremist narrative: a ‘basic grievance’, ‘vision of the good society,’ and a ‘path from the 
grievance to the realisation of the vision’ (Schmid, 2014, p. 6). Moreover, the ideological emphasis provides 
a key tie between education and extremism.  Schmid, for instance, notes how the narrative is learned by 
extremists: ‘The narrative incorporates pre-existing elements of 20th century anti-Semitism and anti-
Americanism, which have been nurtured by official educational materials prepared by some Arab 
governments, Soviet Cold War propaganda, anti-Western sermons by Muslim clerics…’ (Schmid, 2014, p. 
7). This ideological focus has a profound impact on the construction of an educational counter-extremism 
strategy, as Davies argues: ‘If one learns to be a terrorist, one can unlearn it’ (Davies, 2008, p. 54). 
 
This reliance on the importance of ideology in violent extremism and radicalisation persists however, 
despite the lack of evidence to support the theory. The following quotation from Sageman’s work is 
fascinating here, indicating both the reliance on ideological explanations and their lack of support: ‘There 
is no doubt that ideology, including global neo-jihadi ideology, is an important part of any explanation in 
the turn to political violence, but we still don't understand how’ (Sageman, 2014, p. 567). A number of 
scholars lament the endemic lack of empirical data to support theories behind radicalisation, including on 
the issue of ideology (Della Porta, 1992; Borum, 2011a, 2011b; Bouhana & Wikstrom, 2011; Schmid, 
2013). In particular, Briggs challenges the emphasis on so-called non-violent extremism, resulting from the 
linkage between ideology and violence: ‘There is no empirical evidence of a causal link between extremism 
and violent extremism’ (Briggs, 2010 p. 975). Schmid admits, ‘the popularity of the concept of 
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“radicalisation” stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of 
terrorism’ (Schmid, 2013, p. 1).  
 
Scholars have raised substantial concern as to what a counter-radicalisation process, born from such a 
conceptualisation of radicalisation, might look like. Describing radicalisation processes in such linear ways 
ensures that counter-radicalisation work engages ‘upstream’ in order to prevent radicalisation at the earliest 
stages possible (Briggs, 2010). This emphasis on reducing non-violent extremism as a tool to reduce the 
likelihood of later terrorist acts has been criticised for securitising and criminalising thoughts and ideas of 
those yet to break the law. Sedgwick likens attempting to counter extremism through promoting a more 
moderate ideology to countering anarchist terrorism at the turn of the 20th century by attacking socialism – 
an ideology shared by those who went on to found the UK Labour Party (Sedgwick, 2012). Richards adds 
his concerns: ‘The concern is that counterterrorism, rather than focussing on the threat from terrorism, has 
itself become increasingly ideological – that it has gone beyond the remit of countering terrorism and has 
ventured into the broader realm of tackling ideological threats to the state’ (Richards, 2015, p. 380). Stanley 
and Guru question this apparent level of ‘social conditioning’ (2015, p. 361). Edwards describes the Prevent 
strategy as ‘the progressive delegitimation of broad swathes of opinion and a decrease in the political 
pluralism of British society’ (Edwards, 2016, p. 305). Moreover, some authors voice concern that repressive 
measures against groups not breaking the law could isolate communities, and provoke further radicalisation 
as a result (Coppock & McGovern, 2014; Malthaner & Waldmann, 2014; Stevens, 2009). Such criticisms 
of radicalisation models compound a concern raised regarding definitions of extremism - that countering 
extremism and radicalisation appears ideological in its approach, and could endanger political pluralism. 
The dangers of this mode of countering radicalisation are further intensified when examining the 






Sageman argues that there are three broad approaches to studying terrorism and its perpetrators – a 
'biographical' focus at the micro level, searching for causes at the individual level, a more macro focus, 
examining root social and political causes, or (the focus Sageman advocates) ‘a middle way, concentrating 
on how people in groups influence each other to become terrorists’ (Sageman, 2008, p. 13; see also 
Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Ideologically-focused radicalisation thinking, dominant in a UK context, tends to 
assume that an ideology sits at the root of extremism and terrorism, and thus focuses on the micro level, 
examining causes and indicators of individual vulnerability to the radicalising ideology. As such, the 
strategy plays down the role of social and political factors (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 12).  
 
The Prevent strategy isolates three factors in radicalisation: an ideology, people to drive that ideology, and 
vulnerabilities or social factors that render someone able to take on that ideology (HM Government, 2011a). 
That young people are vulnerable to the manipulation and persuasion of extremist ideology is a common 
narrative of counter-extremism policy and scholarship. The Prevent strategy describes vulnerability as ‘the 
condition of being capable of being injured; difficult to defend; open to moral or ideological attack. Within 
Prevent, the word describes factors and characteristics associated with being susceptible to radicalisation’ 
(HM Government, 2011a, p. 108). Being young is a key factor or characteristic of this vulnerability. 
Sageman describes this as ‘The “ignorance” theory of terrorism (a variance of the “weak mind” theory) 
[which] is based on the idea that young people join because they do not know any better’ (Sageman, 2008, 
p. 58). Education, an obvious remedy to ignorance, would thus appear to be a vital counter-extremism tool. 
Moreover, educational institutions are vital spaces in which to identify signs that a young person may be 
undergoing a radicalisation process (Nordbruch, 2016). The emphasis on micro-level factors is most clear 
within the key document in building the UK’s counter-extremism education strategy, Learning to be Safe, 
which outlines that: 
 
The decision by a young person to become involved in violent extremism: 
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● May begin with a search for answers to questions about identity, faith and belonging 
● May be driven by the desire for “adventure” and excitement 
● May be driven by a desire to enhance the self esteem of the individual and promote their “street 
cred” 
● Is likely to involve identification with a charismatic individual and attraction to a group which can 
offer identity, social network and support 
● Is likely to be fuelled by a sense of grievance that can be triggered by personal experiences of 
racism or discrimination (DCSF, 2008, pp. 17-18). 
 
Interestingly, despite offering this large range of factors, the report later concedes: ‘there is no obvious 
profile of a person likely to become involved in extremism’ (DCSF, 2008, p. 19). This denial of a ‘terrorist 
profile’ and concurrent construction of such a profile is mirrored in both academic and policy literature. 
Borum, for instance, argues, ‘one size does not fit all’ (Borum, 2011a, p. 8), and later examines the 
multifarious factors that might indicate or model a process of radicalisation. Such a narrative is mirrored in 
school policy documents on extremism and radicalisation. For example, Wildern School, a secondary 
school in Hampshire in the south of England, have in their ‘Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation’ 
policy a list of ‘indicators of vulnerability to radicalisation or extremism’ which include ‘identity crisis… 
personal crisis… personal circumstances… unmet aspirations… experiences of criminality… special 
educational need’ before then clarifying: ‘However, this list is not exhaustive, nor does it mean that all 
young people experiencing the above are at risk of radicalisation for the purposes of violent extremism’ 
(P6, p. 2). The policy infers that at times such factors would indicate radicalisation, and at other times, it 
would not. This was mirrored in government policy above, cloaked in language of may or might.  
 
It remains unclear whether these ‘indicators’ are of any practical use at all. A foundational source for the 
various indicators mentioned is a classified study completed for the National Offenders Management 
Service, a study heavily criticised in a report by the human rights organisation, CAGE (Qureshi, 2016). The 
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study listed the ‘Extremist Risk Guidance 22+’, which includes a list of 22 indicators of vulnerability to 
radicalisation. Despite being a widely cited and influential piece of research, the lack of scientific credibility 
is deeply concerning: there was no peer review process, no replication studies have been completed, and 
the factor of ‘political grievance’ was ignored by the researchers (Qureshi, 2016).   
 
Despite this empirical uncertainty, indicator factors remain a key component of counter-radicalisation 
strategies. Scholars critical of this approach tend to focus on how such an indicator-based approach draws 
certain identity factors into the realm of ‘signs of radicalisation’. In the current political climate, many argue 
simply being Muslim makes you suspicious. That radicalisation and extremism policies impact negatively 
on Muslim communities is a dominant theme amongst critics of radicalisation (Ali, 2015; Choudhury & 
Fenwick, 2011; Jarvis & Lister, 2013; Lynch, 2013; McDonald, 2015; Mythen, Walklate & Khan, 2009). 
In particular, many scholars argue that such language transforms Muslim communities into ‘suspect 
communities’ (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Nickels, Thomas, Hickmann & Sylvestri, 2012; Pantazis & Pemberton, 
2009; Ragazzi, 2016). This is perhaps most clearly indicated in what appears to be a verbal slippage in 
Leuprecht et al.'s description of their four-tiered pyramid model of radicalisation, in which they describe 
the bottom 'neutral' layer of ‘Muslims who currently do not accept any of the Global Jihad narrative’ 
(Leuprecht et al., 2010, p. 43, emphasis added), inferring that the adoption of the narrative is forever a 
future possibility. In particular, the emphasis on ideology in searching out ‘root causes’, in Heath-Kelly’s 
words, ‘produces the British Muslim population as both “risky” and “at risk”’ (Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 405; 
see also Martin, 2018). The combination of a risky Muslim subject, with narratives of vulnerability, leads, 
as Coppock and McGovern argue, to ‘the construction of the “vulnerable young Muslim other” as “would-
be terrorist”’ (2014, p. 243). These problems are compounded by schools being at times already racist 
environments. As Miah argues: ‘stories about “us and them” drawn principally from the War on Terror 
have created a hostile cultural environment within the confines of the school… the pupils provided 
countless examples of anti-Muslim racism by teachers and fellow pupils’ (Miah, 2013, p. 156). Such subject 
constructions appear to endanger core notions of both democracy and liberal education. 
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Thus far, this chapter has established a definition of counter-extremism that emphasises a need to promote 
a set of values to counter the danger of a fundamentalist ideology that threatens violence. Moreover it has 
explored how theories of radicalisation, despite a profound lack of empirical evidence, compound this 
reification of the threat of ideology. As such, the chapter has begun to infer how education can offer a vital 
venue for counter-extremism – through promoting values and skills to counter the ideological threat of 
extremism. The chapter now moves on to explore facets of the extremism and radicalisation discourses that 
compound this educational emphasis. Through exploring the relationship between education and 
extremism, as well as the emphasis placed on both education and young people in the radicalisation 
discourse’s emphasis on catalytic factors of radicalisation and vulnerabilities to radicalisation, the chapter 
begins to build a picture of what a counter-extremist educational strategy might entail.  
 
Education and Extremism: Why Counter Extremism in Schools? 
That education should be the solution to extremism is something of a truism within the extremism discourse. 
For instance, only three months after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001, 
a group of Nobel Peace Prize winners gathered to discuss the problem of terrorism and its solutions; 
education was often top of their list. The Dalai Lama suggested this solution to violent extremism: ‘If the 
mind is more open, that will automatically bring less fear. Education can narrow the gap between 
appearances and reality’ (Jai, 2001, Dec. 10). Elie Wiesel, winner of the 1986 prize, added: ‘What is it that 
seduces some young people to terrorism? It simplifies things. The fanatic has no questions, only answers. 
Education is the way to eliminate terrorism’ (ibid.). As cited in chapter one, Ed Balls wrote in the 
introduction of the key UK counter-extremism in schools document, Learning to be Safe, ‘Extremists of all 
persuasions try to paint the world as black and white, accentuating division and difference, and exploiting 




This section examines why it is that education is so often relied upon when it comes to finding solutions to 
the problem of extremism. It uncovers an unstable relationship between education and extremism: despite 
it often being relied upon to counter-extremism, no correlation between an increase in education and a 
decrease in extremism exists. The links made between extremism and education do however paint young 
people in a particularly negative light, suggesting that they lack agency and are vulnerable to extremism. 
Such a depiction has the ironic consequence of rendering education less effective in fighting extremism, as 
teachers are less comfortable exposing young people to seemingly dangerous ideas.  
 
Assumptions about the Education of Extremists  
It is presumed that terrorists are poor, that they are brainwashed by either their cultures or their 
schools, that they are naïve young people who do not know any better, that they lack responsibilities 
such as a job or family, which leaves them open to join terrorist organisations, or that they are so 
sexually frustrated that they turn to terrorism to seek their reward of seventy-two virgins in 
paradise. Or they are just criminals, or simply crazy. (Sageman, 2008, pp. 47-48)  
 
Commonplace narratives surrounding extremists suggest that they are unlikely to be well educated. That an 
extremist could, in fact, be educated appears to be impossible (Ford, 2017b). This assumption comes in 
multiple forms: that an educated extremist is de facto an oxymoron, that an extremist has received an evil, 
extremist education, or that extremists studied academic subjects that cognitively prepared them to take on 
extremist narratives.  
 
The argument that education can solve the issue of global terrorism relies heavily on expectations that 
extremists are lacking in education. For example, only days after the US attacks in September 2001, Jessica 
Stern wrote in The Washington Post, ‘We have a stake in the welfare of other peoples and need to devote a 
much higher priority to health, education and economic development, or new Osamas will continue to arise’ 
(Stern, 2001, Sept. 15). Stern here appears to have forgotten that Osama Bin Laden came from an 
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enormously rich and well-educated Saudi background. Similarly, Leiken writes ‘in the September 11 
attacks, the educated tend to form the leadership cadre, with the plebians providing the muscle’ (Leiken, 
2005, p. 127). Leiken here ignores the fact that many of the hijackers in fact had PhDs (Gambetta & Hertog, 
2009). Alternatively, a depiction of the terrorist might suggest, rather than lacking in education, extremists 
might in fact have been indoctrinated by a conservative religious education. Donald Rumsfeld, as US 
Defence Secretary in 2003, asked: ‘Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists 
every day than the madrassas and radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?’ 
(Rumsfeld cited in 9/11 Commission, 2011, pp. 374-5). Yet, such a fear of Islamic schooling has been 
shown to be unfounded. Bergen and Pandey’s (2006) study explored the flaws behind the emphasis placed 
on madrassas, places of Islamic learning, after the US attacks in September 2001, examining how few 
known terrorists have ever visited a madrassa. However, Bergen and Pandey did note two factors relating 
to extremism and education: that young Muslims might feel alienated in Western education systems, and 
that terrorists tend to have studied technical subjects.  
 
Interestingly, one key study has examined the fact that many known terrorists have studied engineering. 
Gambetta and Herzog (2009) found that 44% of their sample of 178 known terrorists had studied 
engineering. They attribute this link between studying engineering and joining an extremist organisation to 
two reasons, one being the economic precariousness of being an engineer in many countries within the 
Middle East which might leave someone with strong grievances, the second being the synergy between the 
‘mindset’ that might attract someone to becoming an engineer, the ‘mindset’ developed during one’s 
engineering studies, and an extremist ‘mindset’:  
 
We can conjecture that engineering as a degree might be relatively more attractive to individuals 
seeking cognitive ‘closure’ and clear-cut answers as opposed to more open-ended sciences… 
Engineering is a subject in which individuals with a dislike for ambiguity might feel comfortable. 
(Gambetta & Herzog, 2009, p. 221) 
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Interestingly, the field of psychology has turned to the question of the cognitive differences between 
conservatives and liberals (though not including extremists): ‘conservatives have been found to be more 
structured and persistent in their judgements and approaches to decision-making… liberals, by contrast, 
report higher tolerance of ambiguity and complexity’ (Amodio, Jost, Master & Yee, 2007, p. 1246). That 
extremism may require or feed from an alternative form of cognition to liberalism does suggest that 
education that attempts to open up minds to complexity might advantage those attempting to counter 
extremism, as long as the depiction of extremism as closed-minded holds true.  
 
Yet, the argument rests on an unsubstantiated claim: that terrorists are closed-minded. The argument is 
reliant on the second of the three iterations of extremism examined earlier: the fundamentalism of 
extremism. However, such an argument falls if one accepts, as research has shown, that violence is used at 
times instrumentally or strategically by terrorists, rather than for its own sake (McCormick, 2003; 
Neumayer & Plumper, 2011). The argument falls because the strategic use of violence indicates a cognitive 
process of evaluating various choices, and estimating the relative impact of a number of options. The notion 
of a closed-minded extremist relies on the idea of a ‘critically thinking extremist’ to be an impossibility. 
Yet, that perhaps might not be the case. Links between extremism and a lack of education are far more 
discursive than they are empirically supported. Where empirical research has taken place, it has 
predominantly disproved the link between education and extremism.  
 
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) investigated the links between education, terrorism and poverty, and 
concluded: ‘any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is, at best, indirect, complicated, and 
probably quite weak’. Sageman studied a sample of 172 known terrorists, finding 62% had attended 
university (2008). Schmid notes that ‘many rebellious young Muslims – not just drifters, misfits and losers 
but also men and women with an advanced education and a middle class background – appear to be 
susceptible to al Qaeda's diagnosis of the source of problems in the Muslim world’ (2014, p. 8). Berribi’s 
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study of Palestinian terrorists drew similar conclusions: ‘If anything, the findings suggests that those with 
higher educational attainment and higher living standards are more likely to participate in terrorist activity’ 
(Berrebi, 2007, p. 4). Berribi offers a number of reasons for this correlation, including that education might 
increase awareness both of global injustices and the ideologies of extremist organisations such that their 
enthusiasm to join such groups would increase.  
 
Bueno de Mesquita offers a nuanced model to understand two seemingly contradictory narratives within 
the terrorism literature – that support for terror organisations is greatest amongst the least well-off and least 
educated, but terrorists themselves tend to be well-educated and middle-class. The author suggests that 
these narratives are a product of a recruitment and selection process: the ‘supply’ of enthusiastic recruits is 
greater than the ‘demand’ for recruits and as such, only the better qualified ever become terrorists: ‘This is 
because higher ability, better educated people are more likely to succeed at the demanding tasks required 
of a terrorist operative’ (De Mesquita, 2005, p. 515). Barro contributes here too: ‘one likely explanation is 
that the poorest, least-education persons make relatively ineffective terrorists’ (Jun. 10, 2002, p. 26). What 
de Mesquita’s research does not attempt to prove however, is whether an overall increase in education 
levels would therefore lead to an overall reduction in the recruitment pool available for terrorist 
organisations, an argument often made in global politics. Moreover, Berribi, Barro and de Mesquita’s work 
concerns a particular idea of a terrorist organisation that fits an insurgency context (Berribi’s work, for 
instance, is located in a Palestinian context) but which appears not to address the nature of homegrown 
terrorism – the independent ‘self-radicalising’ extremist. Here, the explanation of recruitment appears less 
valid, as ‘homegrown terrorists’ are seen to recruit themselves, are devolved from fixed network structures, 
and are much more independent. 
 
However, that is not to say that the education of such ‘homegrown terrorists’ is of any less interest to 
authorities. Indeed, much effort has been made by the UK government to crack down on the radicalising 
role of the Internet, including asking schools to monitor students’ internet use (BBC News, 2015, Dec. 22). 
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The educational or brainwashing role that YouTube videos and such like can have on young people has 
been examined in academic scholarship (Conway & McInerney, 2008). Moreover, while fears of young 
people being radicalised in foreign madrassas are less prominent than in the immediate aftermath of the 
US attacks in 2001, the UK government has put in place efforts to regulate the religious teachings of 
religious institutions (to the dismay of many Sunday school leaders) (Bingham, Dec. 11, 2015), alongside 
the regulations that ensure that UK schools do not undermine ‘fundamental British values’ (Department for 
Education, 2014). Such measures indicate that the narrative around brainwashing and indoctrination 
remains dominant in policy circles.  
 
Literature surrounding education and extremism paints a particular picture of extremists and their education 
that suggests that extremists have received either not enough, or the wrong kind, of education, and that 
therefore the right kind of education can offer a solution. These assertions however, do not hold up to 
scrutiny. Empirical research demonstrates that the relationship between extremists and their education is 
complex. Yet, this complexity does not appear to translate into a policy context, which continues to place 
more and more regulatory pressure on schools to engage in counter-extremist education. Theories of 
radicalisation compound this pressure on educational institutions, through the theories’ emphasis on 
catalytic factors that might initiate or accelerate processes of radicalisation, and an emphasis on 
‘vulnerabilities’ that position young people, and Muslims in particular, as at risk of becoming radicalised.  
 
Assumptions about young people and radicalisation 
The ignorance theory of extremism examined above relies on a series of assumptions concerning young 
people’s vulnerability to being ‘captured’ by ideology that must be critically explored. This vulnerability 
appears to rely on three aspects: an understanding of children as tabula rasa with no agency, assumptions 
regarding young people, identity and security, and lastly, assumptions concerning the nature of young 
people’s idealism. Yet, the three conceptions paint contradictory images of the nature of youth, with both 
agency and passivity being emphasised. This constructs a ‘model’ risky youth that is both, as Sieckelinck 
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et al. note, ‘victim’ and ‘villain’ (Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks & de Winter, 2015). This section of the chapter 
notes concern at the lack of clarity over the nature of the problem with which counter-extremist education 
is designed to address. 
 
Radicalisation is a phenomenon most prevalent amongst young people. Demographic studies of terrorist or 
extremist groups or individuals are relatively rare, though trends do emerge. First, extremists can be of any 
age: Conway and McInerney’s (2008) study examined those who upload ‘Jihadist’ videos to YouTube and 
noted an age range of eighteen to seventy-two; Benmelech and Berribi’s (2007) study into suicide bombers 
noted an age range of between twelve and forty-eight. Yet, within these two studies, the average age was 
27.9 and 21.1 respectively. Ghosh et al. support this finding: ‘those most susceptible to adopting extremist 
religious ideologies continue to be young people between the ages of 15 and 25’ (Ghosh, Chan, Manuel & 
Dilimulati, 2016, p. 3; see also Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009). That young people form the backbone of 
extremist networks provides ready evidence to focus countering radicalisation at young people. Della Porta, 
in attempting to uncover a profile of terrorists suggests, ‘Youth is perhaps the only characteristic “terrorists” 
share’ (1992, p. 10). Roy (2008) goes as far as to describe Al Qaeda as a 'youth movement'. Furthermore, 
such an assessment is supported in the 2011 review of the Prevent Strategy: ‘Statistically, it is clear that in 
this country and overseas most terrorist offences are committed by people under the age of 30. We therefore 
regard it as vital that Prevent engages fully – though in different ways – with schools, higher and further 
education’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 64). Some authors, including government policymakers, thus see 
counter-extremism as a core component of the safeguarding of young people (Evans, Nov. 5, 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, while a focus on young people would appear an appropriate counter-extremism response, the 
ways in which counter-extremism strategies appear to respond to this demographic factor reveal a number 
of problematic assumptions. This is especially pertinent considering how counter-extremist education 
approaches young people. In particular, the agency of young people is both underplayed – the idea that 
young people might rationally choose to join an extremist organisation as a political choice plays second 
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fiddle to explanations that downplay agency and emphasise vulnerability or susceptibility – as well as being 
over-exaggerated: young people are painted as risky through undergoing a rebellious identity-seeking phase 
in adolescence.  
 
The radicalisation discourse appears to have a particularly low impression of young people. Van San et al. 
speak of the ‘increased susceptibility to radical ideas during puberty’ (van San, Sieckelinck & de Winter, 
2013, p. 286), citing Gemmeke who describes adolescence as the ‘impressionable years’ (Gemmeke (1995) 
cited in van San et al., 2013, p. 286). Radicalisation narratives appear to present young people as tabula 
rasa for extremist ideologues to mould and manipulate. Durodie (2016) notes the paradox of such an 
understanding of the nature of young people, writing with a sense of frustration at how the perceived 
fragility of young people leaves teachers too scared to discuss controversial issues with students for fear of 
upsetting them. This is particularly ironic as the discussion of controversial issues is seen as a core 
component of counter-extremism education. Durodie adds: ‘the notion that an individual upon hearing 
somebody speak of coming across ideas on the internet, then begins to alter their behaviour suggests a fairly 
diminished view of human nature. Unfortunately, this projection of people as fragile is becoming more 
mainstream today’ (2016, p. 28). Sieckelinck et al., while offering young people more agency than other 
writers, still describe those vulnerable to radicalisation as ‘political agents in spiritual and educational need’ 
(Sieckelinck et al., 2015, p. 338). 
 
One reason for this characterisation of young people is that adolescence is depicted in the literature as a 
time of identity construction and questioning. This process of identity building is seen to be risky when 
radicalisation is also seen in terms of ‘the quest for personal significance… to be recognised, to matter’ 
(Kruglanski et al., 2013, p. 559). Young people, so the argument goes, are more likely to radicalise, as they 
are engaging in this ‘significance quest’, rendering them more vulnerable to the ‘captive power’ of ideology. 
Van San et al., for example, describe a group of individuals who ‘fell under the spell of radical Islam’ (2013, 
p. 285). For Kruglanski et al. (2013), the solution to this facet of radicalisation, is to promote ‘self-love’. 
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Yet, these assumptions regarding the nature of adolescence are rarely questioned or critiqued. It is 
fascinating that, immediately after providing multiple references and citations regarding definitions of 
radicalisation and extremism, Bhui et al. offer the following description of adolescence with no support 
from previous scholarly literature:  
 
Radicalisation is thought to occur during adolescence or shortly afterwards among young adults 
who are impressionable and seek to resolve personal negotiations of identity. Typically adolescence 
is a period of maturation in which young people experiment with their identity, group relationships, 
political ideologies and their place in the world. Becoming involved in visible and distinct counter-
cultures is a part of maturation. (Bhui, Dinos & Jones, 2012, p. 1) 
 
The argument follows then that young people might join extremist groups as a seemingly natural result of 
identity quests, unless something to stop this happening is enacted. Education can help to stem this 
inevitable flow of adolescent radicalism. Yet, the lack of scholarly citation by Bhui et al. should be of 
profound concern.  
 
One way in which this identity quest narrative manifests itself is in what I term the ‘lost middle’ thesis. 
This theory argues that young British Muslims are stuck between two identity groups to which they do not 
quite fit: the traditional cultures of their parents’ generation, and majority British society (Schmid, 2014). 
Sageman notes this when describing the background of Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, convicted of the kidnap 
and beheading of a US journalist. Sageman highlights ‘Omar’s sense of alienation, of being caught between 
two cultures, Pakistani and British’ (2008, p. 6). According to Liht et al, British Muslims ‘require more 
cognitive resources to successfully resolve the dissonance between religious and secular-rational value 
systems’ (2013, p. 36). As such, some authors argue, young British Muslims are threatening: ‘They are the 
latest, most dangerous incarnation of that staple of immigration literature, the revolt of the second 
generation’ (Leiken, 2005, p. 127).  
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Not all research agrees here, however. Lynch’s (2013) ethnographic research into identity construction 
amongst young British Muslims found that incorporating Britishness alongside a religious identity was a 
key component of these young people’s identities; that the two identities were mutually constitutive, rather 
than exclusive of one another. Such a study challenges these dominant narratives around this identity clash 
that play prominent roles not only in academic scholarship, but also in political discourse. As David 
Cameron said in 2015, speaking directly to young British Muslims: ‘I know that at times you are grappling 
with huge issues over your identity, neither feeling a part of the British mainstream nor a part of the culture 
from your parents’ background’ (Cameron, Jul. 20, 2015). It is a concern here, that this ‘lost middle’ thesis 
compounds the transformation of the young British Muslim into a risky subject.  
 
Lastly, young people’s idealism is added as a third factor of risk, compounding the riskiness of youth central 
to conceptualisations of radicalisation. Interestingly, when emphasising idealism, these descriptions of 
young people present youth as active agents in their own commitment to violence rather than passive 
victims. As Wessells argues: ‘youth are not passive pawns in armed conflict but are actors who find meaning 
and identity in what they see as a struggle for justice’ (2005, pp. 365-6). The role of education to counter 
this idealism is emphasised most comprehensively by Stijn Sieckelinck and colleagues. Sieckelinck et al. 
(2015) recognise the synergy between the idealism at the heart of extremism, and the idealism central to 
adolescence (van San et al., 2013), focussing educational responses to extremism to channel this idealism 
in more reasonable and less violent ways.  
 
The idealism of youth has been central to youth scholarship for some time. The notable American 
sociologist, Kingsley Davis, in a paper examining parent-youth conflict published in 1940, noted ‘the 
conflict between adult realism (or pragmatism) and youthful idealism’ (1940, p. 526). Moreover, youthful 
idealism, Davis argued, could lead to conflict: ‘youth is likely to take action designed to remove 
inconsistencies or force actual conduct into line with ideals, such action assuming one of several typical 
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adolescent forms – from religious withdrawal to the militant support of some Utopian scheme’ (1940, p. 
528). Davis’ assertion that militancy might be typically adolescent is interestingly mirrored in conceptions 
of radicalisation amongst youth. As Wessells argues, writing in the context of the recruitment of child 
soldiers: ‘Ideology and political socialisation exert strong influence over youths’ decisions to join armed 
groups. In many countries, opposition groups recruit successfully by playing on youth’s sense of 
victimisation, social injustice, and disaffection, as well as their sense of idealism and commitment to their 
religion’  (2005, p. 365). Davis (1940) also offers an argument that moving away from idealism is a natural 
part of maturation. Liht et al. argue something similar: ‘We propose that fostering the natural development 
process of increasing value complexity can serve to create resilience to radicalism and thus prevent 
processes of radicalisation since radical groups are intrinsically value-monist’ (2013, p. 36). 
 
In exploring how to handle this idealism, Sieckelinck and Ruyter do not however shun this idealism 
outright, examining how: ‘One reason ideals are important is related to the increased range of options in 
contemporary society that seems to make it more difficult for young people to choose the life they really 
want and be satisfied with their choice’ (2009, p. 185). Thus, rather than an entirely negative phenomenon, 
ideals can offer a life raft in a sea of uncertainty. Yet, it is the role of education to channel these ideals 
appropriately. Sieckelinck and Ruyter argue that young people need to learn to be ‘reasonably passionate’ 
(2009, p. 187), mirroring the ‘critical idealism’ advocated by Davies (2008).  
 
This section has attempted to examine why education is seen as a crucial venue for counter-extremism 
strategy. It has done so through exploring the plural relationships discursively produced in the discourse 
regarding extremists and education. The section examined how extremists are depicted as lacking an 
education, or having received the wrong sort of education. These arguments were challenged however by 
scholarly literature that questions any correlation between education and a reduction of extremism. Despite 
the lack of supporting evidence, the argument that education reduces extremism persists. Yet, the section 
also examined the consequences of this argument through examining how such an argument discursively 
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produces young people. The chapter examined how narratives of catalytic factors of radicalisation and 
vulnerability to radicalisation place young people in positions of being both ‘at risk’ and suspicious. This 
dual role thus creates a conundrum for educators who must balance exploring extremist ideas with students 
to build their resilience, while also recognising that such exposure might present a risk. Overall, the section 
has sought to muddy the waters regarding a seemingly common-sense attitude that education reduces 
extremism. It has replaced this simplicity with complexity, presenting questions that need answers.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine the current state of the literature on extremism and radicalisation, in order 
to define counter-extremism, and to understand why education is seen as a crucial venue in which counter-
extremism strategies should operate. It built upon an initial concern regarding the wide range of strategies, 
policies and laws that UK schools must now follow with regard to extremism and radicalisation. From this 
departure point, the chapter sought to explore how the problem of extremism was conceptualised and the 
theories upon which such a concept relied. In so doing, it uncovered, amongst a poorly defined and 
conceptually confused terrain, a heavy emphasis on, and reification of, ideology in the radicalisation process 
by which someone engages in extremism. This emphasis on ideology is not only poorly supported by 
empirical evidence, and based on a series of problematic assumptions (such as the dismissal of alternative 
theories of political violence from social movement theory), but leads to a series of problematic 
consequences, of profound interest in the context of this thesis. In particular, the chapter questioned the 
implications of a counter-extremism strategy that appeared in nature to be counter-ideological, and the 
dangers countering ideology poses to democratic pluralism. Furthermore, the chapter examined the 
problematic dualism present within the literature concerning ideology and its relationship to violence. It 
was suggested that the discursive linkage between a set of ideas and the motivation to use violence was in 
acute danger of criminalising and stigmatising the holding of non-hegemonic values, and transforming what 
might be considered alternative views into threatening views. 
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Overall, the chapter has examined a literature around extremism and radicalisation that is both riddled with 
conceptual and practical issues, and yet is extremely popular amongst policy makers. Within the literature, 
a core antagonism is clearly present between the objectives of countering extremism and the objectives of 
democratic pluralism. The literature appears confused, and unstably positioned atop a heavily contested 
body of scholarly work. That this body of literature also places great emphasis on education as a tool in 
countering extremism thus places heavy burdens on teachers and school leaders. As such, this thesis is 
motivated to engage in further depth to explore how these antagonisms and uncertainties at a conceptual 
level play out at a pedagogical level, when these issues start to be taught in the classroom. The next chapter 
moves on to examine the UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy, examining the various 
responsibilities school hold, exploring how these contestations and antagonisms only escalate when 




Contested and Contradictory  
An analysis of Britain’s counter-extremism in schools strategy 
 
Teachers play many roles. As well as educating young people in their chosen subjects, they may find 
themselves in roles as diverse as: sports coach, personal tutor, lunch hall monitor, even director of the 
school play. Teachers also play the role of caregiver or guardian, and safeguarding is an increasingly 
important aspect of a teacher’s responsibilities. Teachers are often the first to spot that a student might be 
suffering from neglect or abuse, from bullying or from physical illness or injury. It is under this realm of 
‘safeguarding’ that teachers have become actors in the widely dispersed surveillance regime to spot signs 
of radicalisation. While a teacher may well have expected when training to become a teacher to take a 
football practice, to talk to a parent about bullying, or direct a school play, they may well not have expected 
to play a key role in countering terrorism or extremism.  
 
This chapter explores this curious new role that teachers must play. First, the chapter traces the journey 
from 2001 to the present day, examining how a strategy of countering terrorism abroad has transitioned 
into one countering extremism in schools. From here, the chapter draws from the antagonisms already 
highlighted within this thesis, taking the investigation another step further, through an exploration of the 
UK counter-extremism in schools strategy. The strategy can be subdivided into two core components: a 
surveillance component that ensures teachers are trained to be able to identify students who are at risk of 
being radicalised, and an educational component that ensures students are equipped with the skills, values 
and knowledge required to increase their resilience to radicalisation. The chapter examines how the vast 
majority of the critique of the UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy has been levelled at the 
surveillance aspect of the strategy, or at the so-called ‘fundamental British values’. This thesis argues that 
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while lessons have clearly been learned exploring each aspect in isolation, it is in the interrelationships 
between the components of the strategy where deeper lessons can be learned regarding how the antagonism 
between consensus and pluralism at the heart of counter-extremism impacts teaching on the subject. 
 
The chapter then analyses the three core aspects of the educational component of the strategy: skills 
development, values promotion and knowledge transmission. Through such an examination, it is argued 
that these three aspects are both contested and contradictory. They are contested in that they are each based 
on a number of assumptions and unstable claims challenged by scholarly literature. They are contradictory 
in that the three aims of counter-extremism in schools, rather than complementing each other, in fact work 
against each other. From here, the chapter develops the core research question of this thesis: how do the 
contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in the teaching materials 
designed to fulfil the strategy? 
 
From Countering Terrorism Abroad to Countering Extremism in Schools 
The events of July 7 2005 radically transformed the UK’s understanding of the threat posed by terrorism. 
The attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001 catalysed a UK counter-terrorism strategy, 
which, through domestic security policy and overseas military intervention, emphasised a foreign threat. 
The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 caused controversy due to the inclusion of a clause 
allowing for detention without trial of ‘foreign terror subjects’ (BBC News, Dec. 14, 2001). The threat was 
distinctly external – an evil force emerging from the rural and mountainous region bordering Afghanistan 
and Pakistan (Jackson, 2005). When four young men, Yorkshiremen born and bred, attacked the London 
transport network in 2005, that threat was no longer something foreign and distant, but internal and 
domestic. This re-conceptualisation of the terrorist threat led to the growth of the term ‘homegrown 
terrorism’. Homegrown terrorism focuses on two core features – that the terrorists ‘belong’ to the country 
in which the attack takes place, and that the terrorists are autonomous from international terrorist 
organisations (Crone and Harrow, 2011). The curious phenomenon of young people wanting to commit 
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acts of violence within their home country perplexed academics and policy makers alike. Moreover, it 
prompted an examination of the backgrounds of the four bombers: what within their upbringing could have 
been altered in order to prevent this violent outcome? These questions shifted the emphasis in counter-
terrorism strategy away from foreign terrorism towards a more domestic emphasis on extremism, 
radicalisation and ideology. 
  
Contrasting Blair’s two speeches to the Labour party conferences in 2001 and 2005, both coincidentally 
about two weeks after the respective attacks, offers insight into this transition. In 2001, Blair uses the words 
‘terror’ or ‘terrorism’ nineteen times in his speech, and fails to mention extremism once (Blair, Oct. 2, 
2001). By 2005, Blair uses the term ‘terror’ three times, ‘extreme’ or ‘extremist’ four times, but ‘ideology’, 
nine times (Blair, Jul. 16, 2005). Moreover, this shift to an emphasis on extremism and ideology exposed 
education as a potential tool in countering this threat. As Blair argued: ‘In the end, it is by the power of 
argument, debate, true religious faith and true legitimate politics that we will defeat this threat… Moderates 
are not moderate through weakness but through strength. Now is the time to show it in defence of our 
common values’ (ibid.). These themes of ‘debate’ and ‘values’ place the role of education prominently 
under the spotlight with regards to countering extremism. Ever since, the role the education sector has been 
asked to play in countering extremism has grown. 
  
This understanding of an ideological threat of extremism, rather than a violent threat of terrorism, was 
prominent in the 2006 review of the CONTEST strategy – the UK’s counter-terror strategy first introduced 
in 2003 (Martin, 2018). CONTEST broke down the UK’s counter-terror strategy into four components: 
Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. While the latter three components concern the threat of acts of terror, 
Prevent was concerned with preventing terrorism at as early a stage as possible, and thus concerned itself 
with challenging extremism. Since its inception, Prevent has had an ideological emphasis, as the 2006 
strategy outlines: ‘This is a battle of ideas in which success will depend upon all parts of the community 
challenging the ideological motivations used to justify the use of violence’ (HM Government, 2006, p. 3). 
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If extremism was ideological, then counter-extremism needed to be counter-ideological. Education became 
an increasingly important tool in the fight against global terror as a ‘battleground’ for this fight for hearts 
and minds (Payne, 2009). Such an educational approach was cemented with the introduction of the 
cornerstone document, Learning to be Safe in 2008, a guide for how to incorporate counter-extremism into 
the classroom – a document still used to this day (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2008). 
The document, building heavily on the influential work by Lynn Davies, Educating Against Extremism 
(2008), sets out the justification for education’s role in countering extremism. Ed Balls, then secretary of 
state for children, schools and families makes note of this in the introduction: 
  
Extremists of all persuasions try to paint the world as black and white, accentuating division and 
difference, and exploiting fears based on ignorance or prejudice. Education can be a powerful 
weapon against this, equipping young people with the knowledge, skills and reflex to think for 
themselves, to challenge and to debate; and giving young people the opportunity to learn about 
different cultures and faiths and, crucially, to gain an understanding of the values we share. (Balls, 
2008, p. 3) 
  
Education appears to offer the antidote to extremism. It offers freethinking, open questioning and 
knowledge in the face of absolutism, falsity and myth. Yet, to fulfil its counter-ideological objectives, 
British counter-extremism requires education to not only open up minds to new ideas, but also to close off 
dangerous and threatening ideas. As Payne notes, the ideological nature of counter-extremism appears akin 
to propaganda (a word, interestingly, used by then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown in a TV 
interview in 2007). However, Payne notes, ‘Propaganda is a troubling concept for a democracy, whose 
political elites must negotiate the difficult terrain between message control and liberalism’ (Payne, 2009, 
p. 110). This negotiation presents the nub of the core question at the outset of this thesis: how can an 
educational process negotiate two seemingly competing educational frameworks: one, of a liberal, 
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democratic education that emphasises debate, and another that seeks to counter extremism through 
promoting a fixed set of values? This question became even more profound after the review of the Prevent 
strategy in 2011.  
 
In 2010, the Labour party was ousted from power, replaced by a coalition government led by the 
Conservative party, which commissioned a review of the Prevent strategy. Three key changes took place 
with regards to education and counter-extremism in this review: a cementing of the definition of extremism, 
the prioritisation of challenging extremist ideology, and an emphasis on tackling so-called ‘non-violent 
extremism’. Such changes placed ever-increasing levels of emphasis on challenging ideas and values in 
countering extremism, and continued to emphasise the importance of an educational strategy. 
  
The 2011 Prevent strategy defined extremism as: 
  
Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include 
in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this 
country or overseas. (HM Government, 2011a, p. 107) 
  
Such a definition placed ‘values’ at the centre stage of understandings of extremism, alongside provoking 
contestation and debate regarding who was able to define what was fundamentally ‘British’ (Allen, 2015; 
Miah, 2017). Promoting these fundamental values is central to the UK’s counter-extremism in schools 
strategy. 
  
Second, the role of countering ideology within the counter-extremism strategy was given the highest 
priority. In 2006, this ‘battle of ideas’ was the third component of a three-strand Prevent strategy that also 
comprised ‘tackling disadvantage and supporting reform’ and ‘deterring those who facilitate terrorism’ 
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(HM Government, 2006, pp. 1-2). Yet, by 2011, when the review of Prevent was published, the centrality 
of ideology to counter-extremism was firmly in place. This newly shaped strategy set out its three objectives 
of Prevent: to ‘respond to the ideological challenge… prevent people from being drawn into terrorism… 
[and] work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011a, 
p. 7). Ideology was now the number one Prevent objective. Moreover, education had become a key sector 
in which radicalisation was seen to be a genuine risk (Department for Education, 2015). The locus of 
radicalisation had shifted from the community – with the 2006 strategy’s emphasis on disadvantage – to 
the individual – with the 2011 strategy’s emphasis on ideology and vulnerability to being ‘drawn into 
terrorism’. 
  
The last key alteration of the strategy within this review was to demand that more be done to challenge so-
called ‘non-violent extremism’. Attention should no longer be given purely to those who pose an immediate 
violent threat to UK interests. The strategy argued that extremist groups, individuals and ideas that were 
not in themselves violent play a catalytic role in the violence of others and must also be challenged (HM 
Government, 2011a, p. 19). That ideas that did not incite violence could influence violence in others ensured 
that ideas or values that challenged hegemonic ideas or values were considered threatening and needed to 
be challenged. Fixing the boundaries on legitimate ideas appeared to be a core feature of the counter-
extremism strategy, once again raising the key question: how can an educational process negotiate the 
duality of both opening up and closing down the realm of free debate of ideas? 
  
In 2014, a scandal hit the headlines turning attention onto education and extremism once more. The so-
called ‘Trojan Horse Scandal’ involved the publication of a letter in a national newspaper, the authenticity 
of which remains in doubt (Miah, 2017; Mogra, 2016). This letter supposedly reveals a plot by a group of 
conservative Muslims who were aiming to take control of a group of schools in the Birmingham area in 
order to promote an extremist ideology. The affair catalysed two separate investigations, one by the police, 
and the other by Birmingham City Council, neither of which uncovered concrete evidence of extremism or 
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radicalisation, though both concluded the schools promoted culturally conservative values (Arthur, 2015). 
The conclusions of the investigations into the scandal remain mired in controversy and debate (Habib, 2018; 
Miah, 2017). Moreover, the affair catalysed alterations in schools’ professional responsibilities with regards 
to so-called ‘fundamental British values’.  
 
Guidance was published by the Department for Education in November 2014 that set out advice that schools 
should ‘actively promote fundamental British values’ (Department for Education, 2014, p. 3). This was 
secured in school regulatory mechanisms. In 2011, Teachers’ Standards (the rubric against which teachers 
are evaluated) had already incorporated ‘not undermining fundamental British values’ (Department for 
Education, 2011, p. 14) as a facet of professional conduct. The 2015 edition of the school inspection 
handbook published by Ofsted, the schools inspectorate, included four references to ‘fundamental British 
values’ (Ofsted, 2015), references that were absent in the previous year’s edition (Ofsted, 2014). Schools 
must now not just not undermine, but rather, actively promote these values (Elton-Chalcraft, Lander, Revell, 
Warner & Whitworth, 2017, p. 30). 
 
Schools’ requirements to promote these values have been critiqued by school leaders and teachers’ unions. 
Michael Goodwin, the head of an independent Quaker school, asked in The Guardian, ‘should we really 
promote an unquestioning adherence to the rule of law?’ (Goodwin, Nov. 11, 2014). The National Union 
of Teachers questioned whether the values would promote ‘cultural supremacy’ (Harding, Mar. 29, 2016). 
Scholars have examined the impact of these values, exploring how they provide a racialised understanding 
of Britishness (Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Miah, 2017), and how they engender ‘an atmosphere of fear 
and uncertainty’ (Revell & Bryan, 2016, p. 352).  
  
The next chapter in school counter-extremism policy came in July 2015 when the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015 came into force. This law was the seventh edition/addition to the UK’s terrorism laws 
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since 2001.2 This law, known more colloquially as the ‘Prevent duty’, ensured schools have ‘due regard to 
the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (Department for Education 2015, p. 4). In 
practice, this law requires schools to train their staff in order that they are able to recognise any students 
displaying signs of vulnerability to radicalisation, and to notify relevant authorities. As the government 
advice to schools notes, ‘schools and childcare providers are expected to assess the risk of children being 
drawn into terrorism, including support for extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology’ (Department 
for Education, 2015, p. 5). Such a measure has been met with harsh criticism, as teachers feel unable to 
compromise their role as educators with a new surveillance role (Bubsy, Mar. 25, 2016). Academics have 
contributed criticism too. O’Donnell describes the trap in which teachers are placed to both respond to the 
needs of the students and of legal compliance, as ‘pedagogical injustice’ (2017, p. 179). Martin (2018, p. 
14) examines how the Prevent duty transforms students into ‘new subjects of risk’. In both the Prevent duty 
and the values promotion, at least for some, the strategies of counter-extremism felt at odds with the core 
foundational principles of education itself. Despite this, many schools ensured compliance by publishing 
school counter-extremism and radicalisation policies setting out their school strategy and procedure for 
managing the risk of extremism (see appendix for examples). 
  
Lastly, in January 2016, the then education secretary, Nicky Morgan, launched a key website, 
www.educateagainsthate.com, as a platform for advice and resources for schools, teachers, and school 
leaders regarding extremism and schools (Hughes, Jan. 19, 2016). The website not only offers advice but 
resources that teachers can use in their classrooms to help teach about the issues of radicalisation, extremism 
and terrorism. The website intends to increase awareness of the issues at hand and better equip teachers to 
fulfil their responsibilities. 
                                               
2 Since the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act in 2001 there has been the following subsequent acts of 
parliament: Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; Terrorism Act 2006; Counter-Terrorism Act 2008; Terrorist Asset-
Freezing Act 2010; Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011; Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act 2014, and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. 
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Now eight years since the 2011 Prevent review introduced a definition of extremism to the UK political 
sphere, what extremism might entail is still far from certain. The UK Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(JCHR), investigating Britain’s counter-extremism strategy, argued that the definition of extremism is 
‘couched in such general terms that they would be likely to prove unworkable as a legislative definition’ 
(JCHR, 2016, p. 3). The government, since 2015, has wanted to introduce a Counter-Extremism and 
Safeguarding Bill, including civil orders to prohibit extremism. Delays have plagued this process (JCHR, 
2016). In 2017, a new Commission for Countering Extremism was established to support the government 
to counter extremism. As a House of Commons briefing paper concluded, ‘Unless a consensus can be 
reached as to what constitutes extremism in the first place, the development of effective measures will 
continue to prove problematic for the proposed Commission’ (Dawson & Godec, 2017, p. 54).  
  
As such, since the events of July 2005, schools have been burdened with an ever-increasing number of 
counter-extremism responsibilities, at a time when counter-extremism itself has proved contested and 
poorly understood (Dawson & Godec, 2017; Ford, 2017a; Harris-Hogan, Barrelle & Zammit, 2016). 
Moreover, such regulations have been introduced during an era in which curriculum, schools and teaching 
practices have become ever increasingly scrutinised, and accountability measures ever increasingly 
dominant.  
 
Since the introduction of the National Curriculum in 1988, under the Education Reform Act, the state has 
played an increasingly active role in the governance of the classroom. Schools today operate within an 
environment of surveillance, accountability and market-like competition, dramatically impacting what goes 
on inside the classroom (Winter, 2018). Ball (2003, p. 216) refers to this state-led regime of teacher 
behaviour control using the term ‘performativity’:  
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Performativity is a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, 
comparisons, and displays as a means of incentive, control, attrition and change – based on rewards 
and sanctions.  
It is hardly surprising in this context therefore that post the 2015 legislative changes so many schools have 
produced policies that clearly demonstrate their adherence to the counter-extremism strategy, alongside 
schools producing ‘audits’ to provide easily-consumable documentation to inspectors demonstrating their 
compliance in promoting fundamental British values.  
 
Such a performativity regime has a profound impact on the teaching itself. As Winter (2018, p. 458) notes: 
These pressures of performativity, under such a high-stakes regime, lead, inevitably, to teachers 
teaching to the test; avoiding innovative and challenging teaching strategies and deploying 
reductive, low-risk subject knowledge and technical assessment approaches. 
Importantly therefore, in the context of these various counter-extremism activities that teachers must 
include within such a policy-heavy environment, one must ask the question of how a teacher is capable of 
critically encountering a body of knowledge that, as the previous chapter demonstrated, is far from soundly 
evidenced or objectively secure (Winter, 2018, p. 459).  
 
Furthermore, the Trojan Horse affair added a further politicisation to these accountability measures (Arthur, 
2015). Ofsted inspectors have taken on increasingly political roles in the wake of this scandal, and are keen 
to inspect not just the teaching practices of a school, but the values and principles held by its student body. 
Arthur (2015, p. 323) revealed one instance of an inspection at a Jewish girls’ school where ‘Inspectors 
questioned the girls on whether they knew any gay people and whether they had a boyfriend and whether 
they had friends from other religions.’ This demonstrates an increasingly ideological aspect to the 
accountability regime, and a further injection of control by the state over the thoughts and beliefs, or the 
‘hearts and minds’ of the nation’s school students.  
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Thus far, the chapter has explored how schools must promote debate, develop skills, transmit values, and 
monitor their students for signs of radicalisation, alongside their primary roles as educators. Their 
responsibilities are regulated through teacher standards and inspection guidelines. Yet, these 
responsibilities have been met with a level of resistance that merits investigation. In particular, the 
surveillance aspect of the Prevent duty and the teaching of fundamental British values have provoked 
criticism from educational professionals and academics alike. Yet, other aspects – such as the development 
of critical thinking skills – have been left under-examined. The strategy seems to emphasise both inclusion, 
in the safeguarding of children, and exclusion, in the identification and isolation of extremists and their 
ideas. How a strategy of counter-extremism in schools might negotiate these seemingly contradictory 
objectives – both in theory and in practice – provides the subject on which this thesis bases its examination.  
 
Britain’s Counter Extremism In Schools Strategy 
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTS Act) ensures that a school’s responsibility to protect 
young people from extremism is enshrined in law. Specifically, this law ensures that a school ‘must, in the 
exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ 
(CTS Act, 2015, section 26). In order to comply with what is commonly known as the ‘Prevent duty’, as 
UK Government guidance reports, ‘it is essential that staff are able to identify children who may be 
vulnerable to radicalisation, and know what to do when they are identified’ (Department for Education, 
2015, p. 5). Students identified as vulnerable are then potentially referred to the Channel programme, a 
government-run intervention programme intended to deradicalise vulnerable individuals. Yet the Prevent 
duty not only entails such a surveillance aspect, but also an educational one. The advice continues: ‘Schools 
and childcare providers can also build pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British 
values and enabling them to challenge extremist views’ (ibid.).  This second, educational, arm of counter-
radicalisation strategy can then be further subdivided into three core components: the development of skills, 
the promotion of values and the dissemination of knowledge.  
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Students’ resilience to extremist propaganda, according to policy makers, can be developed through 
improving critical thinking skills. An awareness of plural perspectives, and an ability to assess lines of logic 
and reasoning, will equip students to be able to see through the false argumentation of extremist narratives 
(DCSF, 2008). The promotion of ‘fundamental British values’ follows an increasing dominance of 
assimilationist ideas central to the Government’s policies and strategies regarding integration. That 
radicalisation is more likely when common and shared identities are weaker is a commonly-held belief by 
policy makers and as such, a school’s promotion of common, fundamental British values, reduces a 
student’s vulnerability to radicalisation (Department for Education, 2015). Lastly, schools are also required 
to develop a knowledge base on the issues of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. This knowledge 
concerns not only knowledge about the threat of terrorism, but also about the nature of democracy and 
political systems in the UK too. As such, I argue, a school’s responsibilities with regard to countering 
radicalisation and extremism can be graphically represented thus (figure 3.1): 
 
Figure	3.1:	Britain's	counter-extremism	in	schools	strategy	(source:	author) 
Existing research into the counter-extremism in schools strategy has tended to focus on two independent 
aspects of the strategy: the ‘Prevent duty’ (e.g. O’Donnell, 2016; 2017; Davies, 2016) or ‘fundamental 
British values’ (e.g. Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Revel & Bryan, 2016). Where this thesis aims to offer an 
innovative perspective is to examine the inter-relationships between the three educational components of 
the strategy. Rather than examining each element in isolation, the thesis focuses on how the elements work 
with and against each other, using such tensions to examine the nature of the political realms of extremism 
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and counter-extremism. In so doing, the thesis focuses its examination on the educational component, with 
less emphasis on the inter-relationships between the surveillance and educational components. Each 
analysis chapter, chapters 5, 6, and 7, takes one such component in turn, and critically analyses the 
discourses therein. Chapter 5 addresses the knowledge of extremism developed in the materials, chapter 6 
addresses the British values discourse, and finally chapter 7 explores the discourse around critical thinking 
skills.  
 
However, this is not to say that the educational-surveillance relationship is not a vital one. In fact, it is quite 
clear that the Prevent duty is having a noticeable impact on knowledge development in schools. 
Commentary on the Prevent duty in schools has tended to focus on the impact that the duty is having on the 
ability to engage in free and open debate in schools. Ahmed, an education professional noted after the duty 
was introduced: ‘Increasingly, I hear young people talking about not saying anything in school on current 
affairs in case they are labelled as “extremist”’ (Ahmed, Apr. 28, 2015). Coppock asks: ‘How is it possible 
for Muslim children and young people to “air their grievances safely” when giving voice to their 
experiences of injustice runs the risk of teachers interpreting this as an indicator of potential involvement 
in “extremism”’? (Coppock, 2014, p. 122). Sian’s research has examined how training in preventing 
extremism has caused teachers to have ‘uncritically internalised the Muslim “threat” logic’ (Sian, 2015, p. 
191). Richardson (2015) notes that the emphasis on radicalisation has left schools and teachers unwilling 
to engage in controversial debates for fear of exposing young people to extreme attitudes. Quartermaine 
(2016) even goes so far as to suggest that teachers are in fact nervous of exposing young people to the 
extremist attitudes of others within the same classroom. O’Donnell warns, ‘Making Prevent a statutory duty 
risks damaging relations of trust and openness in institutions by silencing and marginalising students and 
staff who might otherwise wish to engage in the exploration of difficult questions and ideas’ (O’Donnell, 
2016, p. 54; see also Reed, 2016).  
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The so-called ‘chilling effect’ (Marsden, Jul. 9, 2015) of the Prevent duty has been well aired. This research 
looks to take these criticisms one step further, and understand them within a wider context of the various 
responsibilities of teachers to counter extremism. Quartermaine emphasises these tensions: ‘teachers are 
torn between adhering to political discourses, protecting children from violence, as well as the dynamics of 
“good” RE [religious education] teaching that encourages critical thinking’ (2016, p. 25). The pressures of 
the counter-extremism in schools strategy appear to be in direct conflict with a dominant understanding 
shared between teachers and education researchers regarding what values are relevant to critical, democratic 
education. Such tensions are visible when examining how each component of the strategy seems to have 
competing aims. How, for instance, can a teacher approach ‘fundamental British values’ critically without 
endangering their fundamentality? Furthermore, the last chapter examined the problematic and shaky 
empirical basis on which knowledge of extremism and radicalisation is based. The way these discourses 
stigmatise Muslim communities appears to endanger the fundamental value of tolerance. Lastly, would 
critical thinking not equip students to destabilise this unstable knowledge base, placing the fundamental 
logic of the strategy - that shared, common values would defend ‘moderates’ from extremist ideology - in 
jeopardy? 
 
Through such an analysis, and through placing the analysis in the context of current research on the issues 
at hand, the chapter outlines the key questions of this thesis. The thesis seeks to examine how such tensions 
are operationalised in the classroom. It takes this strategy and asks: what appears to be working through 
this not working? What are the implications of such a strategy, and what can these tensions teach us about 
the nature of counter-extremism itself? 
 
Skills of Resilience: Critical Thinking and Extremism 
The first aspect of the educational strategy concerns the teaching of ‘skills of resilience’ – the label used in 
the literature to refer to the teaching predominantly of critical thinking skills. From an international 
governance level to an individual school level, the importance of this loosely-defined notion of critical 
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thinking to fighting extremism appears ubiquitous. UNESCO asks teachers to ‘help learners develop their 
critical thinking to investigate claims, verify rumours and question the legitimacy and appeal of extremist 
beliefs’ (UNESCO, 2016, p. 15). The European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network writes, 
‘Critical thinking is a key element in building resilience against extremism. As such, activities should 
promote dialogue and exchange – not closing down discussions to avoid addressing issues’ (RAN, 2018, p. 
252). At a UK level, ‘teaching and learning strategies’ are promoted ‘which explore controversial issues in 
a way which promotes critical analysis and pro social values’ (DCSF, 2008, p. 9). As one school wrote in 
their British Values & Challenging Radicalisation, Extremism and Terrorism Policy, ‘Education is a 
powerful weapon against this; equipping young people with the knowledge, skills and critical thinking, to 
challenge and debate in an informed way’ (P4, p. 2).   
 
Academic literature on extremism and education mirrors this argument that critical thinking appears an 
efficacious tool in the context of extremism. As Davies explains: ‘Cognitive dissonance is essential in 
learning, whether about religion or anything else. Comparing what one thought one knew against new and 
different information or ideas is the essence of education – that’s what it’s for’ (2008, p. 134). As a result, 
Davies argues that education must involve exposure to the other, allowing students to develop an ability ‘to 
extend potential legitimacy to “otherness”’ (2008, p. 44). Elsewhere, Davies argues that ‘dialogue and 
dissent’ (2014, p. 453) are vital; that it is not conflict or disagreement that promote extremism, but an 
unwillingness to accept the validity of another’s point of view. Davies deploys the term ‘interruptive 
democracy’ to describe the ‘“excuse me” reflex, the hand shooting up to raise questions or concerns, the 
habit of never taking things for granted’ (2014, p. 453). Sieckelinck and de Ruyter marry this argument by 
promoting that young people be ‘reasonably passionate’:  
 
First, a reasonably passionate person is rational in embodying fidelity to reasoning. Second, a 
reasonably passionate person is prudent: such a person is passionate but not at his or her own 
expense; he or she is able to take into account other interests as well. Finally, a reasonably 
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passionate person is at least a minimally moral person, for being reasonable involves that one is 
able to take into account the interests of the other and weigh these against one’s own interests. 
(Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009, p. 187)   
 
Alongside these arguments which champion critical thinking is the argument that schools are appropriate 
spaces in which such thinking should take place. This ‘critical openness’ is developed in the ‘safe space’ 
afforded by an educational venue: ‘democratic classrooms are places where offensive views can be aired 
and picked apart in a relatively safe setting’ (Davies, 2014, p. 454; see also Nordbruch, 2016). This safe 
space rhetoric is mirrored in policy literature also (DCSF, 2008, p. 24). However, as has been demonstrated 
above, this safe space appears endangered by the surveillance component of the counter-extremism in 
schools strategy.   
 
Contested: Unstable definitions of critical thinking  
The emphasis on critical thinking in both policy and academic literatures raises a number of concerns that 
need to be addressed. The first concern regards how ‘critical thinking’ is defined in the literature. The 
second concerns how the aims and intentions of critical thinking can marry the aims and intentions of 
resilience-building, a second dominant narrative within the literature on counter-extremism skills. The third 
concern examines a leap made in the literature between the development of critical thinking skills, and the 
development of liberal democratic values.  
 
‘Critical thinking’ is poorly defined, though heavily used, within counter-extremist educational literature, 
producing a somewhat nebulous definition through its various deployments: reflective thought practices 
(Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009, p. 193); acceptance of plural perspectives (Davies, 2008, p. 33); open 
dialogue (O’Donnell, 2016, p. 63). Yet, references to the academic literature on critical thinking itself are 




A core debate within critical thinking literature concerns whether critical thinking denotes a set of skills, a 
set of values, or both. This is a particularly relevant question in the current context, as critical thinking in 
counter-extremist literature is often deployed as a tool in the development of liberal democratic values. Ed 
Balls sets out the intention of the Learning to be Safe document as both developing ‘skills and reflex [for 
students] to think for themselves’ and ‘an understanding of the values we share’ (Balls, 2008, p. 3). One 
school policy even suggested the school will ‘give pupils a positive sense of identity through the 
development of critical thinking skills’ (P3, p. 5). Critical thinking skills are thus imbued with a daunting 
task of catalysing values and self-esteem. Yet, the relationship between these two ideas and critical thinking 
is far from certain.  
 
Siegel (1988) notes how when Robert Ennis first outlined a definition of critical thinking in 1962, Ennis’ 
emphasis was purely on skills: ‘on a person’s ability correctly to assess or evaluate certain sorts of 
statements’ (Siegel, 1988; see also Burbules & Berk, 1999). Siegel acknowledges that in Ennis’ later work, 
Ennis added a set of ‘tendencies’ that made a good critical thinker, alongside skills. Siegel himself argues 
that reason should be ‘the guiding ideal of educational endeavour’ (Siegel, 1988, p. 8), and that critical 
thinkers ‘recognise the value of critical thinking’ (Siegel, 1988, p. 9, original emphasis). Critical thinking 
should therefore be of value as an ethic for thinking. This is however, very different from suggesting that 
critical thinking will lead to the adoption of a certain set of values – an assumption dominant within counter-
extremist education literature. This false causation is often achieved through the linguistic coupling of 
‘skills’ and ‘attitudes’ within policy and academic literatures alike (DCSF, 2008, p. 9).  
 
Nevertheless, writers do note the importance of critical thinking for citizenship: ‘critical thinking is a crucial 
aspect in the competence citizens need to participate in a plural and democratic society’ (Ten Dam & 
Volman, 2004, p. 360). Davies emphasises critical thinking in a way that strongly links critical thinking to 
democratic values in what she terms ‘critical civic education’ (Davies, 2008, p. 161). A school presents an 
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opportunity to model a society or community that one would like to see in the world at large, ‘where one 
learns the skills and attitudes for living together in a democracy, a democracy in which a plurality of 
different conceptions of the good will be allowed to flourish’ (Davies, 2008, p. 75). It is not about 
developing a fixed list of values to which one must subscribe. Instead, ‘there has to be a set of values which 
is inclusive and yet open to scrutiny and change’ (Davies, 2008, p. 161). Davies perhaps offers a warning 
here to proponents of ‘fundamental British values’. The presence of fundamentalism in both definitions of 
extremism and strategies of counter-extremism suggests a core, foundational tension within the literature. 
Davies argues, ‘the potential for positive peacebuilding change seems to be in the clash of values’ (Davies, 
2014, p. 457). The question remains whether the UK’s educational counter-extremism strategy affords any 
space for values to clash.  
 
The notion of a government or state promoting critical thinking appears problematic due to the common 
assertion made by scholars of critical thinking that critical thinking is inimical to the support of orthodoxy. 
Siegel notes, ‘critical thinking is no rubber-stamp friend of the status quo’ (Siegel, 1988, p. 54). Indeed, the 
independence of critical thinkers to reflect on values is vital, suggesting that any causal link between critical 
thinking skills and liberal democratic values is highly problematic. There is no guarantee, indeed there 
simply cannot be a guarantee of the values one would critically uphold, as Veugelers and Vedder comment: 
‘Acquiring skills to reflect on values is necessary for keeping a critical distance with regard to values, 
observing different perspectives, and making judgements on one’s own behaviour and others’ behaviour’ 
(Veugelers & Vedders, 2003, p. 381). The deployment of critical thinking within the context of a state’s 
counter-extremism strategy appears therefore problematic. Critical thinking challenges the status quo, yet 
critical thinking is often described as a skill of ‘resilience’ (e.g. Nordbruch, 2016), and ‘resilience’ is a term 
with demonstrably defensive and conservative tendencies.  
 
Hardy describes resilience as ‘the ability of an individual community or ecosystem to overcome adversity 
– to absorb the impact of a shock or disturbance and then to recover effectively’ (Hardy, 2014, p. 77). Hardy 
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is critical of the language of resilience for a number of reasons. Perhaps the most important at this juncture 
being its inherently conservative nature: an education set to the task of resilience is one designed to protect 
that which currently exists, transforming education into a tool of the status quo (Hardy, 2014). This 
understanding of resilience appears to contradict critical thinking. Ghosh et al. (2016) do not share this 
concern for an apparent tension between critical openness and resilience however, seeing criticality instead 
as a core component of resilience. Their writing paints a picture of vulnerable young people susceptible to 
the persuasion of an extremist narrative, and as such, sees critical thinking as a vital skill in seeing through 
this myth.  
 
Constructive here, is Richard Paul’s delineation between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ critical thinking:  
 
Conceived of in a weak sense, critical thinking skills are understood as a set of discrete micro-
logical skills ultimately extrinsic to the character of the person; skills that can be tacked onto other 
learning. In the strong sense, critical thinking skills are understood as a set of integrated macro-
logical skills ultimately intrinsic to the character of the person and to insight into one’s own 
cognitive and affective purposes. (Paul, 1984, p. 5) 
 
Weak critical thinking is deployed to support preconceived ideas; strong critical thinking is deployed as an 
ethic with which to approach all ideas. Siegel interprets this distinction by suggesting that weak critical 
thinkers are ‘adept at manipulating argumentative exchanges in such a way that they can always 
“demonstrate” or at least protect from challenge, those deep-seated beliefs and commitments which they 
are not willing to explore or reject’ (Siegel, 1988, p. 11). In the context of countering extremism through 
critical thinking, therefore, a key question must be: is critical thinking being deployed simply to demonstrate 
the virtues of liberal democratic values? What happens if this criticality is deployed solely at extremist 
ideology, but is never reflected back on liberal thought?  
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Interestingly, Thayer-Bacon examines the origins of critical thinking in an American context. Thayer-
Bacon suggests that these antagonisms have been present since the birth of the concept. Thayer-Bacon 
examines how critical thinking as a discourse arose in the context of the US’s fight against communism. 
Here, critical thinking was seen as a tool in the fight against indoctrination. Later, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Thayer-Bacon also notes the argument that was made, arguing ‘how important it is to teach students to be 
critical thinkers so that America can compete in the global economy and remain the wealthiest nation’ 
(Thayer-Bacon, 1998, p. 124). This tense relationship between critical thinking and power is thus not novel 
to the concept of critical thinking against extremism. Nevertheless, the deployment of critical thinking in 
order to challenge an extremist ideology and strengthen ‘common’ and ‘fundamental’ values appears 
particularly problematic. As Mulnix warns: ‘Any model of critical thinking that asserts that there are 
definite ends at which critical thinking aims – in terms of what we should or should not believe, or how we 
should or should not behave – is deeply suspicious’ (Mulnix, 2012, p. 466).  
 
Promoting ‘Fundamental British Values’ 
It’s great to be here at this outstanding school, Ninestiles School. Your inspiring teachers and your 
commitment to British values means you are not just achieving outstanding academic success, but 
you are building a shared community where children of many faiths and backgrounds learn not just 
with each other, but from each other too. (Cameron, Jul. 20, 2015) 
 
This section examines the origins of Fundamental British Values in debates around citizenship, 
multiculturalism and security since the beginning of Tony Blair's leadership of the UK in 1997. Over the 
twenty years of examination, notions of citizenship have been transformed through a lens of security, as 
multiculturalism has been transformed and abandoned, as new forms of assimilationist policies overshadow 
integration debates. In many ways, the narratives around multiculturalism, diversity and common values 
have mirrored the conceptual debate regarding counter-extremism as the production of boundaries on 
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diverse opinion. These common values provide the boundaries within which diversity is permissible, 
containing the risk that diversity brings.  
 
According to Pykett (2010), a link between citizenship and security has been present since the late 1990s, 
when the idea of a specific curriculum of citizenship education for schools was introduced. Pykett argues 
that the reasons for promoting citizenship education were numerous. Alongside issues such as voter apathy, 
and pressures for devolution from Scotland and Wales (see also Maylor, 2016), pressures also included an 
understanding of the ‘alleged threats to “British values” from an increasingly multicultural society’ (Pykett, 
2010, p. 622). Such questions of citizenship and security centre on the question of integration.  
 
Since the outset, narratives around citizenship and values have offered double standards for ethnic 
minorities and the white majority. A key government-commissioned report on the issue, known as the Crick 
Report, published in 1998, provoked substantial criticism. Critics focused on one key quotation within this 
report. The report writes: ‘Majorities must respect, understand and tolerate minorities and minorities must 
learn and respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the majority – not merely because it is useful 
to do so, but because this process helps foster common citizenship’ (Crick, 1998, pp. 17-18). Such a 
distinction between demands made of the majority and minorities attracted criticism, such as from Audrey 
Osler who argues that the report ‘characterises minorities as having a deficit’ (2008, p. 13). In parallel to 
discussions surrounding citizenship, Banerjee and Linstead (2001) describe the problematic hierarchy 
between majority and minority cultures developed in narratives of multiculturalism. These racialised 
imbalances are present within the UK's relationship to citizenship, multiculturalism, security and diversity 
up to the present day with regard to ‘Fundamental British values’. 
 
Two events in 2001 sent shockwaves through the UK establishment, bringing into question the status of 
integration and diversity in the UK. First, in May, riots occurred in a number of towns in the North of 
England. Second, in September, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington sent shockwaves around 
69 
the world, catalysing the so-called ‘Global War on Terror’. As a result of these events, the Muslim 
population within the UK came under the spotlight.  
 
The riots in the northern English towns of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford, saw predominantly young British 
Asian men clash with police officers, as well as right-wing English nationalists. While reports on the riots 
focused on a lack of social and community cohesion (Cantle, 2001), such responses have drawn criticism. 
Amin argues that the riots catalysed ‘a culture of unashamed questioning of the cultural practices and 
national allegiances of British Muslims’ (Amin, 2003, p. 460). Kundnani describes the rioters as a group of 
people ‘deprived of futures, hemmed in on all sides by racism, failed by their own leaders and 
representatives and unwilling to stand by as, first fascists, and then police officers, invaded their streets’ 
(Kundnani, 2001, p. 105). The institutional response to the riots was to blame ‘self-segregation’ (Kundnani, 
2007)3. David Blunkett, then Education Secretary, argued that the riots demonstrated the need for ‘core 
values’ (Kundnani, 2002), offering the first of many references between common values and security. 
Instead, Amin argues, ‘the rampage of the Asian youths should be seen in terms of a counter-public making 
a citizenship claim that cannot be reduced to complaints of ethnic and religious mooring or passing youth 
masculinity’ (Amin, 2003, p. 462). Such claims challenge the establishment response, which focuses on a 
lack of citizenship, seeing the riots as precisely a claim for citizenship instead.  
 
September 11th 2001 catalysed a ‘crisis in multiculturalism’ for many academics and journalists (Kundnani, 
2002). Hugo Young, writing in The Guardian, is emblematic of this when he wrote: ‘The problem is no 
longer just one of hoisting oppressed communities into membership of a colour-blind majority, but, it now 
turns out, of establishing the terms on which a religious minority is prepared to acknowledge prime loyalty 
                                               
3 Self-segregation is a recurring theme. Miah examines how this theme emerged later in the context of 
the ‘Trojan Horse scandal’: “Muslim Spatial segregation and the ‘Trojan Horse’ discourse are underpinned 
by the idea that Muslims self-consciously construct physical barriers between Muslims and non-Muslim 
communities of Birmingham’ (2017, p. 19). 
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to the society in which it lives and works’ (Young, Nov. 6, 2001). The question of loyalty frames continuing 
attitudes towards the British Muslim population: the problematic demand that within supposedly competing 
identity labels, ‘loyalty’ to Britain takes priority (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2015). Interestingly, Young’s article 
offers one of the earliest mentions of an attempt to strictly define British values: ‘Liberalism is betrayed by 
other people who put the comfort of immigrant minorities before the insistence of an irreducible list of 
British civic values: democracy, mutual tolerance, equality of liberty, the rule of law. Let’s hear it from the 
mullahs, right and left’ (Young, Nov. 6, 2001).   
 
Four years later, July 2005 proved an equally defining moment in the history of British multiculturalism. 
Falcous and Silk (2010) examine how discourses of multiculturalism changed in the UK across a 24-hour 
period. First, London won the competition to host the 2012 Olympics, a bid which rested heavily on 
narratives of a diverse, united London, and a beacon of multicultural living. The very next day, bombings 
on the London Underground and bus networks by so-called ‘home-grown terrorists’ placed 
multiculturalism immediately in a position of renewed crisis. For many, the attacks signalled the final 
‘death’ of multiculturalism in the UK (Allen, 2015; 2010). Falcous and Silk describe these two events as 
having ‘a contested rhetoric deployed across the political spectrum [with multiculturalism] as both the 
“cure” for national unification (…) and the “problem”’ (Falcous & Silk, 2010, p. 168).  
 
The attacks of July 2005 signalled for the UK leadership a need to reassess the question of identity and 
diversity in British communities. As Meer and Modood write, it was a ‘coupling of diversity and anti-
terrorism agendas that has implicated contemporary British multiculturalism as the culprit of Britain’s 
security woes’ (2009, p. 481). In January 2006, Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, argued 
that the bombings signalled a need to re-evaluate ‘the balance between diversity and integration’ (Brown, 
2006), as if the two were mutually exclusive. What was required, Brown argues, was the promotion of 
shared values, which ‘define what it means to be British in the modern world… liberty for all, responsibility 
by all, and fairness to all’ (Brown, 2006). In evoking Britishness, Jerome and Clemitshaw (2012) note that 
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Brown made a concerted effort to grapple issues of patriotism and nationalism away from right-wing 
nationalists, through the preferred language of citizenship. Furthermore, Osler (2009) notes how it was 
education that was asked to play a key role in realising these values. Kundnani notes: ‘The new conventional 
wisdom is that a set of “core values” is the glue that must hold Britishness together… these core values 
would also be the mechanism by which limits could be set on multiculturalism’ (Kundnani, 2007, p. 25). 
Such limits, Kundnani argues, result from a fear of multiculturalism that was confirmed in the 2005 
bombings. Kundnani summarises this argument: ‘Multiculturalism has encouraged Muslims to separate 
themselves and live by their own values, resulting in extremism, and ultimately, the fostering of a mortal 
homegrown terrorist threat’ (Kundnani, 2007, p. 26).  
 
This notion of limits on multiculturalism, interestingly picked up by Young in his article in 2001, appears 
to set the boundaries within which diversity can be managed, offering fascinating synergy with the 
definition of counter-extremism, examined in the previous chapter, as the setting of limits on permissible 
attitudes and opinion. Banerjee and Linstead trace the origins of multiculturalism within the context of 
discourses of globalisation, and the need for ‘managing the consequences of cultural diversity’ (2001, p. 
702, original emphasis) resulting from increased migration. They argue that ‘globalisation produces a 
tension between sameness and difference, between the universal and the particular’ (ibid., p. 696), and 
employ the term ‘multicultural nationalism’ (ibid., p. 703) to describe the production of limits on diversity 
within national boundaries. A consumption of diverse cultures and cultural artefacts is produced: ‘This 
celebration of cultural pluralism is predicated on an established hierarchy of cultures and multiculturalism 
consolidates these hegemonic relations without challenging the hierarchy of the majority and the minority’ 
(Banerjee & Linstead, 2001, p. 704). Later, they add: ‘As long as we do not threaten the dominant ideology, 
we can be as multicultural as we like’ (ibid., p. 707). 
 
The election of the Conservative-led coalition government in 2010 saw an intensification of the discourse 
of Britishness, through both speech and policy. The 2011 review of the Prevent strategy saw ‘fundamental 
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British values’ enshrined within the definition of extremism. Furthermore, a series of key speeches by Prime 
Minister David Cameron, most notably in Munich in February 2011, set out a renewed policy of 
assimilation, and so-called ‘muscular liberalism’. From the point of Cameron’s leadership, the discursive 
linkage of British values and security really began to grow stronger, as did the demands made of schools to 
promote such values.  
 
The so-called ‘Trojan Horse Scandal’ cemented the need for both schools to promote fundamental British 
values, as well as for greater scrutiny over what schools were in fact teaching with regard to national identity 
and citizenship. The government responded to the scandal by intensifying schools’ responsibility towards 
fundamental British values from one of needing to ‘respect’ the values, to needing to ‘actively promote’ 
them (Long, 2016). Furthermore, the school inspectorate, Ofsted introduced, in their November 2014 
Inspections Handbook that they would inspect schools on their ability to promote these values (Ofsted, 
2014).  
 
Contested: Exclusionary values defining the ‘really’ British 
In academic scholarship, the discourse surrounding the values has been challenged on a number of fronts: 
scholars have challenged the foundational assumption that diversity poses a threat to social cohesion; 
scholars have challenged the values themselves; and scholars have examined how problematic it has been 
to attempt to introduce these values into schools.  
 
Writers have challenged the links made between diversity and security. Edyvane, for example, writes that 
‘the Britishness agenda… takes far too much for granted in its presumption that disagreement about core 
values tends inexorably to the failure of society, that the flourishing society is a broadly harmonious society’ 
(2011, p. 90). Kundnani notes that ‘the thesis of a slippery slope from segregation to extremism to 




The values themselves have also been challenged. Goodwin (Nov. 11, 2014) challenges whether respecting 
unjust laws was a value in a democracy. Others examine the label ‘British’. Allen (2015, p. 3), Healy, (2018, 
p. 10), Maylor (2016, p. 315), and Osler (2009, p. 86) all challenge whether the values are uniquely ‘British’. 
Busher et al. found that teachers felt unsure how labelling these values as British could comprise a 
component of an ‘inclusive curriculum’ (Busher, Choudhury, Thomas & Harris, 2017, p. 6). Similarly, 
Habib found teachers ‘wary about promoting patriotic agendas’ (2018, p. 57), adding that it could lead to 
racism (ibid., p. 59). Karlsen and Nazroo argue that the discourse surrounding Britishness presents the 
country as ‘superior, successful and dominating’ (2015, p. 763). Arthur (2015), Lander (2016), and Maylor 
(2016) criticise the emphasis the discourse makes on ethnic minorities, and Muslim communities in 
particular, to change to meet the values criteria, whereas other communities are not asked to. Miah (2017, 
p. 5) argues that the ‘values discourse constructs Muslims as racial outsiders’. Elton-Chalcraft et al. 
conclude that ‘no amount of superficial flag-waving will enable BME [black and minority ethnic] pupils to 
be more British because the notion is implicitly racialised’ (2017, p. 42). Winter and Mills (2018, p. 6) 
argue that ‘these policies contribute to racial governance under neoliberalism through the continued 
targeting of certain racialised community groups for surveillance, management and containment’. Arthur 
destabilises the discourse’s inference that ethnic minorities lack these values:  
 
The Muslim community’s focus is largely local with an emphasis on religious faith, traditional 
family and community values. Much of this virtue positive response would have not been out of 
step with the values of an older British generation. It can be difficult to see who better reflects 
traditional British values, conservative Muslim communities or secularised materialist youth 
groups. (Arthur, 2015, p. 315) 
 
Keddie (2014) associates the values with ‘whiteness’, criticising the emphasis placed on minorities to 
assimilate (see also Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017, p. 33). Moreover, not only are these values described as 
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‘white’, supporters of the values, including then Prime Minister David Cameron, have described them as 
‘Christian’: ‘They are Christian values and they should give us the confidence to say yes, we are a Christian 
country and we are proud of it. But they are also values that speak to everyone in Britain – to people of 
every faith and none’ (Cameron, Mar. 27, 2016; see also Peterson & Bentley, 2016). Wemyss explores how 
this disparity in expectations of different ethnic groups, in relation to wider narratives of tolerance, creates 
a ‘hierarchy of belonging’, explaining how ‘those who are at the top of a hierarchy of belonging have the 
power to grant or withhold tolerance from those at the bottom’ (Wemyss, 2006, p. 235). Worryingly, Lander 
suggests that these problematic components of the British values discourse are compounded by a lack of 
teacher training, which transforms teachers into little more than ‘instruments of the state within a liberal 
democracy’ (Lander, 2016, p. 276). Lander continues:  
 
This positioning has been cemented by the lack of training in how to teach about British values and 
the diminution of critical spaces in which to trouble and disrupt their positioning. So teachers and 
student teachers rely on nostalgic imperialist constructions of Britishness thus re-inscribing not 
only the whiteness associated with this national identity… (Lander, 2016, p. 276) 
 
Other scholars have examined how teachers have responded to their requirement to promote British values. 
Jerome and Clemitshaw conducted research at an early stage in the introduction of Britishness to the 
classroom. They found that teachers  
 
were overwhelmingly sceptical about being asked to deliver what they considered to be 
propaganda-like messages through their teaching, and on the whole they were much happier with 
the idea of teaching practices which model democratic values, rather than seeking to inculcate them 
through direct didactic teaching approaches. (Jerome & Clemitshaw, 2012, p. 38)  
 
75 
Maylor (2016) observed teachers nervous to teach British values for fear of excluding ethnic minorities. In 
conversation with pupils, Maylor also noted that pupils suggested that in class, when discussing these 
values, they tended to focus on what made people different rather than on what people had in common. 
Additionally, as Farrell (2016) discovered, not all teachers were entirely against the idea of promoting these 
values, seeing them as universal values and believing there was room to critically appropriate them. Two 
factors appear uncomfortable to teachers therefore: the ‘British’ label, and their didactic teaching.  
 
This section has examined why fundamental British values have come to be valued as a key component of 
a counter-extremism in schools strategy, exploring how they have become seen as a key tool in providing 
a foundational level of common values to challenge the insecurity brought about by increasing levels of 
segregation and poor social cohesion in society. However, the section has also explored just how contested 
this value component is. In particular, the lack of empirical support to prove the link between segregation 
and insecurity was emphasised, alongside an examination of how the values discourse perpetuates low 
levels of social cohesion. The values discourse clearly nominates a group who are already British and a 
group who need to integrate or assimilate in order to be accepted. Lastly, the section explored the various 
studies that have examined how the values teaching component of the counter-extremism strategy has been 
implemented in schools. In particular, the clear antagonism between values promotion and promoting 
tolerance and diversity became evident.  
 
The Knowledge Base: Extremism, Citizenship and other Cultures 
That schools should expand the knowledge of their students is perhaps obvious, and in the context of 
countering extremism, this is certainly no different. Yet, unlike ‘fundamental British values’, which are 
spelled out clearly in government documentation, or critical thinking, which is discussed at length in both 
the education and extremism literature as well as in its own field, what this knowledge should be is far less 
clear. Instead, the word ‘knowledge’ is normally deployed with little explanation or clarification: ‘young 
people need relevant and timely learning opportunities to develop the knowledge, skills and attitudes that 
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can help them build their resilience’ (UNESCO, 2016, p. 9). Alternatively, clarifications of what this 
knowledge might entail are shielded behind the phrase, ‘a broad and balanced curriculum’ (P1). As such, 
insight and clarity is required in order to ascertain what such ‘knowledge’ actually entails.  
 
Yet, within government guidance and school policies, three aspects to this knowledge can be spelled out. 
First, there is knowledge of extremist narratives, and the risks involved in terrorism; second, there is 
knowledge about other cultures, faiths and values; and third, there is knowledge of political systems, 
citizenship and political engagement.4  
 
RAN suggests a key objective of counter-radicalisation education is ‘to enhance knowledge, awareness and 
critical thinking on the nature of terrorism, the phenomenon of radicalisation, and the radicalisation process 
leading to violent extremism’ (RAN, 2018, p. 55).  Some schools focus more explicitly on countering 
extremist narratives. As one school policy put it, ‘we will all strive to eradicate the myths and assumptions 
that can lead to some young people becoming alienated and disempowered’ (P3, p. 5). The 2008 toolkit, 
Learning to Be Safe, demands ‘a curriculum adapted to recognise local need, challenge extremist narratives 
and promote universal rights’ (DCSF, 2008, p. 9).  
 
Second, schools must develop knowledge and awareness of other cultures, faiths and ways of life. Learning 
to be safe argues that ‘the role of religious education (RE), citizenship and history will be particularly 
critical in developing a stronger shared understanding of and respect for culture, belief and heritage’ (DCSF, 
2008, p. 28). The National Union of Teachers (NUT) promotes teachers ‘helping students develop 
knowledge of religion, history, geography, citizenship’ (NUT, 2016, p. 4). UNESCO suggests students 
                                               
4 Interestingly, when it comes to teaching materials that are designed specifically to fulfil schools’ counter-
extremism obligations, the knowledge component focuses far more heavily on teaching about extremism 
and terrorism than the other two elements mentioned here. While some knowledge of political systems is 
disseminated within materials discussing the British value of democracy, these latter two components 
tend to be tackled through wider school curricula. 
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‘acquire knowledge and understanding of local, national and global issues and the interconnectedness and 
interdependency of different countries and populations’ (UNESCO, 2016, p. 20). Such a proposal appears 
to rely on an understanding of extremism that emphasises an intolerance of others. Through being exposed 
to other cultures and other ideas, young people will become more willing to accept alternative values and 
ideas as being legitimate.  
 
Third, schools should improve students’ knowledge of political structures, and the mechanisms through 
which political engagement is both possible and permissible – often through their citizenship lessons: ‘In 
Citizenship, pupils learn about democracy, government and how laws are made and upheld. Pupils are also 
taught about the diverse national, regional, religious and ethnic identities in the United Kingdom and the 
need for respect and understanding’ (Department for Education, 2015, p. 8). Moreover, such knowledge, 
the UK Government argues, can help promote fundamental British values. The Government asks schools 
to enhance students’ awareness of democratic decision-making processes, laws, law-making, and the 
reasons why laws exist, as well as the fundamentals of the UK political systems such as the separation of 
the executive and judiciary (Department for Education, 2014, pp. 5-6). This appears to deploy education to 
meet the third aspect of counter-extremism explored in the previous chapter: the promotion of non-violent 
forms of political engagement. In this regard, the literature suggests that education can offer alternative 
routes to political engagement, rather than violence. Davies argues that ‘it is about opening up, presenting 
alternatives to understandings and actions’ (Davies, 2008, p. 60, original emphasis). Sieckelinck and de 
Ruyter’s examination of ‘reasonable passion’ is emblematic here. They do not aim to change the ideals 
which young people hold on to, but ‘what is required, rather, is awareness of and guidance regarding the 
manner in which individuals dedicate themselves to their ideals’ (Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009, p. 183). 
 
Contestation: what do we really know about these issues? 
The previous chapter examined just how unstable knowledge of extremism and radicalisation is at an 
academic and policy level. That teachers should be able to transmit this unstable, contested and poorly 
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supported knowledge to their students appears a particularly daunting challenge. The chapter also explored 
how knowledge around extremism and radicalisation contributes to the transformation of Muslim 
communities into ‘suspect communities’. There is a real danger therefore that teachers, when developing 
classes on the risks of terrorism, build on and further embed, such alienating narratives. Lander (2016), as 
explored above, fears that the promotion of British values will lead to teachers deploying problematic and 
colonial notions of Britishness as a result of poor levels of training, and it is not unlikely that such narratives 
could equally be deployed when teaching about extremism.  
 
Furthermore, the uncertainty over the body of knowledge extends also to the component regarding 
legitimate political engagement. This was made clear when a police officer delivering training to teachers 
about the Prevent duty in West Yorkshire suggested that non-violent direct action was a form of extremism. 
The officer cited a recent case of the Green Party MP Caroline Lucas’ arrest at an anti-fracking 
demonstration as an example of extremism (Bloom, Sep. 4, 2015). That teachers will, whether through fear 
or lack of adequate training, promote a particularly narrow understanding of legitimate political engagement 
is a real concern.  
 
Beyond a question of whether the uncertain and unstable body of knowledge that will be taught may lead 
to the transmission of deeply problematic and divisive narratives, other studies have examined the issue of 
teacher training. Peterson and Bentley for example, conducting research into the parallel introduction of 
‘Australian values’ to the Australian counter-extremism in schools strategy, warn that ‘it is likely to be the 
case that many teachers are not confident or comfortable enough to teach explicitly about representations 
of Islam in a balanced and informed manner’ (Peterson & Bentley, 2016, p. 242). Alternatively, Ahmed 
(Apr. 28, 2015) expresses how Muslim teachers are nervous about broaching the topic for fear of being 
labelled extremists themselves.  
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Overall, the challenge of teaching the topics of extremism, world faiths, and democratic systems is an 
enormous one that teachers must face. Teachers must cope with problematic and contested bodies of 
knowledge, a lack of training, and pressures from regulators and government bodies that promote narrow 
understandings of democratic engagement. Scholars suggest that these challenges faced by teachers, could 
well lead to problematic messages directed to students. Teachers may well fall back on stereotypical 
narratives that could prove more divisive than inclusive, working against the objectives of the strategy.  
 
Contradictions: three components pulling a strategy in opposite directions 
It is clear that the three components of the UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy are heavily 
contested. The ‘developing skills’ component relies on a poorly defined notion of critical thinking, which 
when deployed in the task of ‘building resilience’ to extremist narrative, belies a core component of critical 
thinking: a reflexive openness to one’s own beliefs. The ‘promoting values’ component assumes that 
‘shared values’ will lead to social cohesion, yet the very language within the term ‘fundamental British 
values’ has been shown to be so exclusionary as to make that aim of social cohesion even harder to reach. 
Lastly, the ‘disseminating knowledge’ component demands that teachers transmit a body of knowledge on 
the issues of extremism and radicalisation to their students. Yet, as the last chapter examined, that body of 
knowledge is based on weak empirical support, is divisive, and is heavily contested. Whether teachers are 
equipped to transmit that knowledge, and whether that knowledge alienates ethnic minorities and Muslims 
in particular, are two key questions that are of profound concern. 
 
Yet, these components are not just contested, they are also contradictory (see figure 3.2). That is, each of 
the three components intends to take the counter-extremism in schools strategy in different directions. As 
a whole, combining these vastly different frameworks, the strategy appears confused and unproductive. 
This section briefly outlines these contradictions, before building the core research question of the thesis, 
which aims to examine how this contested and contradictory strategy manifests itself in discourses within 





While skills and values are, as examined above, so often combined together within the literature, and causal 
relationships are often inferred between skills and values, these two components of the strategy demand 
vastly different things of teachers and students. It was demonstrated above that critical thinking is a skill 
that puts the status quo in a position of uncertainty, as a key component of critical thinking is to reflect and 
analyse the current common sense answer to a question. Yet, the ‘fundamental British values’ are 
definitively fundamental. The strategy appears to demand that students discover a predefined set of 
fundamental values through a critical process of discovery. Such a paradox appears impossible. How can 
one engage critically with fundamental values? 
 
There is more room for synergy rather than contradiction when examining the ‘skills development’ and 
‘disseminating knowledge’ components of the strategy. The knowledge component, unlike the values 
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component, does not rely on fundamental truths to be transmitted. One could conceive of teachers 
developing a critical approach with students to this body of knowledge. Students are required to develop 
knowledge of terrorism and extremism, its risks, and the ways in which its propaganda operate. There is 
nothing to suggest that teachers could not express the uncertainty and contestation of this knowledge to 
their students; in fact, it appears a ripe venue for students to practice key skills. Moreover, the body of 
knowledge to be transmitted also includes knowledge of UK political systems and practices of democratic 
engagement. Teachers could well plan a lesson (or series of lessons) that aimed to critically explore current 
UK political practices – it could examine claims of elitism, explore debates around political reform, and 
even examine issues regarding human rights law and the deportation or detention of terrorist suspects in the 
UK.  
 
However, to do so would appear to undermine the fundamental logic of counter-extremism within the 
Prevent strategy, namely, the promotion of a set of moderate values, and resilient defence against extremist 
ideology. Schools must also promote ‘fundamental British values’. Crucially, when examining the 
regulatory mechanisms by which schools and teachers are evaluated, such critical practices could 
demonstrate the undermining of, rather than active promotion of, the values. As such, there is a very real 
danger that in examining the knowledge that is required to be transmitted, critical thinking might be applied 
only in a ‘weak’ sense. That is, narratives of extremism might be explored critically (in order for students 
to develop the skills of resilience to see through propaganda), but that critical perspective might not be 
reflected back onto the core tenets of liberal democracy, so as to not endanger a school’s commitment to 
promoting ‘fundamental British values’.  
 
There is a further tension between the knowledge and values components. The promotion of fundamental 
British values is designed to extend to students an understanding of the commonalities that are shared by 
all citizens of the UK. Yet, research has shown that this objective is undermined by the fact that lessons on 
these values emphasise differences rather than similarities. Moreover, the clear dualism of teaching about 
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‘us’ and teaching about ‘them’ within the knowledge component appears in danger of further undermining 
a sense of togetherness. Such an emphasis appears in danger of contradicting the pluralism at the heart of 
the ‘fundamental British values’. The question exists therefore as to what extent transmitting knowledge 
about extremism and terrorism to students is endangering the togetherness that shared values intend to 
engender.  
 
In sum, this chapter argues that the aims and objectives of the UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy 
are contested and contradictory. This thesis will present a deep, critical analysis of these tensions, by 
examining how this contestation and contradiction manifests itself at a classroom level. As Smith notes, 
‘the exact nature of how such changes have been interpreted by schools is not yet known’ (Smith, 2016, p. 
306). Thus far, critical research into the UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy has tended to focus 
either on the surveillance aspect of the Prevent duty, or on ‘fundamental British values’. Moreover, this 
research has examined each of these aspects in isolation from the other components of the strategy. This 
thesis argues that there is need for research that examines how each of these component objectives 
interrelates with one another. This thesis will achieve this, as the next chapter examines in detail, by 
analysing teaching materials used to fulfil school’s counter-extremism obligations, in order to explore how 
these objectives translate into a classroom context. 
 
The intentions of the analysis are two-fold. Firstly, it intends to explore the ways in which the apparent not 
working of the strategy presents challenges when writers produce teaching materials to fulfil the obligations 
of the strategy. Secondly, it attempts to go beyond this in developing a critical analysis to examine what is 
working through this apparent not-working. Through placing teaching materials under the critical 
microscope, much wider implications of counter-extremism can be examined and deconstructed. As such, 
the thesis develops the following exploratory research question: How do the contested and contradictory 





 Developing a Discourse Theory Approach 
 
Without language, the social world, full of objects to which we ascribe particular meanings, and between 
which we ascribe particular relationships, would not exist. The material world would; it is not that the 
objects themselves disappear. The social world, however, is a product of meaning-making, and thus a 
product of language. It is in this sense that every utterance of language contributes to the continued 
construction of that social world. Newspapers, for example, construct political events, deciding which 
events we label as ‘important’, which events are ‘tragic’, and whose private lives are deemed ‘public’.  
 
For young people, school teaching materials play a vital role in constructing the social world in which they 
grow up. They tell teachers and students alike not only stories about the past, building images of proud 
nation-states, and battles which defended freedom, but also they tell teachers and students what kinds of 
knowledge are to be valued, and what kinds of intelligence are the most worthy. As such, teaching materials 
are valuable artefacts for research. They can tell researchers enormous amounts both about societal 
discourses on particular issues, as well as the implications of particular educational policies and strategies.  
 
The goal of this thesis is to use a set of teaching materials as a prism through which to examine how the 
political realms of extremism and counter-extremism are constructed, as well as how the world post-
extremism is envisioned to look, once extremism has been dealt with. The research takes the contradictions, 
tensions and antagonisms at the heart of counter-extremism education and asks, not just what does this 
apparent not-working look like when it is translated into teaching materials, but what is working through 
its apparent not-working? 
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This chapter explores how the thesis aims to achieve its goals. It will do so through developing a post-
structuralist discourse theory approach. In so doing, the thesis aims not to adjudicate whether the aims and 
objectives of the strategy are met in a classroom context, but instead to examine the ways in which the aims 
and objectives are built and conceptualised within a classroom setting. Moreover, it aims to explore the 
significance of such constructions through a process of critique. 
 
This chapter intends to first outline the paradigm in which this research is located. As Guba and Lincoln 
note, ‘questions of method are secondary to questions of paradigm, which we define as the basic belief 
system or worldview that guides the investigator not only in choices of method but in ontologically and 
epistemologically fundamental ways’ (1994, p. 105). As such, before examining the method of this thesis, 
it is vital to explicitly express its paradigm. Guba and Lincoln delineate three components to this paradigm: 
ontology, epistemology and methodology, asking, ‘what is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, 
what is there that can be known about it?’ ‘What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or 
would-be knower and what can be known? ‘and ‘How can the inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding 
out whatever he or she believes can be known?’ respectively (ibid., p. 108). This chapter then seeks initially 
to answer these questions, through building the post-structuralist/social constructionist paradigm in which 
this thesis is located. Guba and Lincoln (ibid.) acknowledge, however, that in social 
constructionist/constructivist5 paradigms, the distinction between ontology and epistemology becomes 
somewhat blurred as one so strongly feeds off the other. As such, the chapter first begins by, in combination, 
exploring the ontological and epistemological assumptions at the heart of post-structuralist thought, before 
examining Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory – the framework shaping the research in question. From 
                                               
5 In many social sciences, including political science and international relations (e.g. Heath-Kelly 2016) 
the term ‘constructivism’ is used synonymously with the term ‘social constructionism’, a term more 
popular amongst social psychologists (Gergen 1999, p. 30). This thesis will employ the term social 
constructionism to encompass both terms.  
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here, the chapter then moves to examine the methodology and methods deployed to answer the research 
question.  
 
The research paradigm: social constructionism, discourse and deconstruction 
At its broadest level, the thesis adopts a social constructionist paradigm. Adopting this paradigm of social 
constructionism has both epistemological and ontological consequences, offering both an understanding of 
what reality is around us, and how we have access to knowledge of that reality. The social constructionist 
paradigm has been deployed in both educational settings (Lather, 1992), and in work on terrorism and 
extremism (Heath-Kelly, 2016). Social constructionism offers an epistemological framework, which 
challenges empirical and positivist truth claims by exploring how all claims to truth and knowledge are 
derived within social contexts (Gergen, 1999). Yet, social constructionism is ontological also, in that it 
offers a framework through which scholars come to understand language as being constitutive of the world 
around us, not just our knowledge of it. 
 
Social constructionism builds from a structuralist account of language (Burr, 2003), which challenges what 
Frowe terms a ‘representational’ account: the idea that ‘language is “anchored” in the world… language is 
connected with something else, an extra-linguistic reality’ (Frowe, 2001, p. 176). Instead, structuralists 
argue that a word’s meaning is neither derived from a relationship of representation to reality, nor something 
intrinsic to the word itself, but through its relationship to other words. As Heath-Kelly explains: ‘you know 
what any given word represents because it is situated within a structure of other words, and it obtains its 
meaning through contrast and juxtaposition. Simply put, you know what cat is because it isn’t dog’ (Heath-
Kelly, 2016, p. 61). These words, or ‘signifiers’, bear no actual relationship to that which they label, the 
‘signified’. Bearing on relationships to other signifiers, they are arbitrary labels. Rather than there being a 
relationship between a label and its object, there is in fact a gap. Any notion that our understanding of the 
world is tethered to the material world is thus broken. Instead, our known world is constructed in the social 
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contexts in which we operate, and is perpetually re-constructed through the deployment of language, 
constituting the world. 
 
Structuralists argue that while this network of meaning-giving signifiers may indeed be arbitrary, it becomes 
fixed in a web of meaning, and it is this network-structure of meaning that allows us to ‘know’ the world 
around us (Burr, 2003). Post-structuralists challenge the structuralist account on two counts. First, they 
argue that relations of power run through the web of contrasting relationships between signifiers. Drawing 
from Jacques Derrida’s critique of logocentrism – ‘the belief in orders of meaning, reason or logic that exist 
independently of language or text’ (Burman & MacLure, 2005, p. 285) – post-structuralists argue, akin to 
structuralists, that language is defined by its opposite, existing in dichotomous relationships (Edkins, 2007). 
However, these ‘conceptual oppositions are never simply neutral but are inevitably hierarchical’ (Devetak, 
2009, p. 195) – white/black; good/evil; man/woman – each opposition having a dominant term. Every 
labelling act is thus an expression of power, of dominance or resistance; all language is political, either 
reinforcing or challenging relations of power in the world. Take labelling someone as an ‘extremist’ for 
instance. Instantly, such a claim also conjures up someone as the ‘moderate’, and a hierarchy between them 
is formed, with moderate being the dominant term. 
 
Second, post-structuralists argue that the network of signifiers is not fixed but instead permanently 
contested and in flux, contested both by its linguistic opposite, and by alternative labels excluded in the 
signification process. ‘Deconstruction’, is the label post-structuralists offer to the process of exposing these 
contestations and the power relations attempting to hide them. As Devetak notes, ‘Deconstruction attempts 
to show that such oppositions are untenable, as each term always already depends on the other. Indeed, the 
prized term gains its privilege only by disavowing its dependence on the subordinate or debased term’ 
(2009, p. 195). The reliance of the dominant term on the subordinate term leaves the terms in perpetual 
contestation, unable to permanently mask that arbitrary nature of its dominance. Deconstruction renders 
these hierarchies visible and seeks to expose ‘aporias’, ‘points of impasse – where the integrity of the 
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opposition is fatally compromised’ (Burman & MacLure, 2005, p. 285) – those moments where the 
linguistic hierarchy becomes untenable.  
 
Furthermore, not only are terms themselves reliant on their opposite, they are reliant on continued 
dominance of excluded, yet competing, terms or labels. As such, ‘post-structuralism’s focus is on the 
remainder, all that is left over after the systematic categorisations have been made’ (Lather, 1992, p. 90). 
As Edkins notes, the arbitrary notion of labelling suggests that the chosen label is but one of innumerable 
labelling options, and as such the labelling process is a political process of exclusion – what she terms the 
‘excess’ or ‘lack’: ‘the lack or the excess can be explained by noting that once something has been named, 
that something both never lives up to the name it is given and is always more than the name can encompass’ 
(Edkins, 2007, p. 93). A ‘mother’ both can never fulfil the perfect expression of ‘motherhood’ and 
concurrently is not just ‘mother’ but also ‘sister’, ‘dancer’, ‘engineer’ or ‘activist’.  
 
If all labelling is political, then the objectivity claimed by empiricism and positivism is cast in doubt. While 
empirical scientific accounts of the world may lay claim to authoritative truth claims, the very fact that 
those claims can only be made through linguistic mechanisms means those claims will be imbued with 
relations of power, and normative claims of the ways in which the world should be or operate (Gergen, 
1999). Not only is this challenge vital to recognise in the context of research, but also in the classroom 
context, where every teaching moment is a normative claim and a moment of contestation in the perpetual 
re-constitution of our social reality. It is within this contestation that the criticality of post-structuralist 
research emerges, as Burr explains: ‘With the poststructuralist view of language we are drawn into a view 
of talk, writing and social encounters as sites of struggle and conflict, where power relations are acted out 
and contested’ (2003, p. 55). Critical, deconstructionist scholarship for Edkins (1999) thus entails bringing 
the political ‘back in’, through horitzontalising the process through which one label is prioritised over 
another. The centrality of a ‘critical’ approach to post-structuralist and deconstructionist research is 
recognised in this thesis. By adopting a critical approach, this thesis acknowledges the impossibility of an 
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objective theory, and instead examines the power relations underlying the continued support of particular 
theories over others (Cox, 1981). The thesis moreover acknowledges the historical roots of social 
constructionism in critical scholarship. As Gergen notes: ‘The central hope of social constructionist 
practitioners is to bring forth new and more promising ways of life’ (1999). It is this process of rendering 
visible the political and exclusionary nature of labelling that this thesis terms ‘deconstructionism’, done so 
in the hope that through rendering visible the hidden lines holding the fragile state of current knowledge 




Having stated the theoretical assumptions at the heart of the thesis, the chapter can now build its ‘research 
pyramid’ (see figure 4.1). As such, a post-structuralist or social constructionist paradigm is relativist in its 
ontology. Guba and Lincoln express relativism as an understanding that ‘realities are apprehendable in the 
form of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in 
nature (…), and dependent for their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the 
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constructions’ (1994, pp. 110-111). If the world is built from a set of multiple potential realities, and these 
realities compete for dominance, then it becomes the post-structuralist researcher’s task to uncover how 
and why one reality comes to dominate. It is important to note here, that while the social constructionist 
framework offers a relativist ontology, it remains at a distance from the philosophical school of idealism, 
in that it does not deny the existence of the material world.6 Edley (2001) negotiates this challenge by 
suggesting that social constructionism offers an epistemological, rather than an ontological claim, yet, 
social constructionists, and here post-structuralist accounts in particular, are making claims on the nature 
of reality and what can be known about it.7 In particular, as shall be explored in the context of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory, this relativist account argues that while the material world may exist a priori to 
language, the social world, and the subjects within it, does not.   
 
Within both a post-structuralist and social constructionist framework, the thesis acknowledges ‘discourse’ 
as the core epistemological framework for understanding how language structures our world and our 
knowledge of it. Within the context of a web of signifiers, built in relationships of contrast and juxtaposition, 
a discourse provides a key building block through which those linkages between signifiers are made; a 
building block that not only provides discursive links between different ideas (the terrorism discourse for 
example links together ‘terrorism’ with ‘illegitimacy’), but also constructs the world (of ‘states’, and 
‘militant groups’), and the subjects within it (‘victims’, and ‘villains’). While discourse, and its multifarious 
forms of analyses, has been deployed under numerous ontological or epistemological paradigms (Milliken, 
1999), this thesis adopts the post-structuralist discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, 
                                               
6 See Edwards et al. (1995) for a robust (and entertaining) response to the criticism that social constructionists are 
arguing the material world does not exist. 
7 Interestingly, Zulaika (2016) does in fact question the ontology of terrorism, through exploring the numerous cases 
in which terrorism does not exist in the context of empty threats or bluffs, and thwarted attacks. Zulaika explores 
whether the fear or fantasy of the terrorist attack are enough to suggest that terrorism exists without in fact a material 
act occurring.  
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offering a robust and detailed theory through which to transform a discursive mass (a corpus of data) into 
components prone for analysis and critique.  
 
Laclau and Mouffe share a number of the assumptions outlined above, beginning from the assumption, as 
Leurs articulates, where ‘meanings are differential in nature; they are established in relation to other 
meanings, without a fixed reference point in the “real”’ (2012, p. 34). Moreover, these phenomena are never 
fixed, as in a structuralist account, but perpetually contested (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). From this 
foundation, Laclau and Mouffe offer a unique vocabulary in their exploration of how discourses are 
constructed. Language is built up of a number of different ‘signs’. These signs begin as ‘elements’ – ‘signs 
whose meanings have not yet been fixed’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 27). Through the process of 
‘articulation’, a process ‘establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a 
result of the articulatory practice’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 91), a ‘discourse’ emerges. These elements 
are thus changed into ‘moments’ when ‘articulated within a discourse’ (ibid.), contested by the remaining 
elements excluded in the articulation – what Laclau and Mouffe refer to as a ‘surplus of meaning’ (ibid., 
p.97) floating, as they describe, in a ‘field of discursivity’ (ibid., p. 98). As I argue elsewhere, ‘discourses 
are but temporary homes for these free-flowing elements, stuck in a temporary moment, perpetually 
threatened by alternative conceptualisations of phenomena’ (Ford, 2017b, p. 124). The deployment of the 
term ‘moment’ illustrates a discourse’s impermanence, as Laclau and Mouffe note, ‘the transition from the 
“elements” to the “moments” is never entirely fulfilled’ (2001, p. 97).  
 
Two further features of this theory of discourse are vital for the current research: no reality exists outside 
of the discursive realm, and subjectivity does not precede discourse. 
 
Laclau and Mouffe reject a distinction made in other forms of discourse analysis (e.g. that of Norman 
Fairclough) – that there are two realms: the discursive and the non-discursive. Instead, they argue, ‘every 
object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive 
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condition of emergence’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 93). In other words, no object can be understood 
outside of the context of a discourse. A friendly wave for example can only be understood through the 
discourse of gesture, and the discursive relationship between the subjects giving and receiving the wave; a 
chair can only be understood within the discourse in which it is placed: an office chair, a ‘naughty chair’, a 
‘throne’. Outside of that discourse, while a material object may exist8, understanding of that object persists 
within and constitutes discourse. Laclau and Mouffe do not deny the material world nor suggest the world 
is purely discursive, but instead argue that discourses are themselves material (2001, p. 94) – in this context, 
‘materialised’ in a series of activities presented in teaching materials.  
 
Secondly, akin to other post-structuralist thinkers such as Jenny Edkins who argued that ‘language speaks 
the subject’ (1999, p. 41), Laclau and Mouffe reject the notion of an a priori subject, existing outside of the 
discursive realm. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe refer to ‘subject positions’: ‘Whenever we use the category 
of “subject” in this text, we will do so in the sense of “subject positions” within a discursive structure. 
Subjects cannot, therefore, be the origin of social relations – not even in the limited sense of being endowed 
with powers that render an experience possible – as all “experience” depends on precise discursive 
conditions of possibility’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 101). A subject only exists within a discourse. This 
notion of subjectivity appears akin to that developed by Louis Althusser in his discussion of ‘interpellation’. 
That, in acknowledging the call of ‘hey you there’ from a police officer in a crowded street, the individual 
called turns around: ‘By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a 
subject’ (Althusser, 1971, p. 163). The social order in which those subject positions are designated, are 
(re)constituted in that very moment of articulation. This distinction is particularly key in the context of this 
                                               
8 As in the discussion above, Laclau and Mouffe are at pains to distance themselves from the realism/idealism 
debate: ‘The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a 
world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event 
that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity 
as objects is constructed in terms of “natural phenomena” or “expressions of the wrath of God”, depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field’ (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, p. 94).  
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research, as it asks at various moments how the subject position of ‘student’, ‘citizen’, ‘terrorist’, ‘critical 
thinker’ or ‘Briton’ may be constructed and constituted. 
 
Methodology and Method: Deconstruction and critical discourse analysis 
While this thesis allocates deconstruction the label ‘methodology’, it is something notoriously difficult to 
define, and certainly is antithetical as a school of thought to the notion of ‘method’ (Burman & MacLure, 
2005; Thomassen, 2010). There is not one method of deconstruction; such a notion of a closed, unitary 
process would be inimical to the very theoretical foundation on which deconstruction stands. Furthermore, 
deconstruction challenges the idea of ‘analysis’. While in more positivistic settings, analysis would entail 
the distant calculations and assessment of a set of data, deconstructionist analysis is seen to play a part in 
the construction of knowledge: ‘Deconstruction as method is not given to the individual deconstructions 
but partially articulated and, hence, constituted through them’ (Thomassen, 2010, p. 44). While 
deconstruction as method(ology) appears somewhat contradictory, Burman and MacLure do helpfully offer 
three principles by which to guide a deconstructionist research process: ‘see the world, your data and 
yourself as text, with all that that implies… look for the binary oppositions in texts… challenge the taken-
for-granted’ (2005, p. 286). As such, in developing both a method and a form of analysis, the thesis 
acknowledges the constitutive role played by this research in producing knowledge on the subject, and of 
the role of the researcher in being both a product of, and contributor to, discourse. The method taken in this 
research attempts to take these principles on board, in combination with the analytical tools offered by the 
field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS).  
 
During the first decade of the new millennium, in which counter-terrorism strategies and laws became more 
and more expansive, research on the threat of terrorism was being produced in vast quantities not before 
seen (Gunning, 2007; Breen-Smyth, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris & Robinson, 2008). CTS began from 
an evident frustration among some terrorism scholars that the bulk of this terrorism research was both not 
addressing a series of empirical and methodological flaws, nor was it capable of addressing the wide range 
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of human rights abuses and injustices engendered by the Global War on Terror (Gunning, 2007; Jackson, 
2007a). CTS extends from two foundational perspectives. One is a critique of ‘orthodox’ terrorism studies, 
the second is a set of commitments or approaches relating to epistemology, ontology and ethics (Jackson, 
2007a).  
 
As Jackson (2007a) makes clear, CTS’ critiques of orthodox terrorism studies are extensive, and include: 
its empirical weakness and lack of primary research, its state-centric nature, and its embeddedness in an 
industry surrounding counter-terrorism that reproduces hegemonies such as the legitimacy of state violence 
(see also Breen-Smyth et al., 2008, and Gunning, 2007). Gunning (2007) suggests that orthodox and critical 
terrorism studies can be distinguished through deploying the distinction Robert Cox (1981) makes between 
critical and problem-solving theory. Orthodox terrorism studies might be characterised as the latter. 
Problem-solving theory ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships 
and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’ (Cox, 1981, p. 128). 
Critical approaches begin from Cox’s oft-cited perspective that ‘theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose’ (ibid.), and seek to understand who that someone and purpose are, and why the world has been 
constructed in such a way. CTS presents itself as an alternative approach to the study of terrorism. In 
Jackson’s words ‘CTS refers to terrorism-related research that self-consciously adopts a sceptical attitude 
towards state-centric understandings of terrorism and which does not take existing terrorism knowledge for 
granted but is willing to challenge widely held assumptions and beliefs’ (2007a, p. 246). Importantly with 
regards to this thesis, while CTS is now an established body of work, the concept of extremism remains 
under-examined from this explicitly critical framework.  
 
The epistemological commitment of CTS stems from a post-positivist framework for understanding the 
socially-embedded and contextual nature of knowledge production (Jackson, 2007a). Knowledge 
surrounding terrorism or extremism is collectively produced in a cultural context and is thus an expression 
of power. CTS seeks to examine such expressions of power. ‘CTS starts by asking: who is terrorism 
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knowledge for, and what functions does it serve in supporting their interests?’ (Jackson, 2007a, p. 246). As 
such, a great deal of CTS work entails various modes of discourse analysis (Jackson, 2005 offers one of the 
earliest examples of this). It is important to note that not one model of CDA has been employed throughout 
CTS, with each scholar offering unique interpretations of a broad methodological approach. Jackson, for 
example, notes that within CTS there have been studies from ‘light constructivist studies of political 
rhetoric’ to ‘poststructuralist and Foucault-inspired genealogical and deconstructive analyses’ (2016, p. 78).  
 
CTS’ ontological commitments begin with the claim that terrorism does not exist as such, but is a label 
deployed to position certain forms of violence as illegitimate, and as such, works to legitimise other forms 
of (predominantly state) violence (Jackson, 2007a). Lastly, CTS is committed ethically to what within 
Critical Theory has been termed ‘emancipation’ (Breen-Smyth et al., 2008; McDonald, 2009). There is 
much diversity in how CTS scholars might define this term. Jackson defines emancipation as ‘the realisation 
of greater human freedom and human potential and improvements in individual and social actualisation and 
well-being’ (2007, p. 249). Lindahl appears to limit emancipation more than Jackson, restricting it to the 
maxim ‘that one’s own security cannot come at the cost of another’ (Lindahl, 2017, p. 6). McDonald (2009) 
contributes to a security focus of emancipation (drawing from Critical Security Studies) in emphasising a 
shift from state security to human security (see also Gunning, 2007). McDonald (2009) also adds the idea 
of empowering marginalised voices to this increasingly multi-faceted notion of emancipation. 
 
Jackson’s analyses of terrorism discourses offer robust opportunities to develop a method of analysis to be 
deployed in the thesis. The first process required in such a method is then to collate together the various 
linguistic mechanisms and constructs that are deployed within a text. Jackson, for instance, analyses the 
‘themes, labels, assumptions, narratives, predicates, metaphors, inferences, and arguments [the discourse] 
deploys’ (Jackson, 2016a, p. 82). This seemingly exhaustive list is more limited within other CDA studies. 
Gulliver and Herriot, for example, analyse ‘actors and actions… arguments and assumptions… authority 
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and attributions’ (Gulliver & Herriot, 2015, p. 211). Previous research by this author examined ‘arguments 
and assumptions; actors and actions; labels, and metaphors’ (Ford, 2017b, p. 125).  
 
This study divided the analysis and critique into three independent analyses, each focusing on one of the 
three educational components of the strategy: knowledge, values and skills. For each separate analysis 
different linguistic components emerged from the inductive process of reading and re-reading the materials. 
The thesis adopted what Jackson refers to as a ‘grounded theory approach,’ in that ‘the analysis was 
assumed to be completed or validated when it was found that adding new texts generated no new categories 
or insights beyond those developed through the examination of earlier texts’ (2007b, p. 396). In chapter 
five, where the knowledge component is examined, the discourse of extremism itself is extensively 
analysed, exploring the labels, predicates, actors and examples associated with the term. Chapter six 
examines the discourse surrounding each of the fundamental British values. Here, the linguistic components 
examined were predominantly themes, labels, assumptions, and subject positions. The last analysis – on the 
discourse surrounding critical thinking skills – focuses on the (contradictory) narratives that emerge through 
the discourse’s central presupposition that critical thinking should be deployed ‘outwards’, away from the 
moderate centre.  
 
This identification of these linguistic components is complemented with a robust process of critique. 
Jackson (2005) notes the importance of analysing a text not only in isolation but also within its social 
context. As such, Jackson’s (2005) analysis of the discourse surrounding the War on Terror incorporated 
both an analysis of structural or linguistic elements of texts, and placed these texts within the context of 
social analysis and theory.  
 
Jackson’s (2007b) study into the discourses of ‘Islamic terrorism’ offers further help through offering 
techniques and approaches for engaging in such critique. His study involved a two-phase process (see also 
Jackson, 2016a). The first of these stages involves what Jackson refers to as an ‘immanent critique’ – a 
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form of critique that internally examines a discourse (Lather, 2004, p. 6). Jackson examines the arguments 
and assumptions of a discourse, using ‘a discourse’s internal contradictions, mistakes and misconceptions 
to criticise it on its own terms’ (Jackson, 2007b, p. 397). It is a form of critique that seeks out ‘aporias’, 
what Derrida refers to as those gaps in logic, reason or labelling that cannot be reconciled (Burman & 
MacLure, 2005). The second stage or ‘order’ of critique ‘entails reflecting on the broader political and 
ethical consequences – the ideological effects – of the representations enabled by the discourse’ (Jackson, 
2007b, p. 397).  
 
A similar approach is drawn here, as in each chapter of analysis, the findings are critiqued both to uncover 
internal contradictions (first-order critique), and through a lens of appropriate social theory, to understand 
the implications of the discourse, embedded in a social context (second-order critique). Through exploring 
each key finding, and deconstructing the various linguistic and contextual aspects of that finding, my critical 
analysis was guided by a series of core questions: 
● do these claims stand up to scientific scrutiny? are the claims consistent across the discourse? are 
there contradictions that are important to note? 
● how are different subjectivities constructed in the discourse? what (power) relationships are 
developed between different subjectivities? what characteristics are afforded to different 
subjectivities? 
● who benefits from constructing the discourse in this manner? 
● how else could this material be presented? 
● what are the political and ideological implications of this discourse? 
● what practices/activities are (de)legitimised through this discourse? 
● are there texts that challenge common trends within the discourse? do these challenges present 
modes of resistance, or aporias that reveal the inconsistency of a discourse? 
(these questions are adapted from Jackson, 2005, p. 25). 
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Furthermore, exploring what is not in a discourse is as important as exploring what is. Jackson (2008) 
examined silences in discourse in the context of state terrorism. Jackson explored the ideological effects of 
excluding examples of state terrorism from wider discourses of terrorism, exploring the reasons behind, 
and impact of, a sole focus on non-state terrorism. In so doing, Jackson highlighted the many functions that 
silences can have within a discourse:  
Silence can be a deliberate means of distraction or misdirection from uncomfortable subjects or 
contrasting viewpoints, the suppression or de-legitimisation of alternative forms of knowledge or 
values, the tacit endorsement of particular kinds of practices, setting the boundaries of legitimate 
knowledge, or as a kind of disciplining process directed against certain actors. (Jackson, 2008, p. 
379) 
Throughout the analysis, the question of what is missing from the discourse remains as important as 
exploring what is there. Why, for instance, do some resources choose not to offer a definition of extremism 
to students or teachers? Why are critical thinking skills so often practiced on one particular topic, whereas 
other topics are repeatedly ignored? When discussing the meaning of ‘Britishness’, why are the less positive 
aspects of British history missed out? In combination, examining what is within the discourse, and what is 
not, the ideological implications of such a discursive construction can be examined in full. 
 
Each chapter thus employs various social and political theories to examine and deconstruct the linguistic 
elements of each discourse. Recognising that each of the three discourses (knowledge, values and skills) 
leads to an examination of different linguistic components, the research project draws on a wide range of 
social and political theorists to achieve its critique. Chapter five’s examination of the discourse surrounding 
extremism draws heavily from ideographic analysis, alongside the work of securitisation theorists to 
examine the engendering of exceptional politics through the construction of extremism as a universalised 
threat. Chapter six employs Mouffe’s theory of the ‘post-political’ alongside social theorists critical of 
liberal notions of tolerance such as bell hooks, Wendy Brown, and Ghassan Hage to best understand how 
the discourse builds a neoliberal, racialised governmentality. Chapter seven, finally, draws heavily on 
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critical race theory in its exploration of how critical thinking is so often deployed to tackle the issue of 
Islamophobia.  
 
Research Design: The corpus and data collection 
The thesis is guided by the following research question: 
 
How do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in the teaching 
materials designed to fulfil the strategy? 
 
The chapter now turns to the question of data collection. The research question names ‘counter-extremism 
education’ as its target of analysis. By this, the thesis refers to the deployment of education to achieve 
counter-extremism objectives. While the strategy might include the deployment of wider sections of 
curricula (such as the history, PSHE or citizenship curricula more generally), the focus of this research is 
on lessons and assemblies delivered specifically to address an aspect of the counter-extremism education 
strategy. These lessons may have been developed for delivery in any school subject. In limiting the scope 
of the research, the corpus was limited to resources produced for a secondary school audience (ages 11 to 
18). 
 
Thus, to be included in the initial corpus of the research, a document must fulfil two criteria: 
1. Be considered a ‘teaching material’ 
2. Be specifically connected to the UK’s counter-extremism strategy 
 
The research focuses on ‘teaching materials’. By this, I refer to materials that are used in a teaching context. 
These may be produced for teachers (lesson plans, resource handbooks etc.), or they may be produced for 
students (e.g. worksheets), or they may be produced for students and teachers (e.g. a PowerPoint 
presentation to be delivered in class). Teaching materials here are distinguished from guidance material – 
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documentation intended to inform teachers of their duties and responsibilities with regards to countering 
extremism. Such materials were excluded from the analysis. 
 
A later set of documents - fundamental British values audits - were added to the corpus. These documents 
are developed by schools when inspected by Ofsted in order to demonstrate to inspectors their promotion 
of the values. As such, they offer ripe opportunity to glean insight into how schools promote these values 
not only in moments where they specifically teach the values (such as in a school assembly) but throughout 
their curricula and extra-curricular practices.  
 
The research attempts to capture how the contestation and contradiction that has been shown to exist at a 
theoretical and strategic level translates into a classroom setting. In so doing, it is important to reflect on 
the journey that is implicitly being constructed; the journey taken by an objective from the strategy, through 




It is important therefore to clarify at this stage what is termed here the ‘point of capture’ – the stage in the 
process at which materials were collected, and the analysis focused. The ‘data’ of this research consists of 
the teaching materials produced by various organisations and individuals to contribute to the achievement 
of the counter-extremist education strategy. The above diagram (figure 4.2) attempts to express how this 
teaching material is influenced both by the strategy itself, but also by external influences on the material 
writer – the interests of the organisation for which the material is written for instance, as well as wider 
discourses on terrorism and extremism (that may well be influenced by a localised context). Furthermore, 
it clarifies how the research is not attempting to capture the ‘student experience’ of the strategy, influenced 
as this is by their particular teachers, who themselves filter a particular understanding of both the strategy, 
as well as any interactions they may have had with school inspectors.  
 
In attempting to explore the discourse across a wide range of materials, exploring the commonalities and 
themes that are shared across the discourse as a whole, it is important to recognise that each material is 
written for a unique context. In examining themes across these materials, the research attempts neither to 
assess causality between the strategy itself and the findings of the research, nor to provide generalizable 
claims for all teaching on this subject. Instead it attempts to garner a depth of understanding of how the 
particular materials within the corpus appear to address these objectives, and how these materials are 
located within wider discourses of extremism and counter-extremism. 
 
In including the school audits to supplement the analysis of the discourse around British values, it is 
important to note that these documents are not teaching materials per se, though they include plentiful 
references to teaching activities. They are however documents that, like the teaching materials, are designed 
to meet the needs of the strategy, exist within the context of the wider discourse, and are designed to 
influence teachers and demonstrate adherence to the strategy for inspectors. 
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It is also important to explore the question of where the ‘classroom context’, as mentioned in the research 
question, is within the linear process outlined above. Is it at the point of reception by a teacher, or of the 
students? This research is not attempting to explore how classes are delivered, a research process that would 
require classroom observation in multiple settings, but instead to explore what resources are offered to 
teachers and students to deploy in their delivery. By addressing the ‘stage’ at which the material has been 
produced, the research is able to glean more efficiently a wider picture of how messages are communicated, 
as well as a deeper picture afforded by the exploratory depth of documentary analysis. The field of school 
textbook research acknowledges these limitations and opportunities. Ide (2017, p. 46) notes how textbooks 
offer an opportunity to examine society-wide discourses; Otto (2013, p. 14) refers to textbooks as an 
‘autobiography of the nation’. While it remains contested the extent to which a textbook or a teacher is 
more influential in transmitting values to a student (Ide, 2017), textbooks have the ability to transmit elite 
values to students (Laessig, 2009). Within research examining the impact of a strategy on discourses 
received in classrooms, such value-transmission thus presents teaching materials as particularly valuable 
data sources.  
 
For a document to be included in the corpus, the first criterion was that the document must be a teaching 
material. The second was that the material must be linked to the UK’s counter-extremism in schools 
strategy. This can be proven in a number of ways. The primary source of materials for the corpus was the 
government-run website, www.educateagainsthate.com, which provides a platform collating various 
resources into one space. Not all of the resources linked to on this site were considered relevant for the 
corpus due to their not being teaching materials; they provide links for school visits programmes, for 
example. Furthermore, materials for primary schools were excluded. Alternatively, some of the resources 
were only tangentially linked to countering extremism, such as a website with resources that encourage 
debating in schools. To be included, these resources needed to explicitly mention either the Prevent strategy, 
the topics of extremism, radicalisation and terrorism, or British values.  
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On top of these resources, documents were sourced from local councils or police forces who had produced 
resources for the purposes of countering extremism. These materials were included if they fulfilled the 
criteria of being a ‘teaching material’ and if they explicitly address one of the three aforementioned themes: 
the Prevent strategy, the topics of extremism, radicalisation and terrorism, or British values. Lastly, 
resources published on teaching resource platforms such as that provided by the Times Educational 
Supplement, which made direct references to Prevent, extremism or British values were also included. 
 
At this point, the corpus was compiled, and the number of teaching units calculated. A teaching unit was 
considered to be the collection of resources to be deployed within one class or assembly. For instance, one 
teaching unit might comprise a lesson plan, a PowerPoint presentation and a number of student worksheets, 
or it might comprise simply one PowerPoint presentation. The following table records the numbers of 
teaching units and their respective sources (eighteen school values audits were also included in the analysis 
- see appendix):  
Organisation  Number of teaching ‘units’ 
Prevent for Schools 3 
Gloucestershire Safeguarding 2 
Centre for Urban Education  5 
TES Online Resources  19 
Since 9/11 29 
Hammersmith & Fulham Borough Council 4 
Extreme Dialogue 7 
Tower Hamlets Borough Council 27 
PSHE Association 4 
Geography Association 1 
Hampshire County Council 1 
Stockton City Council 11 
Miriam’s Vision 37 
Tony Blair Faith Foundation  8 
Association for Citizenship Teaching 35 






This chapter has set out both the research paradigm and the research design in which the current research 
takes place. This thesis intends to answer the following question:  
 
How do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in the teaching 
materials designed to fulfil the strategy? 
 
The chapter first outlined the research paradigm in which this research is set: the ontological and 
epistemological framework that scaffolds this investigation. The chapter explored the theories of social 
constructionism and post-structuralism, exploring how the development of a particular understanding of 
language and labelling promotes a form of research that critiques the linguistic hierarchies that dominate 
logocentrist thought. From here, the chapter explored ‘deconstructionism’ as a methodology for such a 
critique, as well as exploring how Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory offers a structure through which 
to understand the ways in which language constitutes the political realm and the subjectivities within it. 
From here, the chapter turned to the research design, exploring each stage in turn, laying out clearly how 
the research question will be answered within this theoretical framework.  
 
The following three chapters present the analysis completed using this methodology. Taking one of the 
three elements of the educational counter-extremism strategy in turn, the chapters lay out and deconstruct 
the various discourses surrounding counter-extremism, and examine the political and ideological 




Building the Outsider: Constituting the Threat of Extremism 
 
This chapter reports the first of the three discourse analyses within the thesis, this time focusing on the 
knowledge component of the education strategy. Engaging in this analysis, I was keen to examine the types 
of knowledge developed in the materials, exploring also how these elements of knowledge operate within 
wider discourses and discursive networks. Through the multiple readings of the materials, one label 
emerged as the dominant term developed within the materials. Unsurprisingly perhaps, that was extremism.  
 
This chapter examines the multiple ways in which extremism as a label is defined and deployed within the 
materials, and the ways in which this discourse of extremism is constructed. First, the ways in which the 
term is defined, and elsewhere is left undefined, is examined. In particular, through exploring how readily 
materials lean on government definitions, one can examine how the discourse begins to build certain subject 
positions around who is the moderate and who is the extreme, and how the term sits within a discourse 
legitimising certain politics and delegitimising others.  
 
Having explored the label itself, the chapter further contextualises how this term sits within wider discursive 
networks. The beliefs, actions and groups described as ‘extreme’ in the materials are collated, and predicate 
analyses are deployed to locate the term ‘extremism’ within other terms, labels and ideas. Through the 
identification of these linguistic elements, weaved throughout the chapter, the analysis of the political 





It is the intention of the three analysis chapters, through examining the inter-relationships between the three 
aspects of the educational counter-extremism strategy, disseminating knowledge, promoting values, and 
developing skills, to justify the argument that the UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy holds a ‘siege 
mentality’, hiding behind defensive walls from the oncoming attack of extremism. This chapter begins the 
justification of this argument through exploring the knowledge component of the strategy, and in particular, 
how the threatening outsider is constructed within the analysed teaching materials. A core opportunity for 
the resources to develop this sense of the outsider is through defining extremism and the extremist. This 
chapter focuses on this particular construction within the discourse. Chapter six examines the extremist’s 
opposite, the moderate centre, through exploring the discourses surrounding fundamental British values. 
Chapter seven then examines the relationship between these two subject positions of moderate and extreme, 
through examining how critical thinking skills are weaponised as mechanisms for the moderate to defend 
itself from the extreme.  
 
In examining the ways in which teaching materials frame the challenge posed by the problem of extremism, 
I argue that counter-extremism education is securitised. I argue that this form of education is constitutive 
of a realm of existential threat, and a need to deploy exceptional politics in order for that threat to be 
managed (Abrahamsen, 2005; O’Donnell, 2016). This chapter examines how that threat is constructed, with 
later chapters (six and seven) examining the consequences of exceptional realms of politics. Through 
exploring how beliefs, values and opinions that differ from that of the ‘moderate’ centre are painted as a 
threat through the depiction of ‘extremism’, and in particular through its association with violence within 
the teaching materials, the chapter explores how both the threat and the exceptional politics materialise.  
 
The chapter notes a certain synergy between securitisation theory and the work on cultural markers and 
ideographs by Carol K. Winkler (2006): that both a securitisation and the deployment of cultural markers 
catalyse exceptional politics - to defeat a threat in the former, and to defend a cultural value in the latter. 
The chapter examines the construction of the cultural markers surrounding extremism to uncover the ways 
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in which both the threatening outsider and the threatened insider are constructed, and the type of politics to 
defend the ‘insiders’ that such a conceptualisation engenders.   
 
The findings within this chapter are divided into two major sections. The first section examines definitions 
of extremism, exploring how the label extremism has become a ‘negative ideograph’ – constituting an 
understanding of moderate Britishness through identifying that which it is not - the extreme. The second 
section examines the vast array of examples of extremism within the materials; it explores how this 
definition of extremism universalises the threat being presented to moderate Britain, and explores how this 
securitises values and beliefs that challenge the moderate hegemony.  
 
Letting students define the ‘extreme’ 
The first port of call is to examine the label extremism, exploring definitions of extremism that are 
developed within the teaching materials. As Winkler argues, ‘the process of labelling is not neutral. Each 
use of a term is a choice (...) that emphasises certain aspects of what is being described, while de-
emphasising others… By happenstance or by design, labelling necessarily entails perspective taking’ (2006, 
p. 8). Through analysing the corpus of teaching materials, it is argued that there are three broad groups of 
definitions of extremism. The first definition does not define extremism at all, the second defines extremism 
tautologically, relying heavily on a dictionary definition, and the third relies upon the UK government’s 
definition. Through exploring these definitions, it is revealed how little is offered to students to aid them in 
constructing an understanding of the ‘extreme’ - raising the question of on what wider discourses and 
knowledge students might rely in order to aid their understanding of the problem of extremism.  
 
The first group of resources appears to not define extremism at all, but explores the topic of extremism as 
if what extremism might be is apparent and obvious; the definition is assumed. In one example, for instance, 
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a lesson begins by asking ‘why do people become extremists?’9, stating the ‘learning objective: to 
explore why extremism happens’ (T384, slide 1). The question of what an extremist is, is assumed to be 
already answered or known. In another example, a presentation explains: ‘In the last decade, terrorism 
based on religious extremism has become more prominent across the world’ (T398, slide 3), yet 
the term ‘religious extremism’ is never unpacked or explored. A third example asks teachers to ‘show 
definition on board of extremism, clarify with understanding’ (T51, p. 4), yet does not offer that 
definition to teachers - assuming that teachers themselves are capable of providing one without assistance. 
 
Secondly, extremism is often described in a tautological fashion. Take for example, this definition of 
extremism deployed in one presentation: ‘Extremism: The holding of extreme political or religious 
views’ (T397, slide 21). Another presentation describes an extremist as ‘a person who holds extreme 
political or religious views and supports illegal, violent, or other extreme action’ (T112, slide 13). 
The resource does not then explore what ‘other extreme action’ might be. This definition in fact originates 
in the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of extremism: ‘the holding of extreme political or religious 
views; fanaticism’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2018). Not all examples of this tautology, however, follow the 
same definition word-for-word. Stockton Council commissioned a resource that first describes extremism 
as ‘extreme behaviour which can lead to excessive action’ and then described violent extremism as 
‘extreme behaviour which leads to excessive violent action’ (T375, p. 1)10. Interestingly, the use of 
tautological definitions is not restricted to teaching resources. Wildern School for example, also define 
extremism within their ‘Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation’ school policy as ‘the holding of 
extreme political or religious views’ (P6, p. 1). Moreover, Mythen, Walklate and Peatfield (2017, p. 184) 
note the tautological definition of radicalisation in the UK Government’s CONTEST strategy of 2006: ‘the 
                                               
9 The use of Tahoma font indicates a quotation directly from the corpus of teaching materials. 
10 It is interesting to note the emphasis placed on violence in these definitions also. The importance of violence to 
extremism definitions will be explored in more depth later in this chapter.  
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process whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalised’ (HM 
Government, 2006, p. 27). In the case of both extremism and radicalisation, what ‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ 
entails, is never clarified. 
 
Thirdly, when resources did seek greater clarity regarding the meaning of terms such as extremism, 
radicalisation and terrorism, they turned to UK Government resources. While the UK Government’s 
definition does not hold great authority within academic literature on extremism (it is one definition 
amongst a chorus of hundreds), it is interesting to note just how prevalent the definition constructed within 
the 2011 review of the Prevent strategy, alongside the government’s definition of terrorism, has become 


















In the following example (figure 5.4), this slide incorporates both the dictionary and government 
definitions. What is particularly interesting to note is not only the presence of the definitions, but also the 




Figure 5.4: T37, slide 5 
Figure	5.3:	T109,	slide	9 
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The prevalence of the UK Government’s definition of extremism is curious given that it does not hold a 
position of dominance within the academic literature at large. Chapter two argued there were broadly three 
groups of definitions of extremism that focused on non-hegemonic values, on fundamentalism, and on 
violence, placing the UK Government’s definition within the first group, with its emphasis on values. Yet, 
it is by no means the only definition, nor the most complete. Nevertheless, it is the only definition offered 
to schools by the Department of Education’s literature advising schools on fulfilling the Prevent duty 
(Department for Education, 2015, p. 5). It is also the dominant definition offered within the corpus.  
 
What it does achieve, importantly, is placing the UK Government into a subject position in which they are 
able to arbitrate what is ‘extreme’ and what is ‘moderate’. It has been argued that conceptions of extremism 
place neoliberal hegemony as the moderate (Ford, 2017b). This is further embedded here by presenting the 
government themselves as the moderate. For instance, the following example (figure 5.5), defines 
extremism according to the government’s definition before getting students to examine a series of examples 
of extremism using that definition (figure 5.6), ensuring that the students frame the question of ‘is this 




It is a concern that in all of these three groups of definitions very little has actually been offered to students 
to aid their understanding of what extremism, and in particular what ‘extreme’, entails. As mentioned in 
chapter four, the silence within the discourse surrounding definitions of extremism is important to examine. 
Yet, this is not to suggest that these definitions have not achieved a level of epistemological groundwork. 
Through this silence, students are either called upon to offer their own understanding of ‘extreme’, or 
‘extreme’ is defined in negation, through exploring ‘fundamental British values’. What is certain is that 
extremism is a concept that is tangible, can be grasped, and can be known. 
 
Epistemological effects of the extremism discourse 
The first thing that these definitions achieve is to produce extremism as knowable. In inferring that 
definitions of extreme are so obvious as to not require defining, or to cite definitions from authoritative 
sources such as dictionaries or governments, the discourse is governed by the presupposition that extremism 
can be known. Presupposition refers to ‘an important textual mechanism that creates background knowledge 
and in doing so constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognised as true’ (Doty, 
1993, p. 306). Often resources achieve this known world through developing seemingly ‘simple’ 
definitions, such as that from a dictionary. Yet in attempts to offer simplicity, often the contestation and 
complexity of definitions is ignored, in favour of creating an easy, comprehensible extremist. Yet, this 
desire for simplicity has profound implications in terms of the construction of the known world. By offering 
teachers and students simple definitions, the discourse brings ‘extremism’ into existence as something 
knowable and definable, and masks the contestation regarding what extremism might entail. Moreover, as 
shall be demonstrated within the chapter, these definitions then engender a set of ‘knowledgeable practices’ 
- actions rendered (im)possible by the knowledge constructed around particular subjects (Milliken, 1999, 
p. 229). Extremism exists, argues the discourse, and must be managed. 
 
Fitzgerald (2016), in his exploration of the philosophical foundations of Critical Terrorism Studies, is keen 
to point out the epistemological assumptions on which orthodox terrorism studies is founded: that terrorism 
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is ‘essentially knowable’ (p. 49). Fitzgerald locates these assumptions within Cox’s (1981) exploration of 
‘problem-solving’ as opposed to ‘critical’ theory - an approach which takes the given world for granted, 
rather than examines the frameworks by which that world is constructed. One can see the ways in which 
these teaching resources equally adopt a ‘problem-solving approach’. One presentation on extremism for 
example states: ‘Extremism in its broadest sense is an individual or group of individuals who take 
an extreme position from that of the norm, or take an extreme action’ (T17, slide 6). While this 
slide does not define either the ‘extreme’, nor the ‘norm’, it offers a presupposition that both terms exist as 
fixed concepts to be grasped. Furthermore, it places the author and the reader (akin to the resources which 
cite government-authorised definitions) in a subject position as the norm from which the extreme would be 
measured. Another example gives students the lesson objective ‘to be able to identify examples of 
extremism and violent extremism’ (T368, slide 2), yet offers students neither definitions of either term 
nor the understanding that the terms are contested. Furthermore, the seven examples it offers to students 
appear all to concern either victims or perpetrators of acts of political violence, thus offering students little 
opportunity to distinguish a violent form of extremism from any other. Yet, importantly, the students take 
away an understanding that both terms have real examples that one can ‘identify’. Instead, a critical 
approach might begin to examine on what basis the notions of ‘extreme’ and ‘norm’ have been developed, 
highlighting the term’s subjectivity. 
  
On the one hand, attempting to ‘simplify’ complex issues in order to render the topic accessible to students 
is commendable. On the other hand, the discourse then shields students from the contestation at the heart 
of debates regarding what extremism in fact might be. Through absence, simplification, or tautology, or 
through masking contestation behind a government’s definition, the lacuna of meaning within the signifier 
‘extremism’ is hidden. While a few resources expressed the complexity and contestation around the 
definitions, for instance, through citing the adage ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter’ (T389, slide 8), or making a note for teachers that ‘extremism is contested definition [sic]’ 
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(T109, slide 9), the majority did not. Moreover, even those that did hint at this contestation, continued to 
ask how it is that someone becomes an extremist, offering ideas such as being manipulated or brainwashed, 












Such confidence in an ability to define extremism is not mirrored within academic and policy literature. 
Chapter two indicated just how diverse definitions of extremism are. Moreover, substantial critical literature 
highlights the high level of contestation concerning such definitions (Baker-Beall et al., 2015, p. 6; Harris-
Hogan et al., 2016, p. 6; Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino & Caluya, 2011, pp. 1-2), and the highly 
subjective nature of what one might term extremism (Ford, 2017a, p. 145; Guiora, 2014, p. 1). Classroom 
resources could therefore have noted that it is not possible to have one singular definition of extremism, to 
mirror the conclusions of the academic literature. That these resources contest this through offering 
seemingly neutral, and indeed ‘simple’, definitions is noteworthy, in that this apparent quest for simplicity 
is shielding students from a level of contestation that is present in the academic literature, producing a 




In a similar vein to how terrorism discourses rely on the marginalisation of state terrorism (Jackson, 2008), 
so too do extremism discourses appear reliant on the marginalisation of the contested, subjective nature of 
extremism. In this sense, the lack of a universal definition of extremism can be seen to be an ‘aporia’. A 
counter-extremism strategy cannot cement the very thing it aims to counter, but to acknowledge this is to 
undermine the viability of the entire project. Do so, and as Burman and McClure (2005, p. 285) suggest, 
‘the integrity of the opposition [moderate/extreme] is fatally compromised’ when this inability, or aporia, 
is recognised.  
 
Searching for the meaning of extremism 
Despite the confidence with which the resources presuppose the existence of extremists, it appears that 
what ‘extreme’ entails is left for students to work out for themselves. It is important to take note of the 
implications of this lacuna within the resources. On what basis are students assumed to be able to know 
what might be considered ‘extreme’? Without direction from these resources as to what extremism might 
entail, students and teachers are left to rely on other sources of information in their lives from which to 
construct the term: media narratives, elite discourses, or popular culture, alongside their everyday 
experiences of the counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy. Exploring this broader body of 
knowledge, and how that might feed into students’ understanding and experience of extremism, profoundly 
challenges the ‘simplicity’ of definitions of extremism as drawn in the teaching materials.  
 
A crucial source of information for young people in gaining an understanding of extremism and terrorism 
is popular culture. A substantial body of work examines the mutually supportive relationship between 
depictions of terrorism and extremism in popular culture, and political discourses of terrorism and 
extremism (e.g. Boggs & Pollard, 2008; Brereton & Culloty, 2012), and the relationship between popular 
culture and national security more broadly (e.g. Loefflmann, 2013). Pears notes how, after the events of 
September 2001, ‘terrorism was not just on the news, but it was at the cinema, on our televisions, and in 
our video games’ (Pears, 2016, p. 79). Moreover, Pears concludes that popular culture typically supports 
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dominant narratives within the terrorism discourse, rather than resisting them - although individuals may 
offer some resistance themselves (Pears, 2016; see also Jackson & Hall, 2016). Jackson (2005) examined 
how aspects of the discourse surrounding the ‘War on Terror’ were supported by, and also influenced, 
depictions of terrorism in popular culture, and the various influences popular culture therefore had, to give 
two examples, in producing a culture of patriotism in the United States, or in the justification of the use of 
torture. One class presentation within the corpus of teaching materials even recommended using a YouTube 
video in class called ‘War on Terror Explained in Minutes’, part of a ‘History Cinematically’ series in 
which video footage from September 11, 2001, through to the assassination of Osama bin Laden was 
compiled to dramatic music (T17, slide 1). This video offers no audio or written commentary, but depicts 
the War on Terror only through the imagery of American soldiers, or threatening imagery of militants. By 
not offering students critical tools to examine definitions of extremism, these resources are likely to allow 
for the reproduction of dominant narratives that stem from cultural and political sources. Yet it is crucial to 
also recognise that many of these tropes within dominant narratives have been challenged in academic 
scholarship.  
 
The field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) has for the past ten years expended great energy in critically 
examining the ways in which knowledge regarding terrorism, extremism and radicalisation has been 
conceived in multiple arenas - political, academic and cultural discourses alike. CTS has moreover exposed 
a number of problematic aspects of dominant discourses: the production of the terrorist as irrational 
(Lyness, 2014) or evil (Jackson, 2005, pp. 66-89; Naseem, 2012; Richards, 2017); the over-emphasis on 
the role of religious ideology in understanding contemporary terrorism (R. Jackson, 2007b; 2012); the 
problematic depiction of Muslims as threatening or risky (Heath-Kelly, 2013);  or the justification of violent 
responses to terrorist threats including the use of torture (Jackson, 2005), to offer some examples challenged 
within this literature. Furthermore, CTS has focussed on forms of knowledge actively ignored or dismissed 
as idealistic within the literature, such as non-violent approaches to countering terrorism (R. Jackson, 2012; 
2017). Yet, it is apparent that such contestation, regarding both the definitions of terms such as extremism 
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and the wider bodies of knowledge on which they rely, is not being communicated to students within these 
classes. It is instead being hidden. That students in a class on extremism might need to rely on an incomplete 
picture of contested knowledge to fill the gaps in the assumed or tautological definitions offered in the 
teaching materials, not only misleads students, but also appears to undermine the desire to develop critical 
thinking skills in students - as will be examined in more depth within chapter seven. 
 
Not only do students receive knowledge regarding extremism from wider discourses surrounding 
extremism, but they also develop an understanding of extremism, and are interpellated into various subject 
positions, through counter-extremism practices including the Prevent strategy itself. This means people of 
different ethnicities and backgrounds will bring very different knowledges of extremism into the classroom. 
In particular, it is important to note how counter-extremism and counter-terrorism narratives have impacted 
the Muslim communities of the UK since September 2001. Lynch describes these common 
conceptualisations, ‘whereby Muslim youth in the United Kingdom were constructed as threatening, 
different, untrustworthy and dangerous’ (Lynch, 2013, p. 242). Miah argues that, ‘in recent years the 
caricature of Muslims as intolerant, violent, misogynistic suicide bombers has become a dominant 
iconography in the media representation of Muslim communities’ (Miah, 2013, p. 157). Drawing from 
research that first explored the experience of Irish communities in the UK at the height of the conflict in 
Northern Ireland (Hillyard, 1993), that the Muslim communities are considered a ‘suspect community’ 
gains substantial consensus amongst literature critical of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy (Bonino, 
2013; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009; Ragazzi, 2016). Other research explores how 
Muslims have been deemed ‘at risk’ or ‘securitised’, particularly through the radicalisation discourse 
(Brown, 2010; Croft, 2012; Gutkowski, 2011; Mavelli, 2013; Mythen, Walklate & Khan, 2013). Heath-
Kelly notes how this dual narrative of vulnerability and risk means Muslims are ‘always already rendered 
as dangerous’ (Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 408). Students will bring to a class, therefore, not only knowledge 
they have received from dominant discourses, but also knowledge built through experience and, in this 
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case, encounters with counter-extremism practices. As such, students of different ethnicities or backgrounds 
will bring different understandings of what ‘extremism’ is to the class.  
 
These wider experiences of ‘othering’ felt by Muslims in the context of extremism and terrorism are then 
further compounded in a school environment, which is both an agent of the UK’s counter-extremism 
strategy, and also a venue for the wider discourses to flourish. Sian’s research concluded that teachers 
themselves have also ‘internalised the Muslim “threat” logic’ (Sian, 2015, p. 191; see also Coppock, 2014). 
Miah’s research examines the prevalence of Islamophobia in Britain’s schools: 
 
It is important to note how micro narratives or stories that are told informally through various 
school activities play a crucial role in essentializing the ‘other’. Muslim pupils are able to pick up 
these narratives to inform their understanding of hostile spaces within the school environment. 
(Miah, 2013, p. 155) 
 
Scholars have argued that the Prevent duty in schools has securitised both education and young Muslims - 
transforming young Muslims into a ‘threat’ that must be managed by the increasing emphasis on 
surveillance in schools (Durodie, 2016; O’Donnell, 2017; Thomas, 2016). Reed suggests that the Prevent 
duty is ‘inviting teachers to profile students based on their race and religion’ (Reed, 2016, p. 1). As 
mentioned in chapter two, both Ahmed (Apr. 28, 2015) and Coppock (2014) note the challenges for young 
people - and young Muslims in particular - to discuss controversial issues because of their awareness of the 
threat of their being reported by teachers who might think they are at risk of radicalisation. As such, it 
becomes very apparent that young people, and young Muslims in particular, are not coming to these classes 
on extremism afresh, but drawing from their wider experiences and exposure to narratives through various 
sources. These varying understandings muddy the waters when teaching materials then attempt to present 
a ‘simplified’ definition of extremism that all students are expected to approach uniformly, as O’Donnell 
notes when describing how young Muslim men respond to the Prevent strategy: 
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Their descriptions of self-censorship and of their efforts to present an outwardly safe identity, as 
well as their tendency to curtail their speech because of fears of being labelled a terrorist 
sympathiser, remind us that when reflecting on strategies like Prevent, one cannot pretend that the 
school is divorced from wider society or that students will remain unaffected by being positioned 
as ‘suspect’ or ‘risky’. (O’Donnell, 2017, p. 183) 
 
The definitions of extremism in the teaching materials, despite attempting to simplify a complex issue, offer 
students vague notions of what extremism might entail. Through examining wider research on the 
experience of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategies of ethnic minorities, and the dominant 
narratives that persist within popular culture, it is evident the knowledge and experiences students will be 
bringing to the classroom will impact their understanding of such concepts. These definitions of extremism 
are not ‘simple’, instead sitting within a complex network of knowledge/power relations. In particular, such 
relations function to locate the norm from which extremes are to be measured. More often than not, it is the 
state that then sits in this position of the norm. It is to these power relations that the chapter now turns. As 
explored below, the discourse of extremism contributes as much to a sense of the ‘us’, as it does to a sense 
of the ‘them’. 
 
Ideographs and Securitisation: moderate Britain and its existential threat 
Extremism plays an important role as a cultural marker in its ability to construct an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, and 
as such, these definitions function to not only construct the extreme, but also the moderate. Lucaites and 
Condit (1990) argue there are three functions to a cultural marker (see also Winkler, 2006): a label, a 
narrative and an ideograph. Extremism’s purpose as a label has already been demonstrated, through the UK 
Government’s definition, to function as a descriptor for anything other than British values. Furthermore, 
this label relies on core narratives, and can be seen to be a ‘negative ideograph’. As Winkler explains: 
‘Negative ideographs contribute to our collective identity by branding behaviour that is unacceptable (...). 
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American society defines itself as much by its opposition to tyranny and slavery as it does by a commitment 
to liberty and equality’ (2006, p. 12). The construction of extremism builds ‘moderate Britain’, by defining 
what moderate Britain is not. Winkler (2006), and here citing the earlier work of McGee (1980), argues that 
there are four components to an ideograph: it is an ordinary term, it is flexible and poorly defined, it 
facilitates exceptional politics in its defence, and it is culturally specific in that ‘a willingness to accept a 
given interpretation of the term becomes a virtual litmus test for membership within the collective’ 
(Winkler, 2006, p. 14). Here, one might refer to acceptance of the fundamental values in order to be a 
member of the British collective, as a key indicator of the way in which extremism functions as a negative 
ideograph.  
 
This theoretical work on ideographs holds a good deal of synergy with the work of securitisation theorists. 
Securitisation theory examines the linguistic construction of threats (Buzan, 2006). Moreover, this theory 
explores the political consequences of such a construction, in particular, the production of exceptional 
politics (Abrahamsen, 2005; Huysmans, 2011). While the foundational thinkers of ‘Copenhagen School’ 
securitisation theory focused their theoretical underpinning within speech act theory and the ‘performative 
utterances’ of security (Stritzel, 2007, p. 361), later thinkers, such as Stritzel (2011) have argued that 
discourse theory can usefully supplant speech act theory as a theoretical-linguistic foundation for 
securitisation studies. It is salient that the conceptual work on both ideographs and securitisation theory 
argue that, through their construction, a realm of exceptional politics is engendered. Furthermore, 
ideographical analysis has proven a useful tool for critical analysts examining discourses of terrorism 
(Jackson, 2007b). Contemporary educational approaches to countering extremism have also been labelled 
as securitisations (O’Donnell, 2016; Mattsson & Saljo, 2018). Given the synergy between securitisation 
theory, discourse analysis, and ideographical analysis on exceptional politics, this chapter examines this 
construction of threat and exceptional politics, and the implications thereof.  
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McGee explores the impact of ideographs on policy: ‘It warrants the use of power, excuses behaviour and 
belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behaviour and belief into 
channels easily recognised by a community as acceptable and laudable’ (McGee, 1980, p. 15). Winkler 
adds that ‘the public accepts extreme measures due to a belief that a threat exists to the continued existence 
of a culture’ (2006, p. 14). In the context of security responses within the global war on terror, scholars 
such as Bigo and Tsoukala (2008) and Agamben (2005) have examined the normalisation of illiberal and 
exceptional practices such as detention without charge, the prison at Guantanamo Bay, or the militarisation 
of domestic policing. This chapter argues that extremism is presented as a universalised threat that moderate 
Britain must defend itself from. The following chapters explore how such a threat requires the suspension 
of a set of values, and democracy in particular, for their very protection.  
 
Narratives are vital for the construction of ideographs, as well as the engendering of politics and policies 
that otherwise might be considered unfathomable. As Winkler notes, ‘narratives are public stories that 
provide coherence and consistency to the scenes, characters, and themes that guide the moral conduct of a 
society’ (Winkler, 2006, p. 9). One such narrative, within which extremism is placed in the teaching 
materials, is the story of how the West, and the UK, has always acted to defeat the perpetual threat of evil 
violence. 
 
This narrative suggests Britain has consistently throughout history confronted evil threats. The teaching 
materials present the threat of extremism as a somehow timeless threat to Britain. Teaching resources 
contextualise current security threats to moments in history such as the French Revolution, Second World 
War, Guy Fawkes, or Apartheid South Africa (e.g. T109; T263), or through constructing narratives 
regarding various groups or individuals who have engaged in political violence over a historical time period 
(e.g. T368). Moreover, the teaching materials exist within an existing political discourse in which a 
narrative paints Britain as a key figure in countering extremism. Writing as the then Secretary for State for 
Children, Schools and Families, Ed Balls historicises this popular narrative: ‘Dealing with violent 
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extremism is nothing new. Throughout history there have been groups prepared to use violence to achieve 
their aims’ (Balls, 2008, p. 3). David Cameron, in a speech concerning extremism, makes Britain’s role 
quite clear: ‘So as we talk about the threat of extremism and the challenge of integration, we should not do 
our country down – we are, without a shadow of doubt, a beacon to the world’ (Cameron, Jul. 20, 2015). 
Britain is thus here presented within a narrative as the obvious subject to ‘deal with violent extremism’. 
There is an absence of any critical approach to Britain’s historical record of using violence. Indeed, the 
strength of Balls’ claims above regarding violence in history would be profoundly undermined by listing 
any number of ‘non-extremist’ violent histories. One resource compounds this synergy between Britain and 





Britain and extremism are presented as polar opposites, as much a binary opposition as moderate and 
extremism. One resource does this explicitly through contrasting life in the UK with life under the control 





Other resources are subtler in creating that sense of togetherness. Resources by police forces encourage 
students to become agents of counter-extremism. As one resource notes: ‘The Police hope that this DVD 
will help to stop young people from getting involved with extremist groups and help young people 
to identify and possibly prevent acts of extremism’ (T372, slide 3). Another material writes that 
‘Hampshire Constabulary is committed to working with local communities to divert people away 
from any form of extremism’ (T112, slide 2). These resources encourage young people to engage 
themselves in countering extremism. The resource by Hampshire Constabulary asks: ‘What can you and 
society do about it?’ (T112, slide 5). Other resources encourage students to ‘be part of the solution, 
not the problem’ (T398, slide 14), or ask, ‘How can we help prevent people from becoming 
extremists?’ (T389, slide 15). These materials contribute together to create a sense that the UK police, the 
UK government, and individual citizens and school students are coming together to collectively defeat 
extremism, creating an ethical proximity between what might otherwise be dispersed subject positions. This 
negative ideograph of extremism functions, as Winkler describes as ‘collective terms of political allegiance 
that embody a society’s ideals’ (2006, p. 12). 
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Furthermore, materials are keen to ensure that students believe that extremism poses a significant threat to 
them. For example, one presentation notes ‘there is extremism in almost every country’ (T17, slide 3). 
The organisation Since 9/11 argues that, ‘in the UK, there have been many thousands of terrorist 
incidents’ (T287, slide 3).11 Elsewhere, the same organisation emphasises that 
It is very important that students understand that terrorism is, sadly, not unusual. They 
should not emerge from this study believing that 9/11 was the only significant act of 
terrorism. At some point you may wish to use Wikipedia – List of terror incidents to make 
this clear… there is no need for detailed work to be done on this, but simply scrolling 
down the very long list for one year then one or two others should establish the point. 
(T302, p. 7)  
Extreme Dialogue’s resources also encourage teachers to display to students lists of recorded terrorist 
attacks (T92, p. 20). The discourse fails to contextualise this risk and threat in the context of the primary 
causes of death in the UK (such as ill health, road deaths etc.), instead presenting terrorism and extremism 
as looming threats. As one presentation described the threat: ‘It’s closer than you think’ (T398, slide 8). 
The following slide, full of images of terror attacks, ensures students are fully aware of what the strategy is 
attempting to prevent (figure 5.10): 
 
                                               
11 Statistics can perhaps mute the strength of this claim. The Global Terrorism Database records that between 1970 
and 2015 there have been 5008 incidents, the vast majority taking place in Northern Ireland in the period 1970-2000 





These resources put considerable effort into painting a clear picture of the threat faced by British society, 
through conceptualising this ‘other’, the extremist. In this sense, the issue becomes securitised. The chapter 
thus far has examined how school students, counter-extremism officials and Britain, as a group of subject 
positions are collected together through the use of the negative ideograph, extremism. This poorly defined 
term operates to define that which threatens this moderate collective, presenting extremism as a knowable 
threat to be countered.  
 
The chapter now moves on from definitions of extremism to examples of extremism. Through exploring 
that which is described to be ‘extreme’, as well as examining the predicates of extremism within the 
discourse – the words and labels that the discourse associates with extremism and extremists – the location 
of the term extremism within the wider discursive network can be examined. This following section 
expands on its understanding of what ‘moderate Britain’ is not. In so doing, it raises alarm at the breadth of 
the examples offered as ‘extreme’ within the teaching materials. The vague nature of the term ‘extremism’ 
that is developed in the resources open up the opportunity for extremism to be universalised. By this, the 
chapter argues that the examples of extremism offered by the corpus of teaching materials appear 
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dangerously broad, developing an understanding that moderate Britishness is threatened by a great diversity 
of ‘extreme’ values.  
  
Examples of an ‘extremist’ 
To illustrate this universalisation of extremism, I examined all the teaching units to explore and record the 
ways in which certain groups, causes or ideas were being described as ‘extreme’.  I recorded labels as 
constructed by the resources themselves, and as such, included types of extremism, extremist organisations 
or given hypothetical examples of extremist views. I recorded when a teaching unit made mention of a 
given type of extremism. Naturally, many resources cited more than one type of extremism and one type of 
extremism many times, and many resources cited none at all. Where appropriate, I have attempted to group 
some together, and as such produced the following table: 
 
Type of extremism Number of teaching units 
making mention of this type of 
extremism 
Islamic Extremism, ISIS, Al Qaeda 50 
Right wing extremism, Far right extremism, White 
Nationalism, English Defence League, Ku Klux Klan 
27 
Animal Rights Extremism 11 
The IRA 10 
The Holocaust/the Nazi Party 7 
Extremism in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict 4 
The Red Army Faction/Baader-Meinhof Gang 2 
Rwandan genocide 2 
Nelson Mandela/the ANC 2 
ETA in Spain 2 
Eco-extremism, environmental extremism 2 
Guy Fawkes 1 
The French Revolution 1 
The French Resistance 1 
Kosovo 1 
Somalia 1 
Buddhists in Sri Lanka 1 
Hindu Nationalists 1 
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Sikh extremists in India 1 
Timothy McVeigh 1 
The Ulster Volunteer Force 1 
Anti-abortion Activists  1 
Westboro Baptist Church 1 
“Far left groups like Unite Against Fascism” 1 
The Lord’s Resistance Army 1 
The Symbionese Liberation Army 1 
A fictional “anti-capitalist group” who plan to break into 
a bank and spray graffiti 
1 
“Anarcha-feminism” 1 
Student fees protesters breaking windows and throwing 
fire extinguishers 
1 
Presentations argued extremism could also apply to the 
following issues: 
 
Rights for Fathers 2 
Nuclear Power 1 
Whale Hunting 1 
Vegetarianism 1 
Nuclear Weapons 1 
The following attitudes were also described as extreme: 
“A gay couple should not be allowed to have kids” 
“People can be really extreme about socio-political issues” 
“You cannot be British and Muslim” 
“All English people are lazy, they just like to claim benefits” 
“Multiculturalism is bad for Britain” 
“Last month, we chained ourselves to our local school’s gates and refused to eat or drink until 
a member of the government agreed to listen to us” 
“people who hunt whales should be killed with harpoons” 
“I believe that all women should cover their heads and should raise families rather than getting 
jobs. I also feel that all the laws in our country should be based upon the bible, so I hate the 
fact that shops open on a Sunday and that divorced people are allowed to have relationships. 
Blasphemy should be punishable by a fine.” 
“I think that there should be cities where only white people are allowed to live. I also feel that 
it should be against the law for white people to have children with non-white people.” 
“God does not exist. People who believe in God are mentally ill and are a danger to society. 
Teachers who talk to children about religion should be sacked. I have taught my daughter to 
laugh when adults talks about God. “ 
“Every Saturday and Sunday I stand outside McDonalds and try to persuade people about the 
moral benefits of veganism.” 
“Anything that doesn’t obey the law of the land is extreme” 
Table	5.1:	Types	of	extremism	in	the	corpus 
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It is important first to note how many resources (of the total 193 teaching units) make no direct reference 
to extremism at all, despite being part of a counter-extremism educational package. This apparent omission 
is often due to the particular focus on one topic (say, critiquing narratives in the media) in the context of a 
wider scheme of work that approaches extremism. At other times, the word extremism appears to be 
consciously omitted – the organisation Miriam’s Vision, despite producing 37 teaching units all focusing 
on the death and legacy of Miriam Hyman, a victim of the July 2005 bombings on the London transport 
network, makes rare mention of extremism, referring predominantly only to the ‘London bombings’.  
 
The second thing to note is that most often resources mentioned what might be (problematically) termed 
‘Islamic extremism’ – this may have been a direct reference to al-Qaeda, ISIS, Islamic State and so on, or 
to the type, ‘Islamic extremism’. It is of little surprise that such an emphasis is made in the corpus 
considering the position of this type of extremism in the discourse, media, or other dominant narratives 
more broadly. That this corpus may thus contribute to the problematic components of those narratives (as 
mentioned above, see also Jackson, 2007b), and contribute to the development of an understanding that 
terrorism is an issue predominantly within Islamic communities is of some concern, though perhaps of no 
surprise.  
 
This concern perhaps appears mitigated, however, due to the high number of mentions of right-wing 
extremism in the corpus, particularly given how much academic literature critical of the Prevent strategy 
focuses on Prevent’s disproportionate emphasis on Islamic communities in the UK (e.g. Bonino, 2013; 
JUST Yorkshire, 2017, p. 14). Moreover, as will be explored in more depth in chapter seven, the topic of 
Islamophobia (and its role in the radicalisation of both young Muslims and white nationalists) plays a 
prominent role within the teaching materials. This appears to somewhat ‘balance’ the emphasis of the 
discourse - through emphasising as a number of resources do, that extremism is not just a ‘Muslim’ issue: 
‘It is important to remember that radicalisation does not just happen to Muslims. A person who 
becomes involved with any extremist group can be said to be radicalised’ (T400, slide 8). Hampshire 
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Constabulary’s Safe4Me project encourages facilitators to ‘address the stereotypical misconception: 
“all Muslims and people from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq are terrorists”. Emphasis: NOT TRUE – 
good and bad, fair and extreme in all cultures’ (T113, p. 1). The organisation Since 9/11 notes ‘it is 
estimated that only around two percent of all terrorist attacks in the UK over the last five years 
were committed by Islamic groups or individuals’ (T286, slide 4). The irony perhaps is that, despite 
the corpus making sure to emphasise that extremism is ‘not just a Muslim issue’, the corpus itself heavily 
employs examples of this very kind – far more than 2% of the examples within the corpus concern ‘Islamic 
groups or individuals’.  
 
Furthermore, this narrative has problematic consequences in that the ‘threat’ of extremism is painted as 
coming from all directions - not just a minority of Muslims – and thus contributes to the threat being 
universalised. For instance, the corpus makes reference to how extremism can occur in any community, 
and radicalisation can happen to any individual. A Stockton Council resource reinforces students ‘to be 
aware that extremists can come from any community’ (T368, slide 2). The organisation Extreme 
Dialogue ‘recognise that violent extremism is not synonymous with one nationality, creed or 
colour’ (T92, pp. 20-21). This ties into another sub-narrative regarding there being numerous ‘types of 
extremism’: ‘the focus throughout the lessons is on extremism of all kinds, including far-right 
groups, far-left groups, animal rights extremism, eco-extremism and religious extremism’ (T252, 
p. 1). Yet, what this achieves is an understanding that extremism can come from both anywhere, and 
everywhere, heightening its threat.  
 
The sheer vastness of the term extremism, and the great number of groups, agendas and views that are 
considered ‘extremist’ within the literature, illustrates this universalisation. Reporting the results of a survey 
on people’s attitudes to extremism, Guiora writes, ‘It is important to note that respondents did not have 
difficulty offering a definition of the term; rather, their struggle was in articulating a narrow and circumspect 
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definition that avoids unnecessarily infringing on individual rights’ (Guiora, 2014, p. 1). Heath-Kelly and 
Strausz (2018, p. 3) found similarly broad understandings when exploring how workers in the NHS 
understood the notion of radicalisation: ‘NHS staff strongly identified hate speech, the possession of radical 
Islamic/Anarchist philosophy, and anger at foreign policy as indicators of radicalisation’. While the corpus 
of teaching materials did mention most often groups that are most prominent in the literature – Al Qaeda, 
Islamic state, the IRA12, the English Defence League etc – a great number of other issues appeared under 
the extremist umbrella: cases of ethnic cleansing or genocide, civil war, violent resistance movements, the 
direct action of social movements, and a number of political opinions that, while being far from the 
hegemonic attitudes, do not appear to pose an immediate threat, and are certainly not necessarily linked to 
the threat of violence. It appears the corpus, taken as a whole, struggles to place limits on a definition of 
extremism. That the breadth of the term extreme appears to include everything and anything that contrasts 
hegemonic norms is a profound concern. It portrays anything that strays from this narrow realm of moderate 
values as threatening and dangerous. It places democratic pluralism under threat, instead promoting value-
monism under the signifier of ‘moderate values’.  
 
Examined as a whole, the breadth of examples of ‘extremism’ within the materials suggests that there is 
not a clear understanding of what is, and what is not, an example of ‘extremism’. Searching for a line of 
commonality, and aside from those examples of ‘Islamic’ or ‘right-wing’ extremism, three broad groups of 
examples appear to emerge. Firstly, many violent groups or acts of violence are labelled as ‘extreme’. 
Secondly, many examples appear to stray into the realm of illegality. Thirdly, the only thing the examples 
appear to have in common is that they include holding onto a view that differs from the hegemonic, 
suggesting extremism and diversity might be uncomfortably similar in meaning. 
 
 
                                               
12 There is not the time to examine this in detail, but it is interesting to note that while the republican and anti-British 
IRA was mentioned ten times, the unionist and pro-British Ulster Volunteer Force was mentioned only once. 
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Extremism and Violence 
It is evident that confusion persists regarding the relationship between extremism and violence within the 
teaching materials. As mentioned above, as well as in previous chapters, the notion of ‘non-violent 
extremism’ emerged following the review of the Prevent strategy in 2011, to encompass those groups that 
provide an ideological catalyst for those groups who go on to engage in terrorism. As such, the Prevent 
strategy is keen to distinguish between terrorism and extremism – the former being ‘an action that endangers 
or causes serious violence to a person/people’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 108), the latter being ‘vocal or 
active opposition to fundamental British values’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 107).  
 
The relatively high occurrence of the Holocaust as an example of extremism appears emblematic of the 
strong relationship between extremism and violence, but unclear relationship between extremism and 
terrorism. On one level, it appears a relevant example: contemporary far-right extremist organisations take 
ideological inspiration from Nazism, and the Holocaust relied on an ideology that sits contrary to many of 
the values that are held by the vast majority of people today. Yet, that the Holocaust was enacted by a state 
appears to contradict dominant conceptions of extremism, and in particular, extremism’s relationship to 
terrorism. The Holocaust was the violent result of a path that began (in the paradigm of radicalisation) with 
an extreme ideology of white supremacy, yet one would not term the Holocaust terrorism, but genocide. 
The Rwandan genocide is another interesting example. The perpetrators of the genocide are often termed 
‘Hutu extremists’ (Orth, 2001, p. 76), in particular in relation to the killing not only of Tutsis, but also of 
‘moderate’ Hutus. Yet, undoubtedly, the moniker of ‘genocide’ is far more commonly used to describe the 
events of 1994 than terrorism.  
 
Moreover, it is clear that the corpus does not believe that all extremism is violent, but that the risk of non-
violent extremism transforming into violence is too great to allow it to persist. This example argument 
written as a prompt for a debate sums up the argument quite well: ‘Extremism can lead to violence and 
so it is never OK because we can’t predict what will become of extreme views and innocent people 
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don’t deserve to suffer’ (T61, p. 1). This notion is compounded by examples where violence and 
extremism are linked discursively, with many resources mentioning transitions taking place, either between 
extremism and violent extremism/terrorism or between activism and extremism. For example, eight 
resources used examples such as Anders Brevik to examine ‘when extremism becomes violent 
extremism’, (e.g. T409, slide 15). Another resource asked the question ‘when does protest cross the 
line?’, inferring that protest becomes extremism if a protest turns violent (T48, slide 1). Furthermore, 
through a predicate analysis, it becomes evident that such distinction between extremism and violence at a 
conceptual level is not mirrored in the teaching materials. 
 
A predicate analysis entails ‘extracting from the documents the descriptive characteristics, adjectives, 
adverbs, and capabilities attributed to the various subjects’ (Doty, 1993, p. 310; see also Milliken, 1999, p. 
232) - in this case, the subject of extremism. To achieve this, I examined every utterance of the term 
extremism within the corpus, taking note of the accompanying words to analyse the language and inferences 
made by the texts (see table 5.2). Overwhelmingly, ‘violence’ emerged as the top accompanying word, with 
195 instances. The second most common word was ‘radicalisation’ with 100 instances. Extremism was 
linked to terrorism 85 times. By contrast, ‘non-violent extremism’ was mentioned seven times. This 
demonstrates that the linkages between extremism and violence are clearly drawn within the resources. For 
example, one resource used the Paris attacks of 2015 as an example of ‘extremism’, rather than of 














Holding extreme thoughts is not a crime 15 
Distinction between extremism and violent 
extremism 
8 
Transition from extremism to violent extremism 8 
Nonviolent 7 
Not all extremism is violent 6 
Extremism is not the same as terrorism 4 
Are extremism and terrorism the same thing? 2 
Extremism that isn’t violent, but can still be 
dangerous 
1 
Many extremists are not terrorists 1 
Table	5.2:	Predicate	analysis	of	extremism 
 
These predicates aid the construction of a discursive narrative that links all forms of violence together. The 
following quotation from a lesson plan is useful to examine at this point: ‘Discuss briefly some other 
examples of extremism and the consequences; these might include Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia 
and Animal Rights Campaigns and the learners may suggest examples of their own either from 
knowledge or experience’ (T67, p. 18). What is fascinating is how the notion of extremism is capable of 
drawing such diverse examples under one umbrella. In particular, it groups together the vague notion of an 
‘animal rights campaign’ (and in the context of discussing violence, one assumes that the author would be 
referring to the violent campaigns of the Animal Liberation Front for example, rather than the work of 
animal charities) with genocide. The danger of these discursive linkages is that it transmits a message that 
political activism brings with it the threat of profound violence, and this, in turn, securitises political 
diversity: the ideas behind animal rights activism themselves become to be seen as threatening.  
 
Moreover, it is vital to examine how the conflation of extremism with violence does not then produce a 
realm of non-extremist non-violence. Instead, it produces a realm of legitimate violence. As cited above, 
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Ed Balls writes that ‘Throughout history there have been groups prepared to use violence to achieve their 
aims’ (Balls, 2008, p. 3). Yet, clearly Balls is not referring to British military events such as the Amritsar 
massacre in 1919 in which the British army killed a conservative estimate of 379 non-violent protesters. As 
I have written elsewhere: ‘Through the utterance of the term “extremist violence”, its mirror image of “non-
extremist violence” is produced; violence currently thought acceptable, legitimate, or unfortunate: the 
violence of a state military, of misogynistic cultural attitudes, of global inequality’ (Ford, 2017a, p. 148). 
Perhaps the most notable silence within the discourse as a whole concerns what could be framed as 
‘moderate violence’; the violence of states, militaries and colonial powers. There are certain forms of 
violence that are noticeably absent from this long list of violent acts: wars started by Western nations, 
invasions of sovereign territories, imperialism, or ‘collateral damage’ caused by bombing campaigns. 
Indeed, the marginalisation of theories of nonviolence and pacifism (and the label of ‘domestic extremism’ 
that has been placed by the British state on various nonviolent activists) suggests that pacifism and 
nonviolence could be construed as extremist beliefs (Ford, forthcoming).  
 
Extremism and the Law 
In the second of the three groups of extremism examples, extremism is linked to illegality. An educational 
video linked within one resource argued ‘anything that doesn’t obey the law is extreme’ (The Respect 
Programme, Sept. 11, 2018, cited in T17, slide 6). Yet, is burglary extremism? The same video included as 
an example of extremism the protests in London by students when in 2011 the UK government chose to 
treble tuition fees, protests which included violent clashes with police. Yet, the video does not mention that 
the majority of the individuals present did not engage in violence. In another material, a play that students 
were instructed to act out in a lesson incorporated as an ‘extremist’ group an ‘anti-capitalist’ organisation 
that wished to break into and graffiti a bank. It is debatable whether graffiti should constitute extremism. 
Moreover, it is fascinating that, within the play, the teacher apprehended the student after they had handed 
out leaflets - itself an act inferred to be ‘extreme’ – rather than after having broken into the bank. In a similar 
vein, a police officer training teachers in how to spot signs of radicalisation used the example of Caroline 
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Lucas (a British MP) being arrested at an anti-fracking demonstration as an example of extremism (Bloom, 
Sep. 4, 2015).13 While the ‘line’ to extremism appeared to be drawn at using violence, another ‘line’ is 
constructed here - when one opposes the fundamental British value of the rule of law. Indeed, it was the 
inability to contest an unjust law that was challenged by the school head teacher, Michael Goodwin (Nov. 
11, 2014), in a newspaper column in response to schools’ new responsibilities regarding such values. The 
conflation of civil disobedience with extremism appears to offer substantial challenges to the notion of 
political dissent, further limiting the realm of permissible political opinion.  
 
Extremism and unpopular beliefs 
Both the meaning of extremism and its relationship to terrorism are again destabilised by the inclusion of 
the third group of extremism examples, ideas that in themselves pose no threat but are merely diverse or 
umpopular. One presentation confirms this depiction of extremism as being something at a distance from 
the hegemonic centre: ‘Extremism in its broadest sense is an individual or group of individuals who 
take an extreme position from that of the norm, or take an extreme action’ (T17, slide 5). One 
example included standing outside a fast food restaurant to campaign for veganism (T18, p. 6). Another 
class involved discussing the ‘extreme’ attitude that ‘multiculturalism is bad for Britain’ (T109, slide 16). 
What is fascinating here is that not only was this argument often made in the press in the wake of the attacks 
in the US in 2001 (Young, Nov. 6, 2001), and reiterated after the London bombings in 2005 (Allen, 2010; 
2015; Falcous & Silk, 2010), but it was also an argument made by David Cameron during his time as UK 
Prime Minister when he argued in a key speech, ‘Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have 
encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream’ 
(Cameron, Feb. 5, 2011). Yet, one would be hard-pressed to argue that the former Prime Minister is an 
extremist. 
                                               
13 This is not the only occasion of anti-fracking campaigns being labelled as extremist. In a more recent instance, a 
counter-extremism report changed the details of a case study to ensure anonymity and in so doing suggested this 
individual had been ‘groomed’ into extremism by anti-fracking activists (Pidd, Jul. 30, 2018). 
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One resource emphasises this threat of extremist ideas in the teacher notes: ‘Even when violence is not 
used, extremism can still be dangerous… There is a fine line between intolerance and violent 
extremism. Should we draw the line at the use of violence, or the spreading of intolerance?’ 
(T109, slide 10, notes). The resource infers a strong link between intolerant views and the use of violence, 
a link that has been demonstrated already to be unsupported by research. The counter-extremism emphasis 
here becomes ensuring students do not take their views ‘too far’; the line delineating the moderate and the 
extreme is clear to see. This metaphorical line is indeed often used in educational resources. The resource 
‘Cross the Line’ for example, is an app that allows young people to explore radicalisation with the by-line 
‘How far would you go?’ (www.crosstheline.co.uk). Here it is implied that the closer you stay to the 
moderate centre, the better. Emphasising rationality and prudence, Sieckelinck and de Ruyter propose that 
children should be encouraged to be ‘reasonably passionate’ (2009, p. 187) about their ideals. In this 
context, anchoring one’s passions to the moderate centre, and not straying too far from that fulcrum, might 
perhaps entail a barrier to social change. The inclusion of a whole host of issues that might be considered 
‘non-hegemonic’ but that do not immediately pose a threat of violence, demonstrate just how wide this 
understanding of what extremism entails has become.  
 
Such an understanding of extremism extends beyond teaching resources also. The organisation Let’s Talk 
About It aims to offer help and guidance to counter terrorism and extremism. A regular contributor to 
Twitter, the organisation tweeted that a ‘desire for social change’ may increase one’s vulnerability to 






Such an example demonstrates the danger of this particular construction of extremism – that a desire to 
alter the moderate centre should be considered threatening. 
 
The threatening extremists 
Extremism threatens from all directions. The moderate centre is depicted as being under siege, defending 
itself from this threat. This sense of needing to protect the moderate centre is compounded by the ways in 
which extremists themselves are depicted within the discourse. Not only does the discourse paint a picture 
of extremists as being violent, criminal, and holding minority views, the discourse also paints a negative 
picture of the character traits of extremists. That extremism is decidedly negative is clear to see. Alongside 
examining the predicates of extremism, and noting the heavy emphasis on violence, it was possible to 
analyse the predicates deployed around ‘extremist’, to examine the traits of extremists as painted by the 
discourse. In the following table, I have taken all these predicates, and placed them in six groups: 
threatening, abnormal/deficient, religious, political, in contrast to…, and ‘other’ (table 5.3).  
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Table	5.3:	Predicate	analysis	of	extremist	traits	
Threatening (cont.) Abnormal/Deficient  (cont.) Religious  Political In contrast to... 
Violent (195) Butchered (2) Intolerant (7) Fanaticism (1) Islamic (41) Grievance (10) reasoned/reasonable (5) 
Dangerous (9) Hatred in their heart 
(1) 
Alienated (4) Lost (1) Not just Muslims (4) Activist (2) Human rights (3) 
Risk (6) Influential (1) Ignorance (4) Low self-esteem (1) Following God’s instructions (3) Reject the status quo (2) Freedom of choice (2) 
Illegal (4) Contagion (1) Position from the norm (4) Misalignment (1) Fundamentalist (3) Resentment (1) Equality, justice, democracy 
and human rights (1) 
Intimidating (4) Radical (1) Misguided self-interest (3) Myth-making (1) Claiming to be part of a religion (2) Social disadvantage (1) Peaceful (1) 
Racist (4) Recruiter (1) Prejudice (3) Unwilling to compromise (1) anti-Muslim (1)  Democratic society (1) 
Target susceptible 
young people (3) 
Anti-social (1) Manipulated (2) When someone goes too far 
(1) 
Islamic hate preacher (1)  Fair (1) 
Acting provocatively 
(2) 
Antipathy to the West 
(1) 
Apathy (1) Disengaged (1) Muslims scholars (1)  Middle ground (1) 
Angry (2) Criminal (1) Based on opinion not fact 
(1) 
Distorted worldview (1) 
Absolutist (1) 
Only a handful involved Muslims 
(1) 
  
Sink to new depths (2)  De-humanise (1) Emotional (1) 
Delinquency (1) 
Religion hacked by (1)   
Other: perpetrated (5); minority (4); afraid (2); can flourish (2); arab nationalists (1); exciting (1); from all backgrounds (1); gang (1); hate groups (1); interpretation (1); moticated (1); rhetoric employed by (1); sensitive 
(1); spread (1); teachers (1); unquestioning consensus (1). 
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The primary finding of this analysis is to note how often extremists are painted with threatening language. 
Words such as ‘violent’, ‘risk’, and ‘dangerous’ contribute to build up a ‘barbaric other’ – the existential 
threat against which education is poised. Secondly, the predicates surrounding extremists are dominated by 
a sense of abnormality or deficiency. Language such as ‘ignorant’, ‘manipulated’, ‘misguided’, or ‘lost’ 
add further layers to the construction of both the extremist, and by negation, the moderate centre. This 
contrast with the moderate centre is cemented with occasional references to moderate values such as human 
rights or freedom of choice.  
 
Moreover, there were examples where extremists were ridiculed within the materials. This ridicule further 
embeds a notion of extremist as deficient. In one lesson to combat far right extremism, a video is shown to 
students in which a supporter of the English Defence League is shown to lack basic knowledge regarding 
Islam and the Middle East. The lesson plan instructs teachers to ‘show students the video that highlights 
the idiocy of far-right supporters’ (T386, p.1). To take another example, examine the anecdote within 





Here, the purpose is to paint extremists as ignorant and to dissuade students of any desire to take their 
politics seriously (not that students have many opportunities to address those politics). Any hints at the 
political values of extremists are few and far between, with only ten instances of extremists’ grievances 
being addressed in the corpus of materials. Despite the relatively common recitation of the Oxford English 
Dictionary’s definition of extremism as ‘extreme political or religious views’, the religiosity of extremism 
was more likely to be expressed than its political nature.  
 
When examined as a whole, the corpus paints an enormously diverse range of values, beliefs and actions 
as extreme. These are ideas which contradict the values, beliefs and actions of the hegemonic ‘norm’ or the 
moderate centre. In this sense, extremism performs the role of negative ideograph, which through its 
negation, constructs the moderate British centre. Yet, this process of negation not only constructs a binary, 
but also does so in a way that universalises this threat. The threat of extremism comes from those that 
challenge the hegemony of the moderate in numerous ways – Islamic extremism, right-wing extremism, as 
well as groups that challenge the hegemony of violence, or the rule of law, or moderate ideas. These groups 
of extremes are all poised ready to threaten the moderate centre (see figure 5.12). It can thus be argued that 
the discourse securitises diversity. By this, I mean that the discourse paints diverse (predominantly political 
or religious) views as a threat. It is through this securitisation that the ‘out-group’ can be contrasted with 
the ‘in-group’ and the wall that defends the fortress of liberal democracy under siege from extremism can 







Conclusion: exceptional politics against the universal threat 
This chapter began by arguing that the definition of extremism within the corpus of teaching materials 
indicates a securitisation. Moreover, it argued that extremism could be seen to be a ‘negative ideograph’, 
aiding contemporary Britain in understanding its identity through negation. Britain is the non-extreme. The 
materials attempt to bring students under this non-extreme wing, encouraging a collective identity to 
counter extremism through incorporating narratives of good defeating evil. This securitisation engenders a 
sense of threat, of being under siege. In so doing, it renders exceptional politics more possible and 
permissible. Through exploring how extremism appeared to be coming from all directions, the chapter 
argues that this paints the moderate centre as being under siege. 
 
The chapter has exposed this securitisation, first by exploring definitions of extremism in the corpus, before 
moving on to examine examples of extremism. The chapter argued that there were three broad groups of 
definition of extremism: one that failed to define extremism at all, assuming recipients of that material could 
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define extremism themselves; a second that relied on tautological dictionary definitions which suggest 
extremists are extreme; and a third that relied on the government's definition of extremism as being in 
contrast to fundamental British values. It was argued that these definitions failed to offer concrete assistance 
to students in order to define extremism, and instead left students reliant on wider discourses surrounding 
extremism bringing with them the dangers of Islamophobia, and on their own experiences of counter-
extremism practices which are likely to affect ethnic minorities negatively. The chapter explored critical 
research that challenged the simplistic definitions of extremism offered to students, thus challenging the 
governable and knowable construct of extremism depicted within the corpus: a vague and ill-defined but 
threatening construct that must be managed. 
 
The chapter then explored examples of extremism. Within this second major section, it was argued that 
extremism has become a universalised threat - a threat that could come from anywhere and everywhere. 
Through exploring how there were five major groups of threatening extremist - the Islamic extremist, the 
right-wing extremist, the violent extremist, the illegal extremist, and the holder of extremist views - the 
chapter argued that moderate Britain was being painted as being under attack from extremism from all 
directions.  
 
The chapter aimed to contribute to the overall argument that counter-extremist education appears to be 
dominated by a ‘siege mentality’, and that such a mentality brings with it a threat to pluralist democracy, 
and insecurity to those labelled as extreme. This chapter has contributed to the argument that moderate 
Britain is painted as being distinctly under attack - and under attack from all directions. Such a mentality 
has profound implications for the form of education that can take place in this context. Moreover, as the 
next chapter examines, the sense of being perpetually under attack contributes to the picture of 
contemporary Britain and its values as being vulnerable and in need of vehement defence. Placing education 
on such a footing threatens to undermine the values on which such an education appears to have been 
placed.   
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It is in the next two chapters that the exceptional politics engendered by this securitisation begins to emerge. 
Bigo and Tsoukala (2008) describe exceptionalism as the ‘illiberal practices of liberal regimes’. It is argued 
that in securitising the realm of counter-extremism education, democratic values must be suspended for 
their own protection. The dismissal of political views that stray too far from the hegemonic centre appears 
to be one such illiberal practice. While democracy champions the tolerance of diverse views and values, 
the conflation of diversity with threat appears to negate this. The following two chapters explore this in far 
more depth, first, through exploring how power is executed to govern the behaviour of those within the 
moderate centre, offering narrow modes of permissible behaviour, and second through exploring how 
practices of critical thought mask the discriminatory structures that govern a political system dividing the 




The Vulnerable Under Siege 
The Racialised, Neoliberal Governmentality of Fundamental British Values 
 
It shouldn’t take any intervention from my department to say that young people should be learning the 
fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, tolerance and respect – 
because these British values are fundamentally a good thing. (Morgan, Jan. 27, 2015) 
 
Nicky Morgan, speaking as the Secretary of State for Education, here engages in a fascinating tautology. 
She answers the implied question of ‘why are these values fundamental?’ with the answer, ‘because they 
are fundamentally good’. Like ‘motherhood and apple pie’, these values appear untouchable in their virtue, 
and self-evident in their worth. Yet, there is a danger here too. While democracy, liberty and tolerance all 
sound like good ideas, how they might operate in practice is up for debate. The danger emerges when one 
particular practice of that value is presented as being the fundamentally good practice, and challenging that 
practice is presented as undermining that fundamentally good value. This chapter examines the discourses 
around the promotion of values component of the educational strategy. Exploring the practices and 
discourses within which each of the values is located within the corpus offers an opportunity to examine 
the particular ways in which these values are being promoted. The promotion of these values entails a 
normative commitment to a particular kind of Britain. In examining the discourse surrounding fundamental 
British values, the chapter seeks to investigate the idealised political realm that is constructed within the 
materials. What is this idealised moderate space?  
 
As chapter three examined, the values themselves, as well as the school being the space in which such 
values should be promoted, have been questioned. Scholars and school leaders alike challenged whether 
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they were contradictory (Goodwin, Nov. 11, 2014), whether they were ‘white’ values (Keddie, 2014), or 
whether they made unjustified demands of ethnic minorities (Miah, 2017). Moreover, scholars made note 
of the poor training offered to teachers to achieve the new requirement that they teach such values (Lander, 
2016). Teachers have shared their fears with scholars of excluding ethnic minorities through teaching such 
values (Maylor, 2016) and Farrell (2016) noted students also tended to focus on difference not commonality 
when exploring these values - something noted by civil liberties groups also (JUST Yorkshire, 2017). This 
chapter seeks to put flesh on the bones of these critiques, examining the ways in which the teaching 
materials develop a particular notion of what it means to be British. 
 
Having first ascertained that the materials present fundamental British values as fixed to the definition 
offered by the British government, the analysis takes each ‘sub-discourse’ of each value in turn, analysing 
the linguistic components within. Democracy is presented as a process rather than a value, and moreover 
one that sits in binary opposition to dictatorship. The discourse of the rule of law is presented within a 
narrative of historical improvement to the point of present perfection, and through the metaphor of 
protection. Individual liberty operates through a discourse solely located within the world of work. The 
discourse around tolerance and mutual respect builds a set of narratives around Britishness ripe for 
deconstruction. The chapter takes these linguistic components, and holistically analysing how they both 
contradict and operate with one another, builds a particular picture of the way Britishness is constructed 
within the teaching materials.  
 
The chapter will argue that the discourse surrounding fundamental British values produces a racialised, 
neoliberal governmentality. In so doing, the chapter depicts the limits on diversity and deviance that govern 
the threatened moderate centre, sitting within the castle walls. The chapter examines both the political realm 
and the modes of subjectivity permitted and produced within the discourses surrounding each fundamental 
British value. As such, the chapter explores three such subjects produced under this racialised, neoliberal 
mode of governmentality: a post-political subject, an entrepreneurial subject, and a racialised subject. 
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Examining the discourses surrounding both democracy and the rule of law, the chapter explores the narrow 
modes of permitted political participation embedded within bureaucratic mechanisms of liberal democracy.  
 
Through exploring the synergy with Chantal Mouffe’s (2005) work on the ‘post-political’, here, the ‘post-
political subject’ is examined. Mouffe critiques the way in which contemporary liberal democracy is 
presented as the only virtuous mode of democratic governance. Such closure to the debate around diverse 
notions of democracy has, argues Mouffe, ushered in the post-political era. Through examining how the 
teaching materials envision a limited notion of representative democratic governance, how civic 
engagement is restricted to moments of voting, and lifetimes of following existing laws, the ‘post-political 
subject’ emerges. The level to which this subject is produced as submissive and de-politicised will be 
critiqued. The neoliberal aspect to the governmentality developed within the resources is further embedded 
through discourses of individual liberty. Through exploring the embeddedness of discourses surrounding 
individual liberty within neoliberal frameworks, the ‘entrepreneurial subject’ emerges, and labour itself 
becomes transformed into a mode of countering extremism.  
 
Lastly, through exploring discourses of tolerance and mutual respect, the racialised subject emerges. Here, 
two subjectivities are constructed. One, the original White British subject, who plays host to the second, 
diverse, racialised Other. This Other is welcomed in, but only as long as it performs within certain 
preordained parameters.  The particular ways in which these two subjects develop unbalanced power 
dynamics, where the racialised Other performs in service to the White British subject, will be explored 
through examining scholarly work critical of liberal notions of tolerance, multiculturalism and the embrace 
of difference, such as bell hooks’ essay Eating the Other. 
 
The exceptional politics of a securitised education strategy emerges in this chapter through exploring how 
certain values have been suspended for their own protection. The rationality of government that is 
developed through the discourse on fundamental British values appears to present a very narrow frame 
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within which the moderate can operate. In this sense, the chapter challenges the lack of plurality at the heart 
of this particular vision of democracy. As Mouffe notes, the ‘unchallenged hegemony of neo-liberalism 
represents a threat for democratic institutions’ (2000, p. 6). The chapter explores the dangers that such 
narrow governmentalities pose to the value of democracy; moreover, it explores the dangers of such 
governmentalities for ethnic minorities in particular - individuals who are more likely to be excluded into 
the realm of the extreme, and face the insecurity that such exclusion entails.  
 
Fixed Fundamental British Values 
It is important to begin this examination by first clarifying how the values are defined within the discourse. 
Despite the common criticism that fundamental British values appear poorly defined (JUST Yorkshire, 
2017, p. 14), in a school context the very opposite appears to be the case. Overwhelmingly - both within 
the school values audits, and in the lessons being taught to students - fundamental British values are defined 
as being fivefold: democracy, the rule of law, mutual respect, individual liberty and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs. The values have been copied directly from the Prevent strategy’s definition of extremism 
(HM Government, 2011a, p. 107), and appear fixed. The initial suggestion within the Prevent strategy that 
the values might include these five, rather than be limited to, has in practice been ignored. This example 




Another school developed a set of materials to be used in ‘British values week’, with one assembly each 
day devoted to each of the five values (T401-T405). School values audits were similarly rigid in their 
interpretation of the values. As one school notes: ‘Curricular subject matter is appropriate for the ages 
and aptitudes of the girls and does not undermine the fundamental British values of democracy, 
the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths 
and beliefs’ (A7, p. 1).  The teaching materials and corpus documents clearly produce what we might 
understand to be a ‘field of visibility’. The ‘field’ of values is set. The boundaries are limited, and anything 
that does not fit within these five set constructs is excluded to the shadows. The values are fixed, and it is 
to a critical examination of how these five values are taught that this chapter now turns, and in particular, 
to the three dominant modes of subjectivity permitted: the post-political, the entrepreneurial and the 
racialised subjects.  
 
The Discourses of Democracy and Rule of Law and the Emergence of the Post-Political Subject  
In the context of the discourse surrounding democracy and the rule of law, liberal democracy and its 
associated political and economic mechanisms are presented as being incontestable, irrefutable and self-
evident. The imposition of liberal democracy replaces contestation with a particular consensus surrounding 
the ways in which democracy and the rule of law should be conducted and practiced. As shall be examined, 
there are profound implications of this imposition of consensus on political agency, as the discourse offers 
only a select and proscribed number of channels for political participation. 
 
Within the materials, and within definitions of democracy offered therein, the value of democracy has been 
reduced to the electoral system, and definitions of democracy are reduced to representative democracy: 
● ‘government by elected representatives’ (T387, slide 3).  
● ‘a government which is elected by the people. Everyone who is eligible to vote has a 
chance to have a say in who runs the country’ (T391, slide 3).  
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● ‘government by the people or their elected representatives’ (T417, slide 11).  
The implication of this is that a great deal of the educational content regarding the teaching of democracy 
then focuses on teaching about Britain’s electoral system. Presentations discuss the various political parties 





 Democracy is reduced from a political value into a system of processes. In figure 6.2, democracy is reduced 
to a general election. Similarly, schools might demonstrate that they are promoting democracy, by 
facilitating elections for positions such as school council, emphasising how they are promoting the 
democratic process: 
• ‘we have two student councils which meet regularly’ (A4, p. 2). 
• ‘our student parliament allows students to explore and understand the democratic 
process’ (A8, p. 1). 
• ‘We promote democratic processes, fostering the concept and application of freedom of 
speech and group action to address needs and concerns’ (A12, p. 1). 
• ‘the principle of democracy is consistently reinforced with the democratic process being 
employed for important decisions’ (A7, p. 1). 
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The rule of law is equally systematised, and reduced to a process. One lesson on fundamental British values 
had the following learning objective: ‘Understand that there is a separation of power between the 
government, parliament and the law courts’ (T393, slide 1). Similarly, a different presentation offers 
little more than a question and answer session regarding the various law courts of the UK (T402). A related 
learning objective discussed: ‘the nature of rules and laws and the justice system, including the role 
of the police and the operation of courts and tribunals’ (T102, p. 2). 
 
That Britain is a democracy is obvious according to the discourse; it is an incontestable fact. In this regard, 
it is interesting to note that no teaching materials endeavoured to explore the justifications for each value 
being a British value, and no material explored arguments for or against democracy. The closest that 
materials came to such an examination was that one class asked students ‘would you keep Britain as a 
democracy?’ (T413, slide 7), and a second explored the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative 
vote system, but did not examine democracy more broadly (T391). Only one lesson that tackled the value 
of democracy also explored other forms of democratic engagement aside from voting, such as certain forms 
of protest (T417).  
 
It is interesting to note how often the present tense is used, reinforcing this self-evidence for all the values, 
not just democracy and the rule of law: 
● ‘The UK is a democracy, of course’ (T390, slide 7);  
● ‘In Britain we have individual liberty’ (T403, slide 2);  
● ‘Mutual Respect is a key British value. In Britain we have a tradition of mutual respect’ 
(T404, slide 2).  
These self-evident values then become systems to learn, rather than values to which one can aspire. One 
such discursive mechanism to reinforce this self-evidence was deployed in a set of resources which stated 
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that Britain’s democratic and legal systems had been ‘copied by countries around the world’ (T401, 
slide 3; see also T402, slide 2). In so doing, the resource reinforces a notion of the virtue of Britain’s political 
systems, while ensuring the erasure of Britain’s colonial legacy.  
 
Through exploring how the discourses surrounding the values of democracy and the rule of law are 
developed, an understanding of the ‘post-political subject’ emerges – a subject for whom political 
participation has been reduced to voting in elections, and obeying the laws of the land. Understandings of 
what the post-political entails are varied and diverse. Yet, as Wilson and Swyngedouw argue: 
 
they all refer to a situation in which the political - understood as a space of contestation and 
agonistic engagement - is increasingly colonised by politics - understood as technocratic 
mechanisms and consensual procedures that operate within an unquestioned framework of 
representative democracy, free market economics, and cosmopolitan liberalism. (2014, p. 6) 
 
Discussions of the post-political rely upon a distinction being made between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’, a 
distinction made most prominently by Chantal Mouffe (2005). Built on a post-foundational ontological 
framework (indeed, the very same on which this thesis is built) that emphasises the contingent and 
contestable nature of all social order (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), ‘the political’ refers to the core and perpetual 
antagonism at the heart of social order. ‘Politics’ refers to the institutions and bureaucracies we might 
associate with contemporary liberal democratic hegemony. Wilson and Swyngedouw continue: ‘Mouffe 
equates “politics” with the contingent construction of hegemony, and “the political” with a we/they 
antagonism that she claims is the necessary condition of all political identities… the post-political names a 
hegemonic order in which the antagonistic dimension of the political has not been sublimated, but 
repressed’ (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014, pp. 11-12).  
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Within the discourses of democracy and rule of law, one can see how the discourse functions to repress the 
political, through presenting liberal democracy as the self-evident manifestation of these values. A second 
mode through which this incontestable nature of the values is reinforced is through the ways in which the 
values are introduced through binary frameworks. This structure presents the values as not only 
incontestable, but also perpetually threatened. The values are presented within a binary: democracy/non-
democracy; rule of law/anarchic chaos; liberty/oppression. Democracy is often presented in a binary with 
dictatorship. One presentation, for instance, fails to define democracy itself at all, merely presenting 











A consequence of this is that the values are presented as vulnerable. One lesson painted them as ‘the 
precious liberties enjoyed by the citizens of the United Kingdom’ (T102, p. 3), suggesting that these 
are liberties that could quite feasibly be lost.14 This vulnerability places the values in a defensive mode. 
Neumann highlights the logic of this argument: ‘democracy is fragile, and that it needs to be defended long 
before its enemies break laws or resort to violence’ (Neumann, 2013, p. 887). The implications of this 
defensive mode of thinking becomes clear throughout this chapter. The fundamentality of fundamental 
British values leaves the values incontestable, and any criticism thereof is silenced. Through the production 
of this post-political space, as Mouffe argues: ‘Every opposition is automatically perceived as a sign of 
irrationality and moral backwardness and as being illegitimate’ (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 84-5).  
 
                                               
14 Interestingly, this expression of ‘precious liberties’ is a direct quotation from the UK’s national curriculum for 
citizenship education (Department for Education, 2013, p. 2). 
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These resources appear to tap into what Mouffe calls ‘the very deeply entrenched conviction in Western 
democracies that they are the embodiment of the “best regime” and that they have the “civilising” mission 
of universalising it’ (2005, p. 83). The ‘political’ era is over. Democracy has been achieved, and we now 
operate within the ‘post-political’ era, with fixed liberal democratic institutions of representative democracy 
(see also Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014; Mouffe, 2009). Yet, Britain’s democracy could be easily 
challenged. The unelected House of Lords or the lack of representation of women, ethnic minorities, people 
with disabilities, the LGBT community, the working class and so on within both Houses of Parliament all 
draw criticism, as does the first-past-the-post electoral system. Nevertheless, when teaching the value of 
democracy, these critiques are rarely addressed. This lack of critical examination of democracy is curious 
considering the Department for Education includes ‘advantages and disadvantages of democracy’ 
(Department for Education, 2014, p. 6) as an example of a topic schools could use to promote the value.  
 
These discourses produce a fixed and narrow mode of political participation, developing a particular 
subjectivity: a mode of citizen that fulfils certain functions, and in particular is submissive and 
unchallenging of authority. These post-political subjects participate in politics only through elections, and 
never challenge the rule of law.  
 
The resources develop a sense of what a democratic citizen looks like. Democracy is about institutions and 
systems of elections, and therefore democratic citizens are voters. Take the following slide as an example 





Democracy here is defined, for those who are not members of parliament, as being a ‘voter’. Aside from 
voting, no other modes of democratic subjectivity are offered. The realm of politics described in the 
materials exemplifies the nature of the post-political. 
 
The discourse surrounding the rule of law also indicates the nature of the governmentality that sculpts the 
law-abiding political subject within the materials. Citing the 2014 advice published by the Department for 
Education, schools often express how their students demonstrate ‘an appreciation that living under the rule 
of law protects individual citizens and is essential for their wellbeing and safety’ (Department for 
Education, 2014, p. 5). One teaching material presents to students the following argument: ‘Rules and 
laws create order and harmony in society. They protect and safeguard people’ (T392, slide 6). Such 
an argument dissuades students from criticising the law - arguing that the law must be there for a reason. 
The school audits paint a similar picture: 
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● ‘We help pupils to understand the law and living under the rule of law and its effects upon 
individuals and groups’ (A1, p. 6).  
● A second school also offers ‘chances to look at why our laws are in place and how they 
protect us’ (A11, p. 2).  
● Another communicates ‘the reasons behind rules’ to students (A7, p. 1).  
● A fourth expresses ‘the necessity for rules’ (A13, p. 1).  
 
Two issues are important to raise here. The first was raised by Michael Goodwin, a secondary school head 
teacher, in a newspaper article (discussed also in chapter two). Goodwin (Nov. 11, 2014) argued of the 
danger in promoting the rule of law if certain laws were evidently unjust. Goodwin cited the legality of the 
arms trade, despite the use of British-manufactured weapons in conflicts (such as the Saudi Arabia-led 
campaign in Yemen) that have broken international laws, and suggests that he could not promote the rule 
of law in this setting. Moreover, the narrative of ‘law as protection’ dismisses the important role that civil 
disobedience has played in making UK laws more just, the suffragettes movement being one example. In 
chapter five, I noted the mechanisms through which challenging various laws and engaging in civil 
disobedience is being framed as ‘extreme’. Here, this idea is reinforced through further cementing the fixity 
and justness of Britain’s laws. In so doing, the narrative creates a picture of a just set of laws that are there 
for our own good.  
 
Second, there is a therapeutic quality to this discourse, through coupling law with security and protection. 
The language deployed here is cloaked in the language of safeguarding. The rule of law is painted as a 
protecting and caring mechanism designed to promote safety. The language of safeguarding also permeates 
the literature on counter-radicalisation and young people. As chapter two argued, discourses surrounding 
radicalisation emphasise vulnerabilities to ideology. The Department of Education (2015) argues that 
schools’ counter-extremism responsibilities should be seen as a core component of their wider safeguarding 
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role. Such an emphasis on safeguarding is reminiscent of what Foucault termed ‘pastoral power’ - a political 
relationship akin to a shepherd and their flock: a relationship of care, and responsibility (Dean, 2010). The 
impact of this particular governmentality is two-fold: one, it de-politicises the historical construction of law 
and the legal system within the UK, and two, it conceals the importance of holding that legal system to 
account. 
 
The rule of law contributes to the production of a political realm in which virtuous laws protect and serve 
out interests. Within this realm, a subject is developed, one who abides by the law and does not challenge 
them. In the case of democracy, it is argued that the discourse produces a subject as voter. Here, it is argued 
that the rationality of government promotes a narrative of lawmaker as protector, and as such, promotes a 
submissive subjectivity. In the sense that Althusser’s (1971) fictional police officer hails the subject and 
thus interpellates that subject into a particular position in relation to the state, so too do the teaching 
materials hail school students into a form of subjectivity in which they receive protection from the law. The 
law no longer is a political force that can be altered; rather, it is emaciated and de-politicised to a protective 
device.  
 
At the heart of this concern is a question of agency. Reduced to the role of voter, political agency is 
permitted only once every few years. Where then can agency emerge? Through exploring the discourses 
surrounding individual liberty, the entrepreneurial subject appears: a narrow channel of permitted, 
neoliberal agency. 
 
Individual Liberty and the Entrepreneurial Subject 
Relatively little attention, within both the teaching materials and the audits, is given to the value of 
individual liberty. Interestingly, only one teaching material approached individual liberty as a topic to teach, 
though all school audits do explore how they promote individual liberty throughout school life. Within this 






Having developed this definition, the presentation goes on to use the example of the shooting of Malala 
Yousafzai as an illustration of the denial of individual liberty and the right to an education. This appears to 
achieve a number of things. First, the example places the value of liberty with both the rule of law and 
democracy as being binaries that are threatened. In this case, it is terrorists who threaten. Second, it places 
liberty at the heart of the fight against terrorism and extremism. Liberty is something you have or you do 
not, and extremists want to take it away from you. Third, it masks the political nature of this definition of 
liberty within a very neoliberal framing. Threatened by extremists, the nature of what liberty might mean 
is not in a position to be debated, the existential crisis of liberty being too profound a risk. The fight against 
extremism is reframed as a fight between neoliberalism, and the absence of all liberty. Within this slide, 
liberty is defined in terms of ‘rights’ and government is designated as a controller of freedoms. As shall be 




There were three core narratives that emerged through the discourse analysis: independence, rights and 
responsibilities, and lastly, a focus on careers and the world of work. First, liberty is interpreted as 
independence, emphasising individual responsibility. One school explains that students are ‘Encouraged 
to make their own decisions where they have the appropriate level of maturity’ (A13, p. 2). Another 
cited activities where ‘students have a strong ownership of the group’ (A6, p. 13). A third promotes 
‘independent thinking and learning’ (A8, p. 2). Often citing government advice on countering 
radicalisation, a number of schools make a note that ‘we support all pupils to develop positive self-
esteem, self-confidence’ (A1, p. 5). The liberated subject is an independent subject.  
 
Second, individual liberty appears to be protected through the promotion of an understanding of rights. 
‘The rights of every student are at the centre of our ethos’ (A8, p. 2), argues one institution. ‘Pupils 
explore themes including rights and responsibilities’ (A14, p. 10) argues another, with a third school 
noting their ‘Year 11 Human Rights module’ (A15, p. 3). Rights are often linked both to responsibility 
and liberty. Students are ‘educated about responsibilities and rights’ (A13, p. 2). Lastly, ‘girls are 
encouraged to know, understand and exercise their rights and personal freedoms’ (A7, p. 2). 
 
Third, this discourse on rights and independence is complemented by an emphasis on students’ futures, and 
in particular, linking individual liberty with the world of work. One school argued that ‘developing 
individual aspirations is key to the life and ethos of the school. Whether our students are to be 
found excelling on stage… or developing new ideas across their academic studies, we instil in 
them all a belief in the limitless potential of their own dreams, ambitions and talents’ (A16, p. 2). 
This school promoted this through organising ‘aspiration visits to universities… careers days… work 
experience placements’ (A16, p. 2). Another school committed to ‘Promoting success in subject areas 
leading to a worthwhile career… discussion about job roles within subject areas… use of 
successful professionals linked to subject areas are used as inspiration’ (A11, p. 3). Ensuring that 
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these opportunities were available to all, ‘students are encouraged to consider and develop an 
understanding of how women fit into the world of work’ (A11, p. 3).  
 
These three core narrative operate to develop a particularly neoliberal understanding of how liberty could 
be constructed. Davies and Bansel (2007) note the emphasis neoliberalism puts on increasing capacity for 
individualised responsibility and decreasing capacity for government-level intervention. The promotion of 
liberty appears to have been swept up into a broader promotion of individualised, neoliberal agency. The 
discourse surrounding the individual liberty component in school audits tends to emphasise the role that 
schools play in producing certain forms of individualised subjectivities. Here, it is argued that the discourse 
surrounding individual liberty produces a neoliberal subject, or as Davies and Bansel put it, ‘the citizen as 
active entrepreneur of the self’ (2007, p. 252), what this chapter will term the ‘entrepreneurial subject’. 
Such a subjectivity develops a fascinating inference in the context of counter-extremism - that to defend 
oneself from extremism, one should labour within neoliberal economic models.  
 
This discursive production of the ‘liberated’ individual as someone who is independent, has rights and 
responsibilities and whose success is then framed within the context of labour appears a fascinating example 
of how neoliberal logic has found itself embedded within the context of national values, and a counter-
extremism strategy. Davies and Bansel argue that ‘it is primarily this reconfiguration of subjects as 
economic entrepreneurs, and of institutions capable of producing them, which is central to understanding 
the structuring of possible fields of action that has been taking place with the installation of neoliberal 
modes of governance’ (2007, p. 248). The field of visibility that is produced by these discourses cuts off 
from students the possibility of other forms of subjectivity that might be more communally focussed, and 
limits them to understanding freedom through the individualised and competitive mode of success in the 
labour market. This is reminiscent of the call to Americans after the attacks in New York and Washington 




Within the discourse, capitalist neoliberalism becomes inevitable, unchallenged, and timeless, and 
individual success becomes of moral value; the more you succeed in the neoliberal job market, the more 
you are doing to counter extremism. Interestingly, in exploring the implications of neoliberalism, Davies 
and Bansel cite Chantal Mouffe, and argue ‘through discourses of inevitability and the installation of moral 
absolutes, democratic debate and discussion are obviated, rendering a kind of moral-economic 
totalitarianism’ (2007, p. 251); the authoritarianism of a de-politicised system of democracy, overseen by 
a protective rule of law is supported by a permitted mode of freedom through which escape from an 
economic mode of individualised success becomes impossible. The exceptional politics of suspending the 
value of democracy is apparent here. While the label of democracy is readily deployed, it appears a vacuous 
term.  
 
Tolerance, Mutual Respect and the Racialised Subject 
The last values to be examined are ‘tolerance’ and ‘mutual respect’. Within these last two values, the 
construction of the British subject(s) is most clearly present. Whereas the first three values denote ‘things 
which we value’, the values of tolerance and mutual respect have a much more ethical framing - a sense of 
who the British are, and it is here that the notion of Britishness is rendered visible, and its racialised 
character most obvious. Britain itself, through the notion of ‘Britishness’, emerges as a tolerant and diverse 
character. Yet, two distinct subjects are produced: an original, white British subject who is being altered 
and challenged by a diverse, racialised Other. The diverse Other is tolerated, but only in ways which service 
and privilege the original white British subject. The discourse of diversity and tolerance within British 
values narratives constructs a sense of the host Briton and develops core rules by which the diverse Other 
must abide. As Hage notes in his discussion of whiteness in the context of Australia, multiculturalism 
retains a sense of white supremacy: 
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Both the ‘racists’ and the ‘multiculturalists’ shared in the conviction that they were, in one way or 
another, masters of national space, and that it was up to them to decide who stayed in and who 
ought to be kept out of that space. (Hage, 2000, p. 17) 
 
As such, the section challenges this construction of a racialised governmentality. As shall be demonstrated, 
diversity and security, inclusion and exclusion, walk a tightrope. Through this, this section examines the 
modes in which diversity is permitted, and those modes through which it is not. This examination gives 




The concept of Britishness is hard to locate. It is a contested concept like so many examined in this thesis. 
Yet, examining the corpus of lessons that tackled the concept, certain themes emerge. In order to gain a 
greater understanding of the meaning of Britishness, I recorded all of the objects or concepts that were 
associated with being British within the teaching materials. 
Examples of ‘British’ objects or concepts Number of 
appearances 
Nostalgic or touristic references (e.g. red phone box, Big Ben, cricket) 63 
Flags (Union Jack, St George cross) 45 
Negative stereotypes (e.g. hooliganism, binge drinking) 22 
Examples of diversity (e.g. curry, world religions) 17 
Total  147  
Table	6.1:	What	things	are	British?	(source:	author) 
The notions of Britishness evident within the corpus appear to mirror those isolated within a study on 
Britishness by the Commission for Racial Equality (2005) which found Britishness to be: a combination of 
geography (e.g. rolling hills); symbols such as the Union Jack; British people (this might be in terms of 
‘white Britain’ or in terms of a diverse Britain); a set of values (e.g. human rights and the rule of law); 
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certain habits or behaviours like queuing; the English language; and the historical achievements of British 
people. The nostalgic references in the corpus, as well as the presence of the flags, chimes with the comment 
that Karlsen and Nazroo make, noting how as Prime Minister, David Cameron ‘sought to revert to ideas of 
Britishness based on particular representations of history… which reasserts a picture of Britain as superior, 
successful and dominating’ (2015, p. 763). This historical or chronological approach appears evident here 
in the ubiquity of nostalgic references to a Britain of old.  
 
Yet, while the sum of individual mentions appears to suggest that diversity and negative stereotypes are far 
outweighed by flags and phone boxes with only 17 references to diversity, the classroom presentations 
themselves suggest that most classes are delivered to get students thinking somewhat critically about which 
images of Britishness most reflect their experiences. A number of classes introduce a stereotypically 
nostalgic impression of Britishness before immediately challenging this with either a negative image of 
Britishness, an image of diverse Britain, or perhaps questioning whether Britishness even exists. Below, 
for instance, are two slides from one presentation in which the stereotypical British ideas on the left are 
then challenged by images of diversity on the right (figures 6.7 & 6.8). Alternatively, in the example below, 
an understanding of stereotypical Britishness is challenged by images of punk rock, sex, and hoodies 
(figures 6.8 & 6.10): 
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Yet, it is important to note the order in which the slides, and the ideas of Britishness, are presented. The 
‘traditional’ understanding of Britishness is presented first, before being challenged. In the slides above 
(figures 6.7 & 6.8), the whiteness of the Royal Family and the man in a bowler hat is then contrasted with 
the many colours of ethnic diversity. This appears to develop a narrative of an ‘original’ Britain that has 
been altered in the modern era. Moreover, this sense of originality develops a sense of the White British 





How should this discourse be understood – a discourse that presents this dual narrative between a national 
narrative scaffolded by nostalgic imagery, and a diversity that recognises the change that has occurred and 
the multiple ways in which Britons today celebrate Britishness? It is argued that this duality is mediated 
through developing two racialized subjectivities, the white host and the diverse Other. In so doing, diversity 
is co-opted within a national project. Writing about how Britishness was negotiated within the Parekh 
Report in 2000, Fortier argues that Britain was ‘developing its own version of what I call “multicultural 
nationalism”, that is, the reworking of the nation as inherently multicultural’ (Fortier, 2005, p. 560). Fortier 
notes that ‘this is a conception of Britishness that centres on ideas of inherent diversity and mixity that 
dissolves differences’ (Fortier, 2005, p. 560). This understanding of tolerance and pluralism curates a 
careful space for diversity to flourish: ‘Still primarily ethnicized, the new nation is now re-imagined as the 
result of a timeless mixing of cultures, in a typical melting-pot assimilationist stew where differences are 
dissolved and assimilated into a palatable diversity’ (Fortier, 2005, p. 561, emphasis added). While the 
production of a ‘palatable’ diversity restricts and inhibits the modes through which diversity is expressed, 
it also ensures that diversity is governed by the unshakeable threat that diversity continues to pose.  
 
While diversity is championed as a positive, it never loses its twin, the threat of diversity, and it is this 
looming threat that mediates the boundaries of what diversity is permissible. The motivation for promoting 
shared values was, in part, promoted by what might be termed the ‘lost middle’ argument. As Prime 
Minister, David Cameron isolated the sense of shared values as being key:  
 
This hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. And this 
all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and 
something to believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology. Now for sure, they don’t turn into 
terrorists overnight, but what we see - and what we see in so many European countries - is a process 
of radicalisation. (Cameron, Feb. 5, 2011)  
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Cameron appears to contribute to a ‘lost middle’ thesis where young Muslims in Britain today feel lost and 
trapped between a parental conservatism and a liberalism of their peers. The irony here is that this narrative 
contributes to a sense that there is an inherent antagonism between Islamic and British values (Karlsen & 
Nazroo, 2015). For many young Muslims in Britain, this boundary between permitted and outlawed 
diversity is something they experience profoundly. Reports by human rights and equality groups are full of 
case studies of young Muslims whose political activism, questions, jokes or art work has been misconstrued 
as having strayed across the boundary between the permissible and the threatening (JUST Yorkshire, 2017; 
Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016). As the JUST Yorkshire report on Prevent notes: 
 
this narrative of British values was regarded by our respondents as problematising anything that is 
considered different, especially where the individual concerned also happens to be different. For 
many of our respondents, what they are being told by the Government is that is it not possible to 
be regarded as Muslim and British at the same time (JUST Yorkshire, 2017, p. 15).  
 
Within the context of countering terrorism or extremism, not only does diversity provide a benefit, a 
richness, to the host, but it also produces threat and the need to practice security. Stephens notes this 
duality when analysing how difference and unity coincided in narratives after the London bombings in 
2005: ‘this promotion of difference is curiously, and yet firmly, supported by an insistence on unity… 
difference appears as both something that can be valued and a threat’ (Stephens, 2007, p. 165, original 
emphasis). Stephens describes this sense of being invited in, but not quite, when discussing Blair’s 
narratives regarding Muslims in Britain in the wake of the 2005 bombings: ‘in a double move, while 
“bringing Muslims in”, Blair’s framing of terrorism also works to construct Muslims as another 
community - one that is not quite British, and not quite terrorist either’ (Stephens, 2007, p. 161). How 
diversity is accommodated by schools is explored below.
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Diversity and integration appear to be at odds. One school’s values audit appears to summarise this duality 
succinctly: ‘While celebrating this diversity (indeed regarding the celebration of diversity as 
fundamentally British), we promote fundamental British values’ (A 16, p. 2). The school appears to 
both place diversity as being other to British, as well as placing ‘diversity’ as a core component of the very 
same Britishness.  
 
The main themes, narratives and metaphors that emerge through the discourse analysis specifically of where 
audits outline how schools promote the value ‘mutual respect and tolerance’ contribute strongly to this line 
of argument. In particular, three themes appeared to emerge. The first was an emphasis on difference rather 
than similarity. The second was a desire to bring the ‘Other’ into school. The third was a consumption of 
culture through celebrations and ritual. Such narratives and themes appear to suggest that cultural diversity 
remains something that has two purposes. One is to invite in the Other for the benefit of the host, and the 
second is to invite that Other in in order to keep a safe proximity for surveillance and control. The discourse 
around diversity produces a particular rationality of government in which racialised Other subjectivities 
can be conducted through particular modes.  
 
Recognising difference 
One approach to promoting tolerance and mutual respect is for schools to ensure students are aware of 
differences. This was certainly one critique that has already been made by scholars examining the teaching 
of fundamental British values, bringing with it a fear that the values will do the opposite of teaching students 
about what we all ‘share’ (Farrell, 2016). Difference is a dominant theme within the audits. Schools are 
very keen to recognise difference and to share awareness of difference with students: 
• Rosehill School ‘Demonstrates the similarities and celebrates the differences’ (A13, p. 2).  
• Other school students leave ‘Knowing that there are differences between each religion’ (A11, 
p. 4).  
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• A third school states: ‘We develop respect for difference by celebrating events connected 
to different communities’ (A16, p. 2).  
• In another school, ‘Students’ differences and ideas are celebrated in assemblies’ (A8, p. 2). 
• Hope House School ‘encourage critical thinking and deeper understanding of difference and 
beliefs… we discuss differences between people’ (A1, p. 8). 
 
Interestingly, some of these statements infer that these differences are evidence of different cultures, rather 
than different components within a British culture:  
• ‘We enable students to appreciate different cultures and traditions, including their own’ 
(A17, p. 2) 
•  ‘Through music, pupils have an opportunity to explore aspects of their own culture and 
begin to recognise, and appreciate, differences in music from different times and places’ 
(A9, p. 5).  
In both examples, it is unclear whether the students’ own culture may be British, but that there are distinct 
cultures appears important. 
 
Yet, scholars have been keen to point out that this emphasis on difference may have negative consequences. 
Brown (2006, p. 16) makes a fascinating point about the way that tolerating difference renders those 
differences as fixed and natural, rather than exploring those differences as socially, politically and 
historically constituted:  
 
When, for example, middle and high schoolers are urged to tolerate one another's race, ethnicity, 
culture, religion or sexual orientation, there is no suggestion that the differences at issue... are 
themselves the effect of power and hegemonic norms... Rather, difference itself is what students 
learn to tolerate. 
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The way of knowing the world as ‘similar’ and ‘different’ is cemented within the students’ imaginary, 
placing the ‘different’ at a distance from the norm. Semati (2010) makes a similar point regarding the 
production of difference in the context of Islamophobia, and the production of the Muslim Other. Semati 
notes that ‘the racist imagination does not appeal to “race” to posit the inferiority of an Other based on 
biology but to “cultural differences” and their insurmountability’ (2010, p. 257). The danger within the way 
that difference plays a key role in tolerance, is that once again, the political system which develops that 
sense of difference is never questioned: 
 
The appeal to the category of culture to explain the Muslim Other takes two forms. In the first, the 
Muslim Other is seen as the embodiment of inferior civilizations and cultures. In the second, the 
attempt is made to embrace difference by trying to ‘understand’ the culture and religion of the 
Other. In either case, what is conveniently left out is the politics that has given rise to the category 
of the Muslim Other (Semati, 2010, p. 257). 
 
Importantly for Semati, the power dynamic of those who wish to distance different cultures and those who 
want to understand cultural differences is remarkably similar. As Hage (2000) mentioned above, the power 
dynamic of the racist and the multiculturalist are not that different. For instance, schools are keen to explore 
the positives of what difference can bring: ‘We welcome difference and diversity and aim to create 
understanding of how this adds to the richness of our community’ (A8, p. 2). This word ‘rich’ is 
often linked to diversity. Yet, as shall be explored below, this enrichment must be met with caution, as bell 
hooks explains: ‘the over-riding fear is that cultural, ethnic, and racial differences will be continually 
commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate - that the Other will be eaten, 
consumed, and forgotten’ (hooks, 2014, p. 39). 
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Within the discourse is the clear sense that there is an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. One school describes ‘Studying 
different religious and cultural attitudes to the British system’ (A9, p. 5). It is fascinating to note the 
inference within this statement that Britain itself holds particular religious or cultural attitudes of its own. 
Perhaps not all Britons are part of these religious or cultural attitudes? Often this sense of Otherness is quite 
apparent. Describing how globalisation is taught in Business Studies, one audit describes: ‘This includes 
in different areas of the UK as well as on a global scale as certain areas of the UK have pockets 
of different cultures/ religions’ (A3, p. 2). The Other is over there. As described below, the ‘Other’ can 
be brought in, but the behaviour that they must demonstrate is proscribed. One school explains that ‘Pupils 
consider how democracy, justice, diversity, toleration, respect and freedom are values by people 
with different beliefs, backgrounds and traditions within a changing democratic society’ (A9, p. 6). 
This school universalises Western values of democracy, justice, and freedom, and translates how 
‘difference’ sits within such constructs. Here, the boundaries of diversity are clearly delineated. There are 
ways to be different, but the boundaries of what is (un)acceptable is clear. Falcous and Silk make similar 
remarks when discussing how Black and Asian British athletes were brought to the fore in the UK’s bid to 
host the 2012 Olympics. They note that ‘these figures are taken up as legitimate multicultural racialised 
subjects, but inclusion is contingent; they are “allowed” to be “racialised” but only in bounded ways’ 
(Falcous & Silk, 2010, p. 173). In this sense, the diverse ‘Other’ is allowed in, but only if they perform 
within certain bounds. 
 
One manifestation of this boundary-setting for diversity can be seen in the way that the ‘Prevent duty’ has 
been implemented. The duty - as set out earlier in the thesis - requires teachers to inform authorities of any 
young person they see as being vulnerable to extremism. Yet, the duty has impacted most heavily young 
Muslim students, and particularly those who express political opinion. To give just one example, the report 
entitled Eroding Trust on the impact of the Prevent strategy in schools revealed a case study where a school 
student was interviewed by police for wearing a pro-Palestinian badge on their school uniform and 
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organising a fundraising event for Palestinian children affected by war (Open Society Justice Initiative, 
2017, pp. 86-7). In this sense, diversity is permitted within the discourse on fundamental British values, but 
the combination of diversity and political participation appears toxic.  
 
In a school setting, the ‘us’ entails the non-diverse and non-threatening majority, the ‘them’ can be brought 
in, but always as guests. This creates what might be termed a ‘hierarchy of belonging’ (Weymss, 2006). 
The door remains perpetually able to be shut, as Fortier notes: 
 
The formation of new multicultural subjects involves a movement between closeness and distance; 
that is, one which means that other is now integral to ‘our’ imagined community, while at the same 
time, their otherness, which is necessary to the project of multiculturalist Britain, keeps them distant 
and indeterminate (Fortier, 2005, p. 572).  
 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the Other is voiceless within the audits. The school is the ‘us’, and 
the Other can be brought in. The important thing to note here is that there is a danger, even if the ‘us’ in 
this case wants to celebrate and embrace the Other. As Hage describes, ‘the way the voice of the “ethnic 
other” is made passive not only by those who want to eradicate it, but also by those who are happy to 
welcome it under some conditions they feel entitled to set’ (Hage, 2000, p. 17). 
 
Bringing the ‘Other’ in 
Exploring how schools interpret what promoting diversity means offers insight into how diversity is 
interpreted within schools. Often, diversity is perceived as about ‘bringing in’ those who are different to 
expose students to difference. One school for instance described that their ‘Curriculum [is] enriched with 
visitors from different cultures’ (A13, p. 2). Another school mentions also: ‘students are taught to 
appreciate the diversity and richness belief and faith can bring to the different artwork they see 
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around the world’ (A3, p. 3). This school’s approach is particularly interesting: ‘We aim to do more 
than “tolerate” those with different faiths and beliefs. We recognise the extent to which our own 
traditions and history have developed side by side and the rich cultural heritage that different 
world religions bring… we encourage those in our school who hold different faiths and beliefs to 
share their experiences and provide us with insight’ (A8, p. 3, emphasis added). What is particularly 
evident in this last quotation is that the ‘richness’ and the addition to the wealth is to the benefit of the host 
– the ‘us’ given insight. While there is some acknowledgement that toleration may not be an ultimately 
positive virtue, there is a real sense in this extract that not only is there a clear us and them, but that the 
Other must be brought in, for their presence is of benefit to the host community.  
 
The purpose of ‘bringing in’ this Other to expose difference to students appears to be designed to benefit 
the ‘host’ students - and to offer those students knowledge and understanding. According to the Department 
of Education, schools should: ‘Further tolerance and harmony between different cultural traditions by 
enabling students to acquire an appreciation of and respect for their own and other cultures’ (Department 
for Education, 2015, p. 5). Yet, what is this tolerance attempting to achieve? How should we understand 
this idea of tolerance? Audre Lorde offers a warning here. Lorde was speaking to a conference on feminist 
thought and was criticising the conference for its lack of acknowledgement of the different experiences of 
black, poor and lesbian women in a conference programme that ignored difference. In her speech, Lorde 
argued that ‘Advocating for mere tolerance of difference between women is the grossest reformism. It is a 
total denial of the creative function of difference in our lives. Difference must not be tolerated, but seen as 
a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark as a dialectic. Only then does the 
necessity for interdependence become unthreatening’ (Lorde, 2010, p. 450). Lorde acknowledges what 
difference can offer, and suggests interdependence should be valued between those who are different. Yet, 
if that difference is only tolerated, then that Otherness will perpetuate. Yet, in these school resources 
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toleration is precisely what is being aimed for, cementing a sense of self and Other. Often, as the next 
section will examine, this involves offering diversity as something that can be consumed.  
 
Consuming culture 
It is fascinating within the audits how the celebration of diversity was described within the contexts of 
consuming cultural artefacts from around the world. This might be a cultural celebration such as: 
• ‘Music from different cultures’ (A6, p. 5) 
•  ‘Visiting artists e.g. Indian dancer’ (A10, p. 2).  
• ‘Promoting of diversity in resources - when possible the way of life, custom, traditions, 
festivals, literature, songs from other cultures are explored’ (A11, p. 4).  
Or, it might concern a series of festivals:  
• ‘We discuss different religious and cultural festivals and celebrations in French and 
Spanish speaking countries and encourage our own students to share their experiences 
of religious celebrations’ (A9, p. 4).  
• ‘We develop respect for difference by celebrating events connected to different 
communities. Our Assemblies celebrate Eid, Diwali, Chinese New Year and other festivals’ 
(A16, p. 2).  
• ‘Review and develop an understanding of cultures and customs around the world, 
identifying cultural festivals and methods of celebration, cultural differences regarding 
food... ‘(A9, p. 4).  
Often, this celebration comes through food:  
• ‘Special meals and assemblies may celebrate events such as Chinese New Year’ (A4, p. 3).  
• ‘This is even extended to the school catering where special food “theme” days are 
organised to celebrate both British and World events’ (A7, p. 2).  
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This is positive, as one school describes: ‘Life is more interesting with a greater variety of food, music 
and culture’ (A6, p. 18). Once again, the purpose is to benefit the ‘host’: ‘We welcome difference and 
diversity and aim to create understanding of how this adds to the richness of our community’ 
(A8, p.2). Diversity appears to be present in order to serve host communities.  
 
This emphasis on consumption of diverse culture by a host community was heavily criticised by bell hooks 
in her essay, Eating the Other, in which she criticised how ‘ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that can 
liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture’ (hooks, 2014, p. 21). In her essay, hooks critiques 
the argument that the bringing in of the Other should signify a break between a discriminatory past and an 
inclusive present. Exploring the case of young white men’s sexual encounters with the racial Other, she 
explains:  
 
Unlike racist white men who historically violated the bodies of black women/women of color to 
assert their position as coloniser/conqueror, these young men see themselves as non-racists, who 
choose to transgress racial boundaries within the sexual realm not to dominate the Other, but rather 
so that they can be acted upon, so that they can be changed utterly (hooks, 2014, p. 24).  
 
The Other is brought in, be it in the sense of a sexual encounter in hooks’ example, or in the example of 
cultural consumption or ‘insight’ in a school encounter, precisely to change and benefit the host. In this 
sense, the white supremacist dynamic continues to operate - one in which the hierarchy of white self and 
racialised Other goes unchallenged. hooks does however offer a way out. Exploring a play, Les Blancs, in 
which a white character, Charles, tries to befriend a black character, Tshembe, hooks notes: ‘Again and 
again Tshembe must make it clear to Charles that subject to subject contact between white and black which 
signals the absence of domination, of an oppressor/oppressed relationship, must emerge through mutual 
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choice and negotiation’ (hooks, 2014, p. 28). It appears particularly evident in this case of British values, 
that any sense of mutuality is entirely lacking.  
 
These discourses present Britain as a country that holds onto a set of fundamental values. One of these 
values is tolerance. Yet, as this section has demonstrated, tolerance of diversity should not be confused with 
equality of diversity. Tolerance of diversity, as practiced within schools, produces an imbalanced dynamic 
of power relations in which the diverse, threatening Other is permitted narrow modes through which to 
express diversity, often for the benefit of the White, original British subject. This imbalanced power 
relationship was summarised succinctly by Winter and Mills who argue that while the values strategy 
 
manifests itself as a ‘new’ curriculum policy, its underlying logic and rationale are symptoms of 
the much-older colonial education-security relationship, and thus, of white British supremacist 
subjectivity deployed by government to defend white privilege. (Winter & Mills, 2018, p. 2).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to understand how, within the analogous depiction of Britain’s counter-extremism 
education strategy as a castle under siege, the ‘moderate’ within the castle’s walls is constructed. It 
examined the nature of the political and social realm envisioned within the discourses surrounding 
‘fundamental British values’ in materials designed to promote these values in schools. Developing a 
governmentality approach, the chapter sought to examine how power, through discursive practices, is 
deployed to govern and shape the conduct of various forms of subjectivity. Through examining the 
discourse surrounding the fixed set of four values - democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and 
tolerance and mutual respect – the chapter has examined and critiqued this particular mode of racialised, 
neoliberal governmentality.  
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While the justification for the promotion of fundamental British values is built on a logic of shared values 
and promoting commonality, the opposite was found to be the case. Instead, through examining the modes 
of subjectivity that are deemed permissible within the discourse, the discourse is proven to be both narrow 
and exclusionary.  
 
The chapter has focussed on three primary modes of subjectivity. First, the post-political subject was 
examined. Exploring the discourse through the theoretical prism offered by Chantal Mouffe’s work on the 
post-political, the chapter examined the implications of reducing values of democracy and the rule of law 
to uncontestable systems of governance. Such presentation of liberal democratic mechanisms as values 
provided narrow, and depoliticised, modes of political participation. The post-political subject is one that 
is submissive and non-challenging. 
 
Second, the chapter focused on what it referred to as the entrepreneurial subject. Through examining how 
discourses around individual liberty were enveloped in neoliberal modes of framing liberty, and exploring 
how the world of work, careers and labour more broadly were swept up into understandings of what liberty 
entails, the chapter was able to examine the ways in which counter-extremism has become a practice of 
promoting neoliberal frames of logic. 
 
Last, the chapter explored what it termed the racialised subject. Exploring discourses surrounding tolerance 
and mutual respect, the analysis uncovered a White, British ‘host’ subject, and a racialized Other. It then 
explored the ways in which these two subjects might interact within the discourse, arguing that a clear 
‘hierarchy of belonging’ exists in which tolerance and respect are values in service to the host, White British 
subject. In Kundnani’s words, ‘the solution for liberals is to allow difference so long as it does not make a 
difference’ (2015, p. 88). The chapter critiqued such exclusionary practices.  
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UNESCO notes the role of ‘fundamental values that help raise the defences of peace against violent 
extremism’ (2016, p. 15). Here, the role of values as defence has been challenged and critiqued. Chapter 
five demonstrated that the threat of extremism appeared to have become universalised, securitising counter-
extremism education and engendering a realm of exceptional politics. Through examining how the 
exceptional politics necessitate the suspension of values for their protection, this chapter has explored how 
this exceptionality has governed the moderate centre. In particular, two challenges dominate. First, the 
nature of democracy, entrapped within these walls, appears narrow and exclusionary, offering only one 
conception of how democracy is to be done. Such a conceptualisation of democracy appears a direct 
challenge to more plural notions of democracy. Moreover, such exclusionary understandings of permitted 
democracy promote exclusionary modes of politics, rendering those excluded from the moderate centre in 
a realm of insecurity. Governmentalities of diversity set narrow modes of permitted diversity: the Other is 
only ‘allowed in’ under certain circumstances.  
 
The thesis has now examined how the extreme and the moderate are conceptualised within the discourse. 
In the following chapter, the relationship between the two is examined, as the discourse around the skill of 
critical thinking is explored. Here, the thesis exposes how critical thinking is deployed as a weapon to 
protect the moderate from the extreme, and in so doing, both masks and perpetuates the modes of 





 Critical Thinking, Islamophobia and the Post-Racial 
 
The values of democracy, tolerance and respect are not the only ‘motherhood and apple pie’ concepts 
promoted within counter-extremism education. Critical thinking appears to be another similarly 
incontestable idea. Celebrated in curricula documents from primary schools in Finland to tertiary level 
university papers in South Africa, critical thinking is a vital component of contemporary education. This 
chapter seeks to evaluate how the critical thinking component of the counter-extremism in schools strategy 
is developed within the teaching resources. In chapter three, I argued that there were a number of questions 
or issues that arose out of the deployment of critical thinking within the strategy. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to examine those questions. The chapter noted the lack of a secure definition of critical thinking, 
and how that definition might then relate to extremism. In particular, some definitions of critical thinking 
emphasise developing a relationship with the Other, in order to understand the Other’s perspective (Davies, 
2008; Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009). Within this framework, it is often argued that critical thinking is an 
important component of citizenship skills (Ten Dam & Volman, 2004). Yet, it was argued in chapter three 
that this understanding of critical thinking seemed to clash with other core components of the counter-
extremism strategy, particularly, the importance of protecting and promoting liberal democratic values. 
Furthermore, the chapter noted the common assumption that scholars made, namely, that critical thinking 
skills automatically lead to the cultivation a particular set of (liberal) values. The question of how one might 
critically think towards a predetermined answer was raised. 
 
This chapter explores how these antagonisms and contradictions emerge within the teaching materials 
themselves. In so doing, it seeks to go beyond an explanation of how things are not working, to try to 
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understand what is working through its not working: what are the political and ideological consequences of 
this particular deployment of ‘critical thinking’? The chapter explores how critical thinking has become 
weaponised - transformed into a tool or technique of defence. Critical thinking is deployed to protect the 
moderate centre from the extremes, but as the chapter will argue, such a weaponising function serves to 
both mask and perpetuate certain modes of discrimination. 
 
The chapter focuses on how the antagonism between critical thinking skills and liberal democratic values 
promotion emerges in the context of discussing Islamophobia, a common topic chosen when teaching 
critical thinking. In particular, it explores how three separate themes operate in conjunction with one 
another: the resources challenge the Islamophobia of others (in particular, the media and right-wing 
extremists); they produce an essentialised understanding of ‘True Islam’ as a form of Islam that is tolerant 
of and does not challenge or threaten liberal democracy; and lastly, the resources lack critical analysis of 
the Islamophobic and discriminatory structures of the counter-extremism strategy itself, while presenting 
itself as a ‘safe space’. Through examining literatures on the ‘Post-Racial’ and on ‘New Racism’, the 
chapter explores each of the three strands, and examines how they cooperate to mask from students the 
racialised and discriminatory structures of a counter-extremism strategy which deploys critical thinking in 
a defensive mode, designed to protect liberal democracy from challenge and critique. As such, the chapter 
further develops the argument made in the previous chapter that the defensive and securitised mode of 
education in the face of the extremist threat has engendered an exceptional politics in which values must be 
suspended for their own protection. While diversity, tolerance and mutual respect are fundamental British 
values, here the machinations of an Islamophobic strategy are exposed. The chapter begins by examining 
first how critical thinking is defined, and the ways in which it is deployed, before exploring the various 





Defining Critical Thinking 
The first thing to note is how often developing critical thinking skills is cited as a core learning component 
of these materials. To give three examples: 
● Since 9/11 argues ‘this topic provides a meaningful and relevant context through which to 
engage students with the concepts of democracy and justice, rights and responsibilities, 
and identities and diversity, and to develop the skills of critical thinking and enquiry, 
advocacy and representation, and taking informed and responsible action’ (T285, p.2).  
● Extreme Dialogue express ‘Developing the skills to think critically’ (T90, p. 4) as one of their 
key aims.  
● The PSHE Association note the importance of ‘developing critical and flexible thinking’ (T252, 
p. 4) in teaching about extremism.  
 
Yet, what does ‘critical thinking’ really mean? In chapter three, it was argued that literature on education 
and extremism offers little in the way of definition and fails to draw upon academic literatures on critical 
thinking itself. This left the question of the purpose of critical thinking in counter-extremism unanswered: 
did it refer to the deployment of a set of reasoning skills to disrupt the brainwashing capacity of extremist 
narrative, or was it designed somehow to catalyse the uptake of certain values through the improvement of 
a set of skills? 
 
Rather symmetrically, it is important to note that the term is never defined within any of the teaching 
materials in the corpus. Instead, an understanding of what critical thinking entails can be deduced by 
exploring all the words and phrases that are used in association with the word ‘critical’ in the resources. 




thinking enquiry skills 
debate question investigation 
issues explore weigh evidence 
reasoned arguments contentious issues examine 
resilience independently free enquiry 
serious discussion judgement  argument 
deliberation scrutiny analysis 
aware evaluate idealism 
look reflect judging 
assess understanding responding 
informed choosing justifying 
dialogue moral reasoning consumer 
appraisal rational  
Table	7.4:	critical	thinking's	associated	words	(source:	author) 
 
The corpus appears to understand critical thinking skills as the set of skills one would use to take an idea 
and assess it, evaluating whether or not one would agree with it, whether it has justification and so on. It 
does not therefore imply any one particular arena for critical thinking, but instead a universal skill. 
 
However, despite being presented as a universal skill, critical thinking is deployed in specific ways. This 
chapter will explore the mono-directional nature of the deployment of critical thinking within counter-
extremism education. By this, it will be argued that critical thinking is always used ‘outwards’, away from 
the liberal democratic moderate centre. Critical thinking may be deployed towards those who challenge, 
those who are extreme, but the moderate centre is never itself critically approached. This ‘weaponisation’ 
of critical thinking has particular ramifications, in that it plays a key role in masking the discriminatory 
structures of the counter-extremism strategy. 
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This mono-directional nature can be immediately evidenced through an exploration of the topics within the 
teaching materials isolated above which describe themselves as somehow ‘critical’. The topics covered in 
the same teaching materials from which the above associated words were collated are as follows: 
 
Extremism Challenging extremist narratives dictatorship 
“Anarchic states in Libya, 
Tunisia, and Egypt” 
Meanings of extremism and 
terrorism 
Signs of radicalisation 
Immigration and right-wing 
extremism 
Political and social issues Contentious issues 
Who is considered a terrorist Terrorism in the context of 
apartheid 
Challenges facing the UK 
Complex problems The “nature of democracy”  The role of laws 
Social change Violence in whatever forms Media and current affairs 
9/11 and its memorialisation Beliefs and attitudes Responses to 9/11 
Violent extremism Religious extremism intolerance 
Charismatic leadership London bombings 2005 Learning dialogue 
Table	7.5:	Topics	approached	critically	(source:	author) 
 
Within these materials, there are classes or presentations which challenge some of the orthodox narratives 
of discourses of terrorism (e.g. ‘who is considered a terrorist’ or ‘responses to 9/11’). There are moments 
where either the way in which terrorism or extremism is defined might be afforded critical attention (e.g. 
‘terrorism in the context of apartheid’).15 For the most part, however, the fact that critical thinking is being 
drawn very heavily in the direction of extremism and its associated terms is important to note. Aside from 
one instance of a resource appearing to approach British values with some level of criticality, the materials 
do not appear to acknowledge a need for a critical approach to the moderate centre. Critical thinking is a 
skill to protect from a threat, rather than a universally applicable skill in its own right.  
                                               
15 These moments of ‘resistance’ to the discourse are discussed in depth in chapter eight. 
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Marsden offers an interesting take on the purpose of critical thinking in the context of countering extremism: 
‘to develop critical, informed, compassionate citizens able to engage constructively with those difficult 
questions that political violence is, at heart, concerned with: how to negotiate difference; how to “do” 
politics in an increasingly pluralistic society; what to do about injustice; and what counts as “extreme” and 
“moderate” and why’ (Marsden, Jul. 9, 2015). What is fascinating is how much emphasis appears to be 
poured into critically exploring why people might be drawn to extremism, but very little about ‘those 
difficult questions’ that extremists believe they have an answer to. This will be explored below when 
investigating the uncritical approach the corpus overall takes towards the production of counter-narratives.  
 
Marsden finishes her commentary with a pertinent comment: ‘Young people sympathetic to “radical” ideas 
aren’t necessarily ideologically “brainwashed”, they have political agency, it’s rather that the scope of 
critical thinking is limited, confined to their opponent’s behaviour. The task of educators is to expand the 
object and direction of that thinking, to include the arguments of those to whom they’re sympathetic’ 
(Marsden, 2015). This chapter rather suggests that the same could be said for those sympathetic to 
‘moderate’ ideas too.  
 
Critically Examining an Islamophobic Media  
It is evident that a number of resources make clear attempts to develop their students’ critical skills. The 
majority of those resources focus on developing skills in critical reception of information and narratives. A 
dominant topic through which to develop the skills of critical thinking is the media. Since 9/11, for instance, 
explores the values with which media outlets evaluate which news stories to promote to their front pages 
(T293). Extreme Dialogue explores sensationalism in the media (T91). The PSHE Association ‘aims to 
help young people understand the impact of editorial choices in the media’ (T267, p. 1). A Stockton 
Council resource, using the example of how young people are represented in the media, ensures students 
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‘have considered how the media can misrepresent communities and how it can influence society’s 
perceptions’ (T353, slide 2). Academic study supports the importance of media literacy. For instance, 
Jerome and Elwick report a focus group with students: ‘The prevailing sense of these discussions was a 
feeling that the students were quite vulnerable to distorted media messages, but that this could be tackled, 
at least partially, through a more critical engagement with information’ (2017, p. 7). Likewise, Lenos and 
Krasenberg argue ‘critical thinking (media literacy) is the weapon that we should arm everyone with, so 
that they can avoid the forces that lure so many into polarisation’ (2017, p. 3).  
 
One way in which this was achieved was, for example, through supporting students to be able to distinguish 
fact and opinion. A number of resources focussed on developing skills to distinguish between fact and 
opinion and to examine bias (figures 7.1 & 7.2): 
 
The prevalence of Islamophobia in the media (and its potential impact to further alienate and radicalise 
young Muslims) was a common theme to emerge within the context of what one resource described as, 
becoming ‘critical consumers of information’ (T258, slide 10). The emphasis on Islamophobia in the 
media within the context of counter-extremism education is perhaps unsurprising, given the academic 
literature on the problematic portrayal of Muslims and Islam within print media (e.g. Saeed, 2007) and 
Figure	7.2:	T110,	slide	5 Figure	7.3:	T429,	slide	8	
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racism in the media more broadly (e.g. van Dijk, 1995; 2000). In one large scale analysis of media content 
concerning British Muslims, it was found that ‘the idea that Islam is dangerous, backward or irrational is 
present in 26% of stories. By contrast, only 2% of stories contained the proposition that Muslims supported 
dominant moral values’ (Moore et al., 2008, p. 3). This report concluded that ‘Decontextualisation, 
misinformation and a preferred discourse of threat, fear and danger, while not uniformly present, were 
strong forces in the reporting of British Muslims in the UK national press’ (Moore et al., 2008, p. 4).  
 
Perhaps reflecting this portrayal in the media, a number of resources cited instances of Islamophobia in 











In these three presentations, the nature of Islamophobia in the media is described in different ways. In the 
first, it is offered as an example of propaganda; the second suggests that Islamophobia in the media is a 
contributing factor to extremism; and the third describes these essentializing attitudes as the use of 
stereotypes for particular agendas. While they all, therefore, diverge in some ways, the central narrative - 
that the media are Islamophobic - remains.  
 
In many cases, these resources demonstrate a number of the features that Gardner et al. identify as key 
components of a ‘multicultural media competence’ (2008, p. 132). In particular, teaching materials attempt 
to develop ‘an ability to understand media reporting and its background’ and ‘a capacity to interpret the 
meaning of the lack of multiple perspectives in the media discourse on migration and multiculturalism, as 
well as on Islam’ (ibid.). Other resources contextualised Islamophobia by linking the issue to debates 
surrounding migration, and wider discourses surrounding terrorism. In the following images, one slide 
challenges media discourses on migration, while the second contrasts these discourses with the reporting 
of the death of Aylan Kurdi, a child whose body washed up on the Turkish shore having drowned in the 





These resources do therefore attempt to help students to develop critical skills to challenge stereotypes and 
to read the media with a critical eye. Yet, it is important that this nod towards criticality is itself approached 
critically. McQueeney, for instance, in an article exploring Islamophobia and the media, argues ‘Critical 
media literacy is especially useful for cultivating equity and justice among today’s students, who… lack 
the ability to evaluate information and debunk stereotypes in the media’ (2014, p. 297). This begs the 
question, to what extent does the critical literacy teaching regarding Islamophobia, evident within these 
resources, cultivate some sort of justice? It has been argued that the teaching materials are quick to label 
the media as Islamophobic. Yet, for what purpose has this finger of blame been pointed? 
 
The Post-Racial and New Racism 
The chapter will deploy the theories of Post-Raciality and New Racism to explore the implications of this 
critical approach to Islamophobia. These theories have been developed in the counter-extremism context 
before. Sian argues that we should see the Prevent strategy as a part of ‘the current hegemonic post-racial 
discourse’ (2015, p. 194), noting how teachers receive training to identify extremism, but do not receive 
training to promote anti-racism. Postraciality acknowledges a contemporary current through which racism 
is both dismissed and denied, while at the same time underlying structures of racial inequality continue to 
function. As Sayyid notes, ‘It is characterised by a sense that we have seen the “end of racism” and its 
expulsion from the public domain’ (2010, p. 3). Yet, importantly Sayyid continues by highlighting: ‘A 
black president, third world rock stars, and all the ethnic food you can eat does not change the violent 
hierarchies that remain in place grinding away at the souls of the dispossessed’ (Sayyid, 2010, p. 4).  
 
The discourse of ‘post-raciality’ has parallels and commonalities with the literature on ‘new racism’ which 
explores a shift, as Saeed puts it: ‘from crude notions of biological inferiority and instead forged links 
between race, nationhood, patriotism and nationalism. It has done so by defining the nation as a unified 
cultural community, a national culture ethnically pure and homogeneous in its whiteness’ (Saeed, 2007, p. 
445). Van Dijk adds, ‘In the New Racism, minorities are not biologically inferior, but different’ (van Dijk, 
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2000, p. 34). Or, as Semati writes, ‘The racist imagination does not appeal to ‘race’ to posit the inferiority 
of an Other based on biology but on “cultural differences” and their insurmountability’ (Semati, 2010, p. 
257). The previous chapter explored criticisms of fundamental British values that argued these were ‘white’ 
values, or presented White people as a priori British. Fundamental British values appear to be an exemplar 
instance of new racism at play. One might see this also in the emphasis placed on cultural markers such as 
the hijab when exploring issues of extremism and security. Questions arise as to whether such choices 
indicate an inability for assimilation.  
 
There are thus two complementary trends to take note of here. The first is the denial of racism while racial 
discriminatory structures persist. This is a trend shared by both post-raciality and new racism. Bonilla-Silva 
notes that new racism also refers to ‘the manifold subtle yet systemic ways in which racial privilege is 
reproduced’ (Bonilla-Silva, 2003, p. 272). The second is the shift in understanding race from one of 
biological inferiority, to unbridgeable cultural difference. Both trends shall be explored in this chapter as 
they emerge within the themes and narratives surrounding Islamophobia within the teaching materials. 
 
This post-racial dismissal of Islamophobia is moreover key to the construction of the moderate centre; both 
distancing it from exceptional racism such as that of far-right movements, and also making any challenge 
to the powerful dominance of the non-ethnic moderate centre more difficult. As Sayyid notes, ‘By focussing 
on racism as something to be found in the mind of racists, it makes it difficult to understand a world in 
which there could be racism without self-ascribed racists… the solution to racism is individual reform rather 
than social transformation’ (Sayyid, 2010, p. 5). The chapter will thus explore the ways in which not only 






They are the Islamophobes! 
It is interesting to note that within the discourse of the teaching materials, the media was so often depicted 
as the source of the Islamophobia. This discursive act appears to distance the moderate centre from the 
charge of Islamophobia itself, through identifying an ‘Other’ as Islamophobic. One resource asked students: 






This material inferred, therefore, that the media produce Islamophobia. Similarly, another resource shared 
an example of a newspaper headline, noting: ‘However, headlines like this probably don’t help either. 
Some of the UK press does push young people away by being Islamophobic’ (T426, slide 5). Such 
expressions and depictions of the media present the production of Islamophobia as an isolated, agentic 
choice of the media. Such a depiction thus also distances the Islamophobic media away from the moderate 
centre, creating a binary distinction between the intolerant, Islamophobic subject and its opposite - the 
liberal moderate.  
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One way of understanding this discursive move is through Brown’s use of the concept of ‘depoliticisation’. 
Brown, in her work exploring the discourses of tolerance, argues: 
 
Depoliticisation involves construing inequality, subordination, marginalisation and social conflict, 
which all require political analysis and political solutions, as personal and individual, on the one 
hand, or as natural, religious, or cultural on the other. (Brown, 2006, p. 15)  
 
The discourse, I argue, in its blaming of the media for producing Islamophobia, thus individualises 
Islamophobia by providing isolated agents of Islamophobia rather than exploring it as a social phenomenon. 
This depiction of the problem can be contrasted with an exploration of the socially embedded nature of 
media outlets. As van Dijk writes: ‘Media discourse is the main source of people’s knowledge, attitudes 
and ideologies, both of other elites and of ordinary citizens. Of course, the media do this in joint production 
with the other elites, primarily politicians, professionals and academics’ (van Dijk, 2000, p. 35). In van 
Dijk’s research into racism within media institutions, he has concluded: 
 
Analyses of ethnic affairs coverage show a remarkable alignment of the press with the dominant 
white power elites, as well as with the popular resentment among the white population at large, 
whose protests against further immigration or serious equal rights policies are prominently 
displayed in, and thus further exacerbated by, the news media. (van Dijk, 1995, p. 17) 
 
In van Dijk’s work, the dual role of the media is emphasised - as both a producer of discourse, and as 
reproducer. Instead of, therefore, seeing media as the source of racism or Islamophobia, media should be 
evaluated as an institution within a social context in which it operates. Thus, evidence of Islamophobia in 
the media is not just evidence of an Islamophobic media, but of the permissibility and pervasiveness of 
Islamophobia across society more broadly. Macdonald (2003) for instance, begins a chapter on discourses 
around Islam in the media by introducing Said’s theory of ‘Orientalism’, locating contemporary 
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Islamophobia in hundreds of years of history during which European thinkers contrasted the West with the 
barbaric and exotic ‘Other’ (see also Saeed, 2007; Semati, 2010). Similarly, when discussing an example 
of racism expressed by a football commentator, Matheson writes: ‘The way of thinking and the way of 
talking about black players which popped readily into this commentator’s head did so precisely because it 
was socially shared knowledge’ (2005, p. 138). This racism did not emerge from nowhere, but exists in a 
social context. As such, it is interesting to note that this discursive distancing from Islamophobia within the 
corpus, in fact operates to mask the audience of the social and political location in which Islamophobia 
takes place. Brown continues, ‘Depoliticisation involves removing a political phenomenon from 
comprehension of its historical emergence and from a recognition of the powers that produce and contour 
it’ (2006, p. 15).   
 
A similar narrative process exists where corpus materials highlight instances of Islamophobia by right-wing 
groups such as the English Defence League. These instances serve to isolate right-wing groups as 
anomalies; at odds with, rather than the logical extension of, wider social forces. This serves to reinforce 
the distance between the moderate centre - the voice of these materials - and the racism or Islamophobia on 
show. So often, images of the English Defence League marching through British streets develop a menacing 






This production of the evil and barbaric white nationalist figure appears akin to the production of the evil 
or threatening Orientalist Other produced by the media. It produces an essentialised barbarism that can be 
contrasted with a tolerant, moderate subject, producing clear delineations in what might otherwise be 
understood as a murky, complex and interlinked environment in which society as a whole allows 
Islamophobia to emerge and thrive. This discursive mechanism shifts the spotlight away from the moderate 
centre, and produces clear boundaries between the permissible and the unacceptable.  
 
Moreover, within the teaching materials’ handling of the topic of Islamophobia, a core antagonism of 
counter-extremism critical thinking is evident: the antagonism between thinking critically and the 
importance of promoting certain counter-narratives. Teaching materials are keen to provide counter-
Figure	7.10:	T109,	slide	8 Figure	7.11:	T387,	slide	4	
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narratives to compete with those coming from more extreme sources. For example, resources encouraged 





The material was designed with a clear sense of what was ‘wrong’ and what needed to be addressed. While 
many ‘extreme narratives’, such as those of Islamophobic media outlets, were being critically approached, 
the corpus also develops counter-narratives to these extremist narratives that are presented, not so much 
critically, as dogmatically. One resource on the topic of ISIS instructs students: ‘Imagine you found out 
a friend was planning on joining ISIS. Write them a letter persuading them not to go.’ The exercise 
laid out the success criteria, including: ‘Explains reasons why they might want to go are wrong; uses 
British Values to persuade them to stay in Britain; explains what is wrong with IS’ (T400, slide 13). 
Secondly, within guidance notes given to teachers, one teaching material offered the following warning: 
‘You will need to be sensitive to opinions pupils may be expressing which come from home – do 
challenge these with factual information’ (T36, slide 8 notes). This appears to infer that the teacher or 
the teaching material are the holder of facts, and that facts can challenge ‘extreme’ opinions. Yet, it is 
important to expose certain discursive slips which demonstrate this may not be as simple as the resource 
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suggests. Under one image of the EDL, the teacher notes describe the ‘dangers’ of the group, including 
‘rejects multiculturalism’ (T109, slide 8 notes). As was suggested in chapter six, it is interesting to note 
that as Prime Minister, David Cameron rejected ‘state multiculturalism’ himself (Cameron, Feb. 5, 2011); 
it is not simply a view held by the ‘extremists’. 
 
It is interesting within these examples that ‘moderate’ knowledge is presumed to be a priori to the class. 
This is not the first time that the dangers of attempting to teach counter-narratives have been examined. 
O’Donnell explores this style of learning, but offers concern as to the pedagogical implications: 
 
I worry that the presumption that we must challenge extremist ideas in order to prevent terrorism 
precludes the far more important exercises that we engage in classrooms when we train our 
imaginations to go visiting… Rather than fixating on ‘challenging’ extremist ideas, which assumed 
a position of certainty in one’s own worldview, how would it be to imagine the world from the 
standpoint of another, indeed of many others? (O’Donnell, 2017, pp. 190-1, original emphasis)  
 
It is noticeable that so many of these resources adopt a certainty in worldview, allowing what O’Donnell 
describes as ‘pedagogical injustice’, through framing the class in terms of defeating extremist narrative 
through the promoting of counter-narrative. The world that O’Donnell describes, one in which it is only 
extremist ideas that are ‘challenged’, appears at a distance from the one which Marsden (Jul. 9, 2015) 
envisaged in the quotation used earlier – one in which the ‘difficult questions’ that extremists tackle might 
be brought into the classroom. The consequences of counter-narrative production are evidenced within the 
next section. Here, the second dominant narrative of the discourse surrounding critical thinking and 





These are the True Muslims 
A recurring example of these uncritical discourses is that regarding ‘true Islam’, a narrative through the 
resources which assumes that the author of the resource has access to the legitimate interpretation of Islam, 
and which is something that extremists evidently lack.  One resource described a factor that might lead 
someone towards extremism as ‘lack of understanding of faith’ (T254, slide 7). The following slide gives 
another example in which the argument is clearly made that extremists lack an understanding about their 





Within the corpus, this narrative regarding ‘true Islam’ extends beyond a discussion of Islamophobia, and 
regularly emerges when materials discuss Islamic extremism more broadly. One presentation slide writes: 
‘ISIS, ISIL or Islamic State want to create a new caliphate, an area run by their own 
understanding of strict Islamic society. This is widely rejected by the vast majority of Muslims and 
especially by Islamic scholars’ (T426, slide 3, original emphasis). The following slide attempts to 
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In this slide, a series of criteria of a legitimate military Jihad are outlined, and a cross and accompanying 
explanation are placed next to each one, explaining how ISIS’ current campaign in Iraq and Syria fails to 
comply with the criteria.  
 
The narrative of ‘true Islam’ sits within a wider societal discourse that adjudicates between true and false 
forms of Islam. These concepts operate within academic discourses. Rosyad, for example, framed divisions 
between fundamentalist and moderate movements in Islam in terms of groups arguing for their 
interpretation of ‘True Islam’ (Rosyad, 2007). Trevino et al.’s research on the portrayal of Islam within 
American media highlights what the authors see as the presence of lots of misconceptions ‘and lack of 
understanding of true Islam’ within the media (2010, p. 3), something that the authors apparently hold.  
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Academic literature also emphasises the contestation around the notion of ‘Jihad’ as much as the slides 
within the corpus do. Macdonald, in a chapter on the demonisation of Islam within the media writes, ‘Jihad 
is not, however, an aggressive concept within Islam’ (Macdonald, 2003, p. 156). Jihad is often mentioned 
in relation to misunderstanding, and an emphasis is placed on ‘struggle’ rather than violence (see for 
example, Armstrong, Sep. 23, 2001). Oftentimes it is the concept of Jihad that attracts the most attention 
from the teaching materials, with resources affirming that Jihad has been misunderstood and Islam is a 
religion of peace, such as in the following slide which clearly affirms that an extremist interpretation of 




The following two slides also demonstrate discursive attempts to dismiss the idea that ISIS, or ‘Islamic 




What is troubling here, is not a question of whether or not these claims are accurate; the purpose here is not 
to begin a search for the true Islam. Instead, it is important to note the implications of this narrative: how it 
places the authors of these resources as the arbiters of what true Islam consists of, and how this true/false 
dichotomy fits within other discursive binaries and produces a particular form of True Islam. It is here 
where the anti-Islamophobic message of these resources is endangered in that they begin to produce the 
very same essentialization of Islam as Islamophobia does - albeit through producing a legitimised, and 
tolerated, form.  
 
Teaching materials regularly produce an idea of a ‘true Islam’ in the face of a false or misinterpreted 
extremist Islam. While it is undeniably true that the theological foundations of ISIS divert enormously from 
the majority of Muslims around the world, this argument faces numerous dangers. Mahmood Mamdani 
wrote of this in the years following the attacks in the US in 2001, under what he termed ‘Good Muslim, 
Bad Muslim’: ‘We are told that there is a fault line running through Islam, a line that separates moderate 
Islam, called “genuine Islam”, from extremist political Islam’ (Mamdani, 2002, p. 767; 2005). The danger 
here is twofold. The first is that the discourse is in danger of creating a very narrow remit for true Islam. 
Figure	7.16:	T398,	slide	4 Figure	7.17:	T397,	slide	17	
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The second is that the discourse fits within and supports other problematic discourses around Islam, and 
the discourse between moderate and radical Islam in particular.  
 
Regarding the first danger, the discourse falls into what Mamdani calls ‘culture talk’: ‘the predilection to 
define cultures according to their presumed “essential” characteristics’ (Mamdani, 2002, p. 766). In this 
case, the danger is that the resources create a uniform sense of what ‘true Islam’ entails, painting over the 
inevitable diversity between interpretations of Islam within a population of over a billion people (Semati, 
2010, p. 258).  
 
Moreover, the narrative places the teaching materials in an unsettling position of being the arbiters of what 
counts as ‘true Islam’. In this sense, the resources act in a way to set the parameters through which Islam is 
rendered knowable. In particular, the materials produce a particularly passive understanding of true Islam, 
















Within these slides, true Islam becomes defined through common themes such as ‘equality’, ‘peacefulness’, 
and ‘tolerance’. Within these three examples, the resources in particular give emphasis to quotations from 
the Koran which promote tolerance. These quotations function to paint true Muslims as passive individuals 
when one considers the role of this narrative within a counter-extremism strategy that emphasises the threats 
from an intolerant extremist Muslim population. The message appears to become, ‘a true Muslim is one 
who tolerates us’.  
 
What is fascinating about these examples is that, in combination, they appear to be re-presenting Islam 
within linguistic frames that are themselves heavily embedded and located within Eurocentric discourses, 
and the discourse of tolerance in particular. Brown’s (2006) work on tolerance offers helpful insight, 
particular where she notes that discourses of tolerance exist in ‘a Euro-Atlantic political imaginary within 
which the nation-states of the West are presumed always already tolerant’ (Brown, 2006, p. 3). This co-
option of Islamic scripture is deployed to mask the inequalities and discriminatory practices of the social 
and political context in which the resource was written, in the context of a counter-extremism strategy that 
impacts different communities so differently. Citing the Koran, ‘All people are equal’ (T412, slide 24), 




Here, one can begin to see how the two narratives thus far examined in the chapter operate within a post-
racial framework: a duality in which certain forms of discrimination are criticised, while others go 
unnoticed. The first narrative highlighted Islamophobia and produced clear counter-narratives to challenge 
it. Yet, the second narrative, in producing such a counter-narrative evidently serves to mask students from 
the persisting inequality.  
 
The second danger is that the discourse between true and false Islam sits neatly within the troubling 
discourse between so-called moderate and radical Islam. While Rabasa notes that the terms ‘are often used 
in a subjective and imprecise way’ (2005, p. 1), Schwedler notes that the distinction between moderate and 
radical Islam is very often between ‘supporting and opposing liberal democratic reforms, respectively’ 
(2011, p. 348). Rabasa (2005, p. 2) adds to this typology by including the willingness to use violence to 
achieve political change as a component of radical Islam. As was explored in chapter six, the danger here 
is that the discourse securitises any Muslim voices that challenge liberal democratic norms, painting them 
as a violent threat.  
 
Underneath the narrative of ‘True Islam’ therefore is a sense of loyalty: True Muslims are those who do not 
critique or challenge liberal norms. Maira writes of this distinction between moderate and extreme Islam: 
‘These distinctions form the core of imperial thinking about “loyal” citizen-subjects and “enemy aliens”’ 
(2009, p. 633). Later she adds: ‘“Good citizenship” is performed by Muslim American individuals and 
organisations in a variety of ways, testifying loyalty to the nation and asserting belief in its democratic 
ideals, often through public testimonials that emphasise that Muslims are peaceful, loyal US citizens’ 
(Maira, 2009, p. 634). The importance of distinguishing the true from the false within Islam places an 
enormous burden on Muslims themselves, as Mamdani warns: ‘This could not hide the central message of 




It is a concern that this true/false binary contributes to a much wider civilising narrative that places the West 
in a position of enlightened privilege. One presentation describes the execution of Alan Henning, an aid 
worker in Syria, and argues that ‘it clearly exposed how evil, unislamic [sic] and barbaric ISIS were 
and exposed the lies that they told about being a “Muslim state”’ (T397, slide 10). The discourse 
surrounding a false/true binary of interpretations of Islam is thus incorporated into a much wider binary 
between good/evil, civilised/barbaric. It upholds an idea that there are two sides to the Islamic coin; one, 
assimilated within the civilised individualism of Western society, the other, a looming terrorist threat 
(Maira, 2009). Such narratives are in danger of contributing to the legitimisation of imperialist arguments 
which seek to invade Islam from outside (be that Islam within Britain, or any other country), and transform 
it from within for the benefit of Western interests. The narratives of ‘True Islam’ thus then become a form 
of a new Orientalism. Semati summarises ‘Orientalism as a discursive and textual operation through which 
the Occident renders the Orient knowable’ (Semati, 2010, p 258), and that appears to be precisely the 
operation occurring here. At the same time, this binary functions to mask the barbaric practices of ‘liberal 
democratic’ nations. Examples of human rights abuse from Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib prisons can be 
either ignored or decried as ‘bad apples’ of an otherwise civilised population.  
 
Thus far, two competing and contestable trends regarding Islam and Islamophobia have emerged through 
examining how critical thinking is depicted and deployed in the corpus. The first explored how 
Islamophobia was critically approached in the discourse. The second was to examine how Islamophobia 
was being challenged with an equally essentialising interpretation of a True Islam that appeared as 
imperialistic as any other. The chapter now turns to a third narrative, and explores how the critical 
approaches to Islamophobia within the teaching materials operate to mask from students the underlying 





An Islamophobic Prevent Strategy  
It is fascinating to examine how the argument for the importance of critical thinking skills in order to be 
resilient to the Islamophobic messages of tabloid newspapers appears within a counter-extremism strategy 
itself criticised for being Islamophobic. The Prevent duty is a core component of a counter-extremism 
strategy that, it has been argued, contributes to discourses that link Muslims with the notion of threat and 
increases instances of Islamophobia (e.g. Awan, 2012). This spreads to British schools too. Mirza, for 
instance, writes of how ‘Powerful, unrestrained Islamophobic discourses of risk, surveillance and fear now 
freely circulate in our educational spaces’ (Mirza, 2015, p. 40). A circularity of teaching about Islamophobia 
appears to exist. It is a component of an Islamophobic counter-terror strategy which also cites Islamophobia 
as a catalyst of the radicalisation it aims to prevent.  
 
The introduction of an Islamophobic Prevent duty in 2015 was not the first instance of Islamophobia in 
school counter-extremism. Sian describes the emphasis on Muslims within the cornerstone government 
document, Learning to be safe, published in 2008: ‘the focus on Muslims shapes the document from 
beginning to end in which all concerns raised are centered upon the Muslim “problem”’ (2015, p. 186). 
Later, regarding the unspecific reference to a lack of evidence of an ‘extremist profile’, Sian argues that 
‘the lack of clarity and speculation enables assumptions to flourish and both amplifies and perpetuates an 
Islamophobic discourse which treats Muslims as suspects’ (2015, p. 187). Similar evidence exists within 
the corpus materials themselves. In the following slide for instance, a slide designed to teach students more 
about the backgrounds of the bombers who attacked the London transport network in 2005, the religiosity 






The slide is titled ‘knowing more about those who carried out violent extremism’, implying a general 
introduction to extremists and their backgrounds. Yet, the four examples all focus on the 2005 London 
bombers, and emphasis is given to a binary in which religiosity is placed in opposition to Westernisation. 
For instance, Khan is described as ‘a highly Westernised young man’. Tanweer is described as ‘very 
religious’. Lindsay’s biography details that ‘in 2002 he married a white convert to Islam’. Hussain, 
we are told, ‘while still at school… went on the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca’. While these facts may well 
be the case, it is certainly noticeable that the religiosity (or lack of) of these individuals is presented as being 
of importance with regard to their actions, despite there being little empirical evidence to support such 
assumptions.  
 
Indeed, Sian argues that ‘PVE [Preventing Violent Extremism] is stitched together by the logics of 
Islamophobia’ (Sian, 2015, p. 189). In order to make this argument, Sian argues for a re-shaping of 
understanding Islamophobia which ‘shifts the focus from daily incidents of name calling and harassment 
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to a wider critique of structural operations of power which govern and regulate Muslim bodies’ (Sian, 2015, 
p. 189). Here Sian distances this definition from others such as Zempi and Awan who describe Islamophobia 
as ‘fear and hostility against Muslim communities’ (2016, p. 2). 
  
Sian’s article goes on to explore some instances of this Islamophobia. While this includes examples of 
direct acts of Islamophobia by teachers (such as the spraying of air freshener at students ‘who smell like 
curry’), Sian also includes more subtle examples such as two neighbouring schools where only in the school 
with a majority of Black minority and ethnic students was Prevent training undertaken by staff (Sian, 2015). 
A report released by the Home Office reveals that in the 12 months following April 2015, 65% of referrals 
through the Prevent programme concerned Islamic extremism. As Versi (Nov. 10, 2017) noted, ‘this means 
that Muslims have an approximate 1 in 500 chance of having been referred to Prevent last year, 
approximately 40 times more likely than someone who is not a Muslim’. That educational resources should 
be deploying narratives countering Islamophobia in these contexts is particularly fascinating. Furthermore, 
it is interesting to note within this context the prevalence of narratives concerning the importance of ‘safe’ 
educational spaces for critical thinking, and the challenges facing ethnic minorities, and young Muslims in 
particular, in seeking to experience those educational spaces as ‘safe’ in the context of the Prevent strategy.  
 
This is a Safe Space  
The materials often draw upon a core narrative, namely, that a ‘safe space’ is a necessary condition for 
critical thinking to take place. The resource Essentials of Dialogue argues: ‘It is critical to establish a 
safe space at the start, so that all participants are aware that they can feel safe about sharing 
their ideas’ (T406, p. 8). The Centre for Urban Education argues ‘Schools also help learners develop 
the skills to critically evaluate controversial issues. They provide safe places for learners’ (T67, p. 
5). The PSHE Association lays out advice for how to develop a good ‘climate for learning’ by, for 
example, encouraging teachers to ‘establish or reinforce existing ground rules’ (T275, p. 2).  
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The term ‘safe space’ originates in feminist literature, referring to the safety offered to women within 
women-only spaces (Hunter, 2008; Ludlow, 2004). Hunter (2008) offers a useful typology of four common 
ways in which the term ‘safe space’ has since been deployed: in terms of physical safety; ‘metaphorical 
safety… in which discriminatory activities, expressions of intolerance or policies of inequity are barred’ 
(ibid., p. 8); familiarity; and lastly, creative risk. Within counter-extremism education, safety is often 
discussed within the second context - safety from discrimination. Sieckelinck et al. argue that a ‘battle of 
ideas requires a specific “safe” environment, here understood as an educational setting that could help 
students find another, more inclusive and less rigid expression for their ideals’ (2015, p. 338). Davies argues 
that safety is a core component of what she refers to as turbulent classrooms to counter extremism: 
‘Interruptive (turbulent) democratic classrooms are places where offensive views can be aired and picked 
apart in a relatively safe setting’ (Davies, 2014, p. 454). Davies’ inclusion of the word ‘relatively’ here 
indicates a key caveat that Davies incorporates - that ‘safety’ should not prevent offense, as all ideas and 
views should be open to criticism. This argument hints at a tension within safe spaces and their enaction. 
This tension regards the limits of permissible ideas to ensure a realm of safety within. It is often argued 
there is a need to ensure that not every idea is permissible to be heard. A Stockton Council commissioned 
resource expresses the inevitable challenge here: ‘Each participant should be encouraged to express 
their opinions freely, however, discussions must be objective and no sessions should become a 
platform for personal, racist or offensive remarks’ (T382, p. 2). The slip of suggesting that some 
opinions may be ‘objective’ reveals an inevitable challenge regarding who or what governs the realm of the 
permissible opinion or view. Whose ideas inhibit whose safety? 
 
The safe space literature has faced substantial criticism. Paradoxically, considering that safe spaces are 
often presented as a necessary condition for critical thinking to take place, safe spaces have been argued to 
in fact endanger critical thought (Barrett, 2010; Boostrom, 1998). Boostrom conceptualises safe spaces as 
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‘a place without stress. In a “safe space” classroom, students are not isolated, alienated, threatened, 
intimidated, or “stressed-out”. Teachers who create “safe spaces” care about their students, and because 
they care, they eliminated the pain from education’ (1998, p. 405). While this sounds unerringly positive, 
Boostrom presents this comfort of a space of safety as inimical to critical thought, and the clash of ideas in 
particular: ‘If critical thinking, imagination and individuality are to flourish in classrooms, teachers need to 
manage conflict, not prohibit it’ (1998, p. 407). Current research on the implementation of the Prevent 
strategy in schools suggests that this construction of a safe space is challenging indeed. As mentioned in 
chapter three, Muslim teachers fear discussing such topics in case they themselves are labelled as ‘extreme’ 
(Ahmed, Apr. 28, 2015). It has also been reported that many teachers are nervous to introduce such topics 
for fear of the extreme attitudes held by the students in the class that might be shared (Quartermaine, 2016).   
 
Second, a number of authors examine the dangers of presenting classroom spaces as safe when, in fact, it 
is impossible to remove the inequalities and power disparities which permeate experiences of (a lack of) 
safety outside the classroom, when students enter that classroom space (Frusciante, 2008). As Barrett notes, 
‘The classroom is not (and cannot) be constructed as a community of equals, as students enter the space 
with different degrees of power and privilege based on their membership in privileged (or oppressed) social 
categories’ (Barrett, 2010, pp. 6-7). Ludlow (2004), sharing experience from her own classroom, examines 
how creating a safe space might in fact entail ignoring difference or privilege in order to protect the safety 
of the privileged. Ludlow notes how ‘Students who identify with privileged groups often perceive a threat 
to privilege and suspension of safety in the very construction of feminist/diversity classes’ (2004, p. 41). 
The protection of their safety would thus entail the protection of privilege. The question of how to create 
safe spaces within the structurally Islamophobic Prevent strategy presents an immense challenge. To 
suggest that all should be presented as equal in class, when Muslim students are evidently under greater 
levels of scrutiny, appears a profound injustice. This appears akin to the cherry-picking of Islamic scripture 
to suggest we are all equal as examined above, or the deployment of ‘colour-blind’ racism more broadly. 
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They share a core narrative of post-racial governance: an overt rejection of inequality and tandem inability 
to examine evident structural inequality.  
 
Third, safe spaces are often criticised for being contrary to spaces in which people can take risks (Ludlow, 
2004). While some authors argue that safe spaces are in fact spaces ‘in which to have risky conversations’ 
(Marsden, Jul. 9, 2015), others oppose this. As bell hooks writes ‘Unlike the stereotypical feminist model 
that suggests women best come to voice in an atmosphere of safety (one in which we are all going to be 
kind and nurturing), I encourage students to work at coming to voice in an atmosphere where they may be 
afraid or see themselves at risk’ (hooks, 1989, p. 53).  
 
If students are bringing their relative levels of ‘safety’ with them into a class that tackles the issues of 
extremism and radicalisation, then it appears evident that those students from ethnic minorities or Muslim 
backgrounds will bring with them a great deal of insecurity to these conversations. Moreover, the lack of 
critical appraisal of liberal democratic norms (the privileged within this context) suggests that any safety 
that is being produced within counter-extremism education, is being produced to protect the privileged 
majority. The role of safe spaces within the Prevent duty appears heavily contested. While Ramsay (2017) 
offers one argument - that the safeguarding role of the Prevent strategy offers students a ‘safe space’ in that 
it prevents them from the harm of radicalisation – many authors are keen to point out the dangers of the 
strategy for student safety. Reed (2016), for instance, argues that Prevent’s surveillance component inhibits 
the ability of teachers to create spaces of safety. Similarly, Marsden (Jul. 9, 2015) argues that Prevent has 
a ‘chilling effect’ on the ability to have free discussions, and reduces levels of trust between teachers and 
students. The prevalence of messages encouraging reporting and peer surveillance further appear to 
undermine any level of safety that might be afforded to students of colour. 
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Counter-extremism education’s ‘safe space’ appears endangered by the number of times that a learning 
resource ends with a slide reinforcing the importance of reporting to staff if a student has any concerns or 





It is particularly interesting to note that in the bottom-right example (T397, slide 36), the safe space that 
has been created has been to protect the safety of the person disclosing fears or concerns about a peer - ‘for 
private and confidential discussions’ - rather than it being a safe space created for the expression of 
difficult ideas. Perhaps this is the perfect example of how the safety envisaged here is born within a post-
racial paradigm.  
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It is a concern that this emphasis on reporting undermines and contradicts the ability of classrooms to be 
genuinely safe spaces. The views and opinions that one is permitted to raise appear constrained by a desire 
to keep classrooms safe, and if one strays outside of this realm of permissiveness, one might be reported. 
Two reports, one entitled Building Distrust, the other, Eroding Trust, each examine cases of schools using 
an educational resource on extremism to monitor and collect the attitudes of their students. Building Distrust 
examines a project in a London borough which included a questionnaire within the educational programme 
apparently designed to monitor the effectiveness of the project, though the report argues it was really 
intended to assess ‘vulnerable’ students through a mode of ethnic profiling. The report examines how, 
instead of the survey being anonymous, students were asked to not only write their names, but also the 
names of their closest friends, and the religious faith of their friends too. The report writes, ‘it should be 
questioned why a counter-radicalisation program is asking children to name their best friends and to state 
their religious backgrounds. This further suggests that the questionnaire was in part about profiling and the 
identification of children considered suspicious’ (Belaon, 2015, p. 18).  
 
The case within the report, Eroding Trust, also concerns the misuse of an evaluation questionnaire. In this 
‘anonymous’ questionnaire to evaluate the effectiveness of the program, on which students were 
encouraged to write their names, students were asked whether they agreed with certain statements and views 
such as ‘It would bother me if a family of a different race or religion moved next door’ (Open Society 
Justice Initiative, 2016, p. 66). The report also notes ‘the questionnaires were from the Home Office, and 
the responses would go back to the Home Office for a report’ (ibid.). This conflation of practices of 
education and of surveillance undermine both the safety of students, and the ‘safe space’ of the classroom, 
as well as the ability for critical thinking to emerge. As O’Donnell notes: ‘this will have a bearing on the 
capacity for deep and critical understanding of content knowledge because it undoes the conditions for trust 
and criticality that enable us to think and enquire together in shared educational spaces’ (2017, p. 184). On 
a wider scale, Rizwaan Sabir notes how the UK’s surveillance (Pursue) and counter-radicalisation strategies 
(Prevent) operate in tandem with one another, and that any notion of a clear distinction between the two is 
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false (Sabir, 2017). Sabir raises the question of the role of prevention strategies more broadly, concluding: 
‘the use of “soft-power” or “hearts and minds” activity is also less about the persuading and “safeguarding” 
of Muslims and more about disciplining and controlling those individuals choosing to exercise a distinct 
Muslim agency’ (Sabir, 2017, p. 219). ‘Safe spaces’ thus appear little more than a discursive mask, hiding 
the reality of insecurity beneath a veneer of liberal value. 
 
Conclusion: A contested and contradictory strategy? 
This chapter began by noting a core antagonism that appears in the counter-extremism in schools strategy, 
namely, that between critical thinking skills and fundamental British values promotion. The chapter was 
framed within an examination of what the implications might be of attempting to promote a fixed set of 
values ‘critically’. 
 
Throughout this exploration, a running theme has focussed on the apparent contradiction in the role of 
critical thinking between an outward rejection of Islamophobia, and the perpetuation of systems of power 
that continue to privilege white majorities and discriminate against ethnic minorities and Muslims in 
particular. Three particular narratives persist through the corpus to support this theme. One argues ‘they are 
the Islamophobes!’, a narrative that presents a series of Islamophobic subjects - the media and right-wing 
extremists in particular - but fails to acknowledge its own Islamophobia. A second narrative expresses 
‘these are the True Muslims’, a narrative which offers a narrow channel of permissibility through which 
Muslims are allowed to perform ‘authentic’ Islam - an imperialistic approach towards knowledge of Islam 
which can be traced through historic and contemporary Orientalism. The third narrative argues ‘this is a 
safe space’, masking the lack of safety for Muslims in such Islamophobic spaces. 
 
From here, the chapter asked: how then could this apparent contradiction, or Orwellian doublethink, where 
an Islamophobic strategy decries Islamophobia, function within the counter-extremism strategy? Through 
the literatures on New Racism and Post-Raciality, it was argued that the development of critical thinking 
211 
skills plays a key role in producing clear boundaries between a virtuous moderate centre and the threatening 
extremist Other. Through masking students from the Islamophobic and racist discriminatory structures of 
the liberal democratic present, the mono-directional deployment of critical thinking strengthens an 
understanding of the virtue of the moderate centre that must be protected and defended from external threat.  
 
Through examining all three discourse anaylses in combination therefore (chapters 5, 6, & 7), the thesis 
argues that the corpus of teaching materials presents a defensive mode of thinking, painting the world of 
moderates and extremists akin to that of a castle under siege. Each of the three strands operates together in 
a siege mentality. While such a siege mentality offers a strong mode of defence, this thesis has also sought 
to explore the problematic consequences of this securitised thinking, noting the exceptional politics that 
such a securitisation engenders, and the need to suspend values for their protection. 
 
Chapter five explored how extremism is defined in the corpus, arguing that the extremist threat had become 
universalised - the moderate centre was under attack from all directions. The castle was under siege from 
extremism of all forms, and anything that strayed too far from that moderate centre was portrayed as a 
threat. Such a construction of a universal extremist threat poses profound challenges to pluralism, 
minimising levels of permitted diversity in values or beliefs. This construction of a threat led the chapter to 
argue that education - deployed as a tool to manage this threat - had become securitised. The danger here 
is that securitisation engenders exceptional politics, rendering the lives of those deemed threatening to be 
profoundly insecure. 
 
Chapter six explored how the castle itself was imagined within the corpus, exploring how the discourse of 
fundamental British values constructed a particular vision for how Britain should be. The moderate centre 
is narrow, vulnerable and incontestable. Through adopting a governmentality approach, the chapter 
identified three subjectivities through which moderate Britishness can be governed: a ‘post-political’ 
subject, an entrepreneurial subject, and a racialised subject. Not only does such a governmentality reveal 
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the homogenising quality of a discourse that promotes such a moderate consensus (again revealing 
challenges for pluralist democracy), but also reveals that membership of the moderate centre is profoundly 
more difficult to achieve for ethnic minorities. Through exploring examples of the insecurity engendered 
by a discourse that places a particular burden on ethnic minorities, the virtues of the moderate centre were 
challenged. 
 
This current chapter has then examined how these clear delineations between extremist and moderate are 
perpetuated and taught. Through exploring how critical thinking is deployed as a weapon ‘outwards’, away 
from the castle walls of the moderate centre, and towards the threatening extremist other, the chapter has 
explored how the distinction between extremist and moderate is practiced as skill. While the knowledge 
taught to students about extremism constructs a clear understanding of the threat they face, and the 
promotion of fundamental British values constructs a clear sense of what it is that is worth protecting, it is 
the deployment of critical thinking that allows for the continuation of the masking of the falsity and 
imperfection of this discursive binary. Furthermore, the chapter has examined how the deployment of these 
skills functions to mask from students the discriminatory, Islamophobic practices of the counter-extremism 
strategy, which place such a burden on young British Muslims. 
 
The thesis argues therefore that the construction of a securitised mode of counter-extremism education is 
deeply problematic. The levels of insecurity, and exceptional political practices engendered by such threat 
constructions, pose profound risk to both those labelled as threatening, as well as the values of democracy 
and pluralism more broadly. It is at this stage that the thesis shifts gear, and begins to ask how else the 
problem of extremism could be constructed, and how else education could be deployed to address it.  
 
It is important to note that not all of the examined teaching materials follow the majority of the flock. As 
has already been noted in these three chapters, materials offer modes of resistance, shards of light peeking 
through the cracks in a wall when the discourse does not all sing from the same hymn sheet. The following 
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chapter opens up these cracks, and explores how else counter-extremist education could be constructed. 
Through exploring these modes of resistance or these moments of acknowledgement of the political nature 
of these discourses, the next chapter begins to ask: instead of building walls between an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, 
and arming students with defensive skills rather than inquisitive ones, how else could a mode of education 






 From Countering Extremism to Encountering Extremism 
 
Think of any example of a peace agreement in history - the Good Friday agreement in 1998 or the Oslo 
Agreement in 1993. The image in your head - if it is at all like mine - might consist of some sort of podium 
or stage, and a number of individuals standing on it. There is an intermediary figure - in 1993, this role was 
played by Bill Clinton, in 1998, Tony Blair - standing between the two former foes. They sign a document, 
make a speech, and they shake hands. Violence is rejected, and politics is embraced.  
 
What is fascinating in both of the examples mentioned above is that both agreements included former 
terrorist leaders. The old adage remains repeated to this day: ‘we will never negotiate with terrorists’. The 
reality, of course, is that states have regularly and repeatedly done exactly the opposite. Back-channels are 
set up, intermediaries found, and off-the-record meetings are set. Negotiation with terrorism is as old as 
terrorism itself. These agreements demonstrate time and time again that political solutions to violent 
problems are not only possible, but indeed the only option for a sustainable peace (Powell, 2014).  
 
It is curious, then, that in the case of extremism, these lessons are not being learned. There are few attempts 
to approach extremism politically; negotiating, discussing, finding solutions or compromise. While there is 
evidently conflict, the field of conflict resolution is ignored. Instead, the approach is: once we remove 
extremism, then there will be peace. Counter-extremism education, as this thesis has demonstrated, entails 
a process of the elimination of, and protection from, extreme ideas.  
  
What if, instead of trying to remove extremism, we try to work with it? 
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This chapter engages with scholarship in the field of critical peace research, alongside the theoretical work 
of Chantal Mouffe, in particular, her critique of consensual liberal democratic politics, and her promotion 
of agonistic pluralism. While not a scholar of conflict resolution per se, I argue that Mouffe’s critique of 
the promotion of liberal democracy demonstrates that a consensus-based model of counter-extremism is 
doomed to failure. The chapter locates itself within critical peace research, as opposed to other sub-fields 
of Peace Studies such as conflict transformation. Agonism offers a theoretical opportunity to engage with, 
and encounter, the ideas, discourses and hegemonic structures surrounding extremism. Other approaches, 
such as Contact Theory (e.g. Pettigrew, 1998), focus more on encounters between individuals.  
 
An attempt to eliminate extremism is not only a never-ending task, but one that plays an active role in 
producing the same extremist violence it seeks to reduce. Mouffe’s agonism offers a way forward. At its 
heart, agonism attempts to construct institutions and practices that, instead of attempting to find one 
agreeable consensus for all to abide by, allows disagreement and pluralism to flourish. It is, I argue, one 
way of transforming education surrounding extremism.  
 
This chapter offers both theoretical and, using examples found within the corpus of teaching materials, 
practical opportunities to create an approach to the problem of extremism that does not seek merely to 
remove the problem, but to engage with it in an agonistic encounter. While acknowledging the limiting 
parameters and constraints of being just one chapter of a thesis, it argues that there is an alternative to 
‘countering’ extremism, and offers directions for further study and practical investigation. This approach is 
what I call encountering extremism. 
 
Mouffe, The Political and Extremism 
Chantal Mouffe has, in a career spanning four decades, produced a potent critique of contemporary liberal 
democracy. Her work examines the core foundations of political conflict at the heart of communal life, a 
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critique of the dominance of contemporary liberal democracy, and the development of agonistic politics as 
a radical approach to addressing the challenge of such dominance. I argue that Mouffe’s body of work 
offers ripe opportunity to both examine the problematic ways in which the problem of extremism is framed, 
as well as examine new ways of conceptualising an agonistic approach to countering extremism.  
 
Mouffe’s democratic theory is inextricably entwined within her theory of ‘the political’ developed with 
Ernesto Laclau (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). In chapter four, I examined how Laclau and Mouffe argue that 
language is constitutive of the social realm, and that all language is thus an ‘articulation’: an expression of 
power which brings the social realm into being, locating objects and individuals in relation to one another 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 91). As such, language is political. By this, Laclau and Mouffe argue that 
expressing certain ideas in a particular way, or using a particular label, is a claim to place certain objects in 
certain relations to one another. For instance, describing an individual or an idea as ‘extreme’ is an act of 
delegitimization, in relation to the legitimacy of the articulator. Importantly this linguistic choice is only 
one of innumerable options. Those excluded options remain to contest the articulation, and it is this 
perpetual contestation that Laclau and Mouffe refer to as ‘antagonism’ (Mouffe, 2013, p. 130). Mouffe 
refers to the realm in which antagonisms perpetuate to be ‘the political’ (ibid.). Political life cannot escape 
the presence of such antagonisms. 
 
While in chapter four I argued that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory offers a helpful ontological foundation for 
a methodology of discourse analysis, chapter six examined how Mouffe’s critique of the hegemony of 
liberal democracy offers a helpful framework to critically examine the notion of fundamental British values. 
Mouffe described a ‘post-political’ hegemony, wherein the bureaucratic mechanisms of liberal democratic 
politics repress the political (Mouffe, 2005). I argued that the promotion of fundamental British values 
developed a ‘post-political’ form of subjectivity. In this chapter, I examine how Mouffe’s conceptualisation 
of the political is also helpful for framing a core, foundational problem regarding countering extremism 
more broadly, namely, a need for consensus, and the elimination of disagreement. 
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Countering extremism is framed around the idea of bringing people ‘away’ from the extremes, and into the 
moderate centre. Scholars such as Lake (2002, p. 18) argue that extremism is often framed within a bell 
curve, with the moderate in the populous centre, and the extremist at the edges. The UK’s definition of 
extremism as the opposite of a set of ‘moderate’ values, which should be promoted, is a perfect example of 
this conceptualisation of counter-extremism. As Theresa May argued in a speech in 2015: 
 
If we want to put British values at the heart of the counter-extremism strategy, we need to make 
sure that every single person living in the UK is fully aware of the rights and responsibilities of 
living in a pluralistic society. We will therefore develop a positive campaign to promote British 
values and show clearly the opportunities they bring. (May, Mar. 23, 2015)  
 
Counter-extremism entails a task of values promotion, building that centrist consensus. The task of 
countering extremism is only complete once the last individual is brought inside the moderate walls.  
 
Scholars other than Mouffe have also wrestled with this need for consensus in a world of ever-present 
conflict. While in the chapter’s introduction I shared the frustration that a conflict resolution approach to 
extremism appears marginalised (especially in a UK context), the field of conflict resolution is not immune 
to this desire for consensus either. Ramsbotham (2010) begins his enquiry into conflict resolution by noting 
that the primary factor in intractable conflict is what he terms ‘radical disagreement’. Each side holds a 
view which is entirely incompatible with the other. Ramsbotham’s frustration emerges in his investigation 
of how the field of conflict resolution tackles this chief component of conflict. Conflict resolution, he 
argues, seeks to, in varying degrees, dismiss it, sideline it, and ignore it. Rather than placing radical 
disagreement at the heart of conflict resolution practices, radical disagreement is presented as a barrier to 
the real purposes of conflict resolution: compromise, mutual understanding, and consensual agreement. For 
conflict resolution scholars, the first step in overcoming conflict is to put aside disagreements. Ramsbotham 
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chides this approach to radical disagreement as ‘what must be overcome, not learnt from’ (2010, p. 93). 
What is interesting about the case of extremism is that, rather than in the world of conflict resolution, where 
consensus is sought through compromise, consensus here is sought for through imposing one side’s view 
onto the other.  
 
The violent imposition of peace is an irony that has not escaped the gaze of critical peace scholars. Shinko, 
for instance, acknowledges the dangers of models of liberal peace in imposing particular norms of global 
politics in conflict resolution interventions. As Shinko puts it, it is a norm ‘where peace slides all too 
comfortably back into familiarised hegemonic iterations of disciplinary order’ (Shinko, 2008, p. 475). 
Cremin explores the Eurocentric ontology underpinning the concept of peace, as orthodoxly conceived, and 
notes the ‘modern concepts of peace that promote suffocating homogeneity, security, assimilation, false 
ideals and limited horizons’ (Cremin, 2016, p. 3). Calls for a ‘post-liberal peace’ (Richmond, 2009), and 
the inclusion of pacifism in post-liberal peacebuilding (Jackson, 2018), have emerged in response to the 
criticism that imposing a liberal peace involves imposing Western cultural and political norms, including 
the legitimacy and monopoly of state violence over a sovereign territory.  
 
Ilan Gur-Ze’ev explores how such a consensual understanding of peace emerges in contemporary peace 
education. His conclusion is critical and provocative: ‘The real aim of peace education is revealed as the 
fortification of the existing order and the preservation of the invisibility of hegemonic violence’ (Gur-Ze’ev, 
2001, p. 331). His writing focuses on one particular mode of violence - epistemic violence - the violence 
inherent within processes which assert the dominance of one ontological perspective over another: 
 
Epistemic violence is realised in the formation of conceptual apparatuses, knowledge, 
consciousness, ideological orientations, and consensus or self-evidence; it is the aim of normalising 
education, in the service of the self-evident and hegemonic order of things. Epistemic violence 
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plays a part in producing the subject and her self-evidence, as well as the horizons of her 
predetermined consensus. (Gur-Ze’ev, 2001, p. 331) 
 
Counter-extremism education, it can be argued, is an excellent example of epistemic violence. It imposes a 
particular ‘moderate’ ideological orientation and consensus onto a population through a normative mode of 
education promoting certain values and perspectives. This scholarship provides profound critique of the 
mode of consensual peace that appears to dominate the logic of countering extremism. While in different 
contexts, and with different emphases, Shinko, Gur-Ze’ev, Cremin, Jackson and Richmond all coalesce in 
exposing the violence of imposing a particular consensus onto a population, and how such an imposition 
contributes to the further global colonisation of Eurocentric conceptualisations of peace.  
 
While not focusing specifically on the violence of imposing consensus, Mouffe’s writing contributes to this 
critique, indicating that conceptualising counter-extremism around consensus is problematic for two further 
reasons. One is that it is an impossible task, as a strategy built on inclusion cannot rid itself of its opposite, 
exclusion. The other is that it is an approach that would, in fact, promote rather than reduce violence.  
 
Mouffe repeats at regular intervals throughout her writing the impossibility of overcoming the political 
(2013, p. Xii; 2005, pp. 10-11; 2000, p. 101). Her critique centres around the contemporary trend which 
seeks to universalise liberal democracy as the best mode of governance around the world, and its desire to 
produce a public space of consensus. This consensual space would eliminate the political, in that the core 
antagonisms of political community would have been consigned to the realms of history. Politics, and its 
bureaucratic mechanisms of liberal democracy would, Mouffe argues, have repressed the political (Mouffe, 
2005, p. 87). Francis Fukuyama’s (1989) description of ‘the end of history’ is an oft-cited example of this 




Mouffe argues that this desire for consensus is an attempt to produce an ‘us’ without producing a ‘them’ 
(2000, p. 101): once everyone is within the ‘us’ of liberal democracy, or the ‘us’ of British values, there 
will not be a ‘them’ to speak of. Once everyone is brought within the realm of the ‘moderate’, there will no 
longer be an ‘extreme’ to counter. Yet, Mouffe argues that this is an impossibility: ‘there is no consensus 
without exclusion, no “we” without a “they” and no politics without the drawing of a frontier’ (2005, p. 
73).  At a linguistic level, labelling something as ‘extreme’ is only possible if one can conceive of the 
‘moderate’ to which it is being compared. As Mouffe notes, ‘the very condition for the constitution of an 
“us” is the demarcation of a “them”’ (2013, p. 6). The label of ‘British values’ clearly demarcates the non-
British, and so on. Mouffe’s claim that antagonisms cannot be repressed comes to life in Britain’s counter-
extremism strategy, a strategy that, while focussed on inclusion, cannot escape its simultaneously 
exclusionary nature.  
 
The Prevent duty and the Channel system appear symptomatic of this type of thinking. If an individual is 
referred to Prevent officers for being at risk of radicalisation, and their case is considered substantial enough 
to require intervention, then that person can (voluntarily) enter the Channel programme (Dawson & Godec, 
2017, p. 9). At this stage of intervention, a panel of experts will decide as to the best intervention required 
for that individual, and will monitor that individual for a period of time, until a point at which they are no 
longer deemed vulnerable to extremism or radicalisation. This process, cloaked in the language of 
safeguarding, epitomises the idea of a counter-extremism strategy desiring to ‘bring in’ the extremes into a 
consensual centre.  
 
Yet, at each and every stage of this process, the ‘them’ can never be shaken from the ‘us’. There is first an 
identification process, based on a set of ‘indicators’. Research demonstrates how this identification process 
transforms certain individuals into potential threats. As Martin writes, such a process operates through 
‘producing new subjects of risk’ (2018, p. 14). Heath-Kelly (2013) has examined how discourses of 
radicalisation turn British Muslims into perpetually potentially risky subjects. Chapter six of this thesis 
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explored the narrow modes of diversity permitted within the moderate centre, and the threat associated with 
diversity that deviates from this, again transforming difference into a problem. This production of risky 
subjects demonstrates that at the heart of a consensus-based counter-extremism strategy is a paradox: one 
cannot include the extreme until one has identified their difference.  
 
Moreover, the counter-extremism strategy never escapes from a need to be able to exclude those deemed 
to be extreme, and in particular, those too extreme to be able to be included. As a House of Commons 
Briefing Paper makes clear, a key counter-extremism task for government is ‘making sure organisations 
have the support and advice they need to confront and exclude extremists’ (Dawson & Godec, 2017, p. 13, 
my own emphasis). Theresa May’s political rhetoric matches this inability to rid the exclusion inherent to 
a policy of inclusion. Speaking in 2015 she argued: 
 
For too long we have let the extremists define the ‘them and us’... I want this partnership to reclaim 
that debate. We, the ‘us’, will form a new partnership and show ‘them’ that we want nothing to do 
with their hatred, bigotry and ignorance… to those who choose consciously to reject our values and 
the basic principles of our society, the message is equally clear. The game is up… we will defeat 
you. (May, Mar. 23, 2015)   
 
While the counter-extremism strategy is apparently based on inclusion, there are in fact two options offered 
to those deemed extreme: play by our rules and we will include you, play by your rules and we will exclude 
you. It is here that Mouffe’s second criticism of consensus-based attempts to quell antagonisms emerges. 
Mouffe makes note of how these consensus-making processes have the opposite of their desired effects. 
Rather than produce a peaceful consensus, attempts to eliminate the political, in fact, produce violence.  
 
In the current climate, counter-extremism is predicated on making a distinction between a ‘friend’ and an 
‘enemy’. One cannot counter extremism until one has delineated the extreme enemy to be countered, from 
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the moderate friend to be defended. Furthermore, this friend/enemy distinction is then predicated on the 
importance of excluding the extreme from the consensual realm. It is this act of exclusion that Mouffe 
argues increases the likelihood of violence occuring: 
 
We should be aware that envisaging the aim of politics - be it at the national or international level 
- as the establishment of a consensus around one single model eliminates the possibility of 
legitimate dissent, thereby creating a favourable terrain for the emergence of violent forms of 
antagonisms. (Mouffe, 2013, p. 20)  
 
If there is not the space within the political consensus for legitimately expressing ideas deemed to be 
‘extreme’, then a violent approach may appear the only option for those who wish to express such ideas 
(see also: Mouffe, 2005, p. 21). 
 
Consensus-based models of counter-extremism are failing. Rather than producing a peaceful, consensual 
harmony, they engender violence through imposing particular ontological models of peace, and produce 
modes of exclusion which both produce the extreme that they attempt to counter, and the likelihood that 
those extremes might turn to violence as a mode of political participation. How else then, aside from through 
consensus, could one frame counter-extremism? Mouffe offers agonism as her solution. Mouffe challenges 
scholars to re-frame the us/them distinction from something to eradicate, to something to work within. The 
need for elimination is predicated on seeing the ‘them’ as a threat. The ‘us’ and the ‘them’ need not be 
enemies. Mouffe argues that ‘the friend/enemy distinction can be considered as merely one of the possible 
forms of expression of the antagonistic dimension which is constitutive of the political’ (2005, p. 16). The 






Mouffe focuses on producing ways of transforming what, within a consensus-based model, might be an 
‘enemy’ into an agonistic ‘adversary’. Mouffe argues that agonism ‘helps us to envisage how the dimension 
of antagonism can be “tamed”, thanks to the establishment of institutions and practices through which the 
potential antagonism can be played out in an agonistic way’ (2005, p. 21). Kundnani makes a similar 
argument:  
 
The role of communities in countering terrorism is not to institute self-censorship but to confidently 
construct political spaces where young people can politicize their disaffection into visions of how 
the world might be better organized, so that radical alternatives to terrorist vanguardism can 
emerge. (Kundnani, 2015, p. 289) 
 
 I argue that this is a key step that must be taken within the context of extremism. While currently extremists 
are seen as ‘enemies’, the challenge is to provide an educational model through which one can see 
extremists as ‘adversaries’. How then, might agonism offer a theoretical approach to transform current 
counter-extremism approaches from models which exclude extreme ideas into models which engage with 
them? Moreover, what might the ‘institutions and practices’ need to look like in order to help this agonism 
emerge? 
 
Mouffe is a political theorist. As such, her work is fantastic at providing the theoretical framework for 
understanding the challenges and problems of the contemporary context, and ways of developing a different 
future. Where Mouffe’s work is less helpful is that she does not offer a model for how to develop such ideas 
within an educational setting. Some scholars have taken these ideas further within an educational context 
(Ruitenberg, 2008; Todd & Sastrom, 2008). This scholarship is examined later in the chapter. First, 
Mouffe’s work is examined to develop the foundational principles required by the agonistic approach.  
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At the heart of Mouffe’s agonism is a commitment to pluralism: there may be more than one way of living 
justly. Mouffe promotes ‘breaking with the very deeply entrenched conviction in Western democracies that 
they are the embodiment of the “best regime” and that they have the “civilising” mission of universalising 
it’ (Mouffe, 2005, p. 83). This conviction was evident in David Cameron’s 2011 speech, as the then Prime 
Minister, on countering extremism. Cameron argued that ‘Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive 
tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism… this is what defines us as society: 
to belong here is to believe in these things’ (Cameron, Feb. 5, 2011). Similarly, four years later, the then 
Secretary of State for Education Nicky Morgan justified promoting British values ‘because these British 
values are fundamentally a good thing’ (Morgan, Jan. 27, 2015). In a speech of the same year, the then 
Home Secretary Theresa May proclaimed: ‘the reality of those [fundamental British] values is far superior 
to anything the extremists have to offer anybody… the extremists have no vision for Britain that can sustain 
the dreams and ambitions of its people’ (May, Mar. 23, 2015). This desire to promote a set of liberal values 
then manifested itself in the requirement for schools to promote such values. It is promoted in classroom 
teaching about the Fundamental British Values when, as in this example, a presentation argues: 
‘Democracy is a key British value. The British Democratic System has been copied by countries 
around the world’ (T401, slide 3). 
 
Instead, Mouffe argues that one should see the world, not as a universe, but as a pluri-verse (2013, p. 22; 
2005, p. 87). There is more than one way for a just society to operate. Importantly, Mouffe does not descend 
into a form of relativism. She does not argue that all ways of conducting political life are equally just or 
ethical. Instead, Mouffe is keen to delineate the parameters within which agonistic conflict can take place: 
 
For the agonistic perspective, the central category of democratic politics is the category of the 
‘adversary’, the opponent with whom one shares a common allegiance to the democratic principles 
of ‘liberty and equality for all’, while disagreeing about their interpretation. (Mouffe, 2013, p. 7) 
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Here, Mouffe concedes that agonism cannot operate without some sort of consensus - what she refers to as 
‘ethico-political principles’ based around liberty and equality in order to produce a ‘conflictual consensus’ 
(2000, p. 103). There must be a foundational consensus, a common allegiance of some sort for agonism to 
materialise. As Wenman writes, the ‘crucial distinction between agonism and antagonism [is] between 
conflict played out within a shared symbolic universe and an uncompromising conflict between those who 
share no symbolic unity’ (Wenman, 2003, p. 167).  
 
It is at this point that Mouffe’s theory of agonism comes face-to-face with alternative visions of agonistic 
politics. Shinko (2008) explores how central an idea of respect is to agonistic politics. ‘As much as agonism 
refers to adversarial competition and contestation, it also incorporates various dimensions of relationality 
and intersubjectivity’ writes Shinko (2008, p. 478). Respect is a core feature of the transformation from 
enemy to adversary. Yet, Shinko critiques Mouffe’s suggestion that respect, and the foundations of a 
conflictual consensus, should precede the encounter: ‘It seems to me that democratic agonists paradoxically 
presume the existence of that which can only emerge from within the terms of the agonistic encounter’ 
(2008, p. 481). Mouffe is faced with a ‘chicken and the egg’ type scenario: is the enemy to adversary 
transition a precondition for, or result of, agonistic politics? Ramsbotham appears to sit on the other side of 
the fence to Mouffe, describing agonistic encounters as ‘dialogue between enemies’ (2010, p. 93). 
Ramsbotham continues in his description: ‘Agonistic dialogue is an admittedly unruly borderland of human 
dialogue, a “wild west”, where many of the “federal rules” that govern polite conversation and orderly 
verbal exchange do not run’ (2010, p. 93). 
 
Mouffe is frustratingly unclear throughout her writings on what such a foundational consensus might entail, 
aside from the idea of ‘liberty and equality for all’ as cited above, nor on how such a consensus should be 
reached. In Todd and Sastrom’s words, ‘What constitutes this movement from antagonism to agonism is 
something about which Mouffe is not particularly loquacious’ (2008, p. 5). It is not outlandish to suggest 
that currently there is little shared symbolic unity between the moderate and the extreme, and that to demand 
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the existence of one before engaging in agonistic dialogue would prove fruitless. The remainder of the 
chapter sets out to examine first, what that foundational consensus might consist of in the context of 
extremism, and second, to explore how educational encounters could build a path towards that conflictual 
consensus. The educational challenge then, is in exploring options for beginning to build what Shinko refers 
to as ‘hard-earned recognition and respect’ (2008, p. 490). In attempting to produce an agonistic form of 
encountering extremism, I shall argue that an ‘ethico-political’ consensus can be developed through (rather 
than preceding) an agonistic encounter - one based on the principle of non-violence. 
 
Non-violence, Ideology and Extremism   
It is clear that currently a shared consensus between the moderate and the extreme appears non-existent. In 
particular, that extremism brings with it a threat of violence excludes it from any negotiating table. 
Seemingly, violence sits at the root of Western states’ fear of extremism. For example, the introduction to 
the 2008 toolkit, Learning to be Safe, clearly states: ‘Dealing with violent extremism is nothing new… A 
small minority seek to radicalise young people with an ideology which justifies the use of violence through 
a distorted interpretation of a peaceful religion’ (Balls, 2008, p. 3). The Prevent strategy draws clear links 
between terrorism and extremism. It argues that extreme ideas often provide the ideological basis for terror 
attacks to occur (HM Government, 2011a, p. 11).  On this basis, to claim that extremism can be engaged 
with through a shared principle of non-violence appears absurd. To counter terrorist violence, the orthodox 
logic follows, extremist ideology must be stopped. Yet, what if the emphasis here is incorrect? What if, 
instead of attempting to counter the ideology of extremism, it is violence itself that is countered? 
 
Chapter two examined the development of narratives concerning radicalisation. These linear processes have 
come to define the journeys individuals take before committing themselves to engaging in a violent attack. 
Along such journeys, are a number of stages that individuals reach. At the end is ‘terrorism’, but before that 
there is ‘violent extremism’, and before that ‘non-violent extremism’. While these terms remain heavily 
contested and unclear (JCHR, 2016), the UK’s interpretation suggests that a violent extremist supports or 
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legitimises the use of violence to further extremist ideas. A non-violent extremist simply believes in the 
extreme ideas themselves (HM Government, 2011a, p. 19).16 The crucial implication of depicting the 
problem within such linear processes is that non-violent extremism and violent terrorism become 
inextricably linked. As Theresa May said in a speech: 
 
Not all extremism leads to violence and not all extremists are violent, but there is without doubt a 
thread that binds the kind of extremism that promotes hatred and a sense of superiority over others 
to the actions of those who want to impose their beliefs on us through violence. (May, Mar. 23, 
2015) 
 
The fear is that those ideas might later manifest themselves in a violent act. As such, ideas become 
threatening in and of themselves. It is this future threat of violent ideologies that then leads to a counter-
ideological counter-extremism strategy. It is important also, of course, that it is not the threat of violence 
per se, but the threat of the wrong kind of violence that is of interest. A violent moderate, a member of the 
armed forces, has not been radicalised according to the dominant paradigm. The importance of 
acknowledging the foundational delineation of legitimate and illegitimate violence in discourses around 
terrorism and extremism in educational encounters will be explored in more depth below.  
 
At this stage, it is worth examining whether countering ideas, rather than countering violence, is the best 
way forward. It certainly seems intuitively far easier to think about promoting non-violent ways for people 
to express certain ideas, than it does to think about changing the ideas that somebody holds (Richards, 
2015). Non-violence in counter-terrorism has gained some recent traction with critical terrorism scholars. 
Lindahl (2017) argues that non-violence should be a key principle of a critical model of counter-terrorism. 
                                               
16 As highlighted in chapter 2, whether or not this category merits the term ‘non-violent’ is a matter of debate 
(Schmid, 2014). In supporting the violence of others, it is clear that these individuals would not merit the term non-
violent or pacifist according to literature on non-violence and pacifism. 
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He argues this for a number of reasons, including that violence is constitutive of further violence, and that 
non-violence is predicated on protecting the dignity of the other (2017, pp. 7-8). This latter aspect becomes 
particularly relevant for an agonistic approach where developing respect for the other is key. Similarly, 
Jackson (2017) laments the lacuna of scholarship examining non-violent approaches to countering terror 
(noting Lindahl’s paper as one exception). One reason for his promotion of non-violence is simply that 
violent approaches to countering terrorism have evidently failed (2017, pp. 358-361). In my own writing 
(Ford, 2017a), I have examined how current ways of conceptualising extremism engender violent modes 
of counter-extremism - modes which inhibit the promotion of a positive, sustainable peace. 
 
Such an emphasis on non-violence in countering extremism would, however, turn current counter-
extremism strategy on its head. It is certainly evident within this thesis that the approach of the past ten 
years has been to emphasise countering ideology, not promoting peace. In contrast, the promotion of peace 
and non-violence is evidently neglected in counter-extremism strategy. 
 
To explore how peace and non-violence are embraced (or dismissed) at a strategic level, I collated together 
key texts produced by the UK Government on countering extremism in schools: seven advice or strategy 
documents published by the government; six speeches given, or articles written, by either the Prime 
Minister or the Secretary of State for Education on extremism; two reports by, and one government response 
to, select committee sessions on radicalisation and counter-extremism, and two House of Commons briefing 
papers on the issue. I also included in the analysis a key UNESCO document on countering extremism in 
schools. I examined these texts for every mention of ‘peace’, ‘nonviolent’, ‘non-violent’ and ‘non-
violence’. While I cannot claim that such a set of texts is comprehensive and inclusive of all texts on the 
topic, the analysis is nonetheless revealing. 
 
Within these documents, peace appears a number of times. There were instances referring to terrorists 
undermining peace (HM Government, 2011b, p. 40), the Northern Ireland peace process (HM Government, 
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2011b p. 41; HM Government, 2011a), or the description of Islam as a peaceful religion (Dawson & Godec, 
2017; HM Government, 2013). However, only two documents made mention of promoting peace. Only 
one of these was written by a UK Government department. The other was written by UNESCO.  
 
Peace is mentioned twice in the 2008 UK Government advice, Learning to be Safe.  This document offers 
tools to teachers to counter extremism in schools. The toolkit suggests one such tool, the idea of ‘a school 
theme to model how peaceful action has achieved results at local, national and international levels’ (DCSF, 
2008, p. 29). It also offers a second suggestion: ‘promoting active citizenship to model how perceived 
injustice can be peacefully challenged’ (DCSF, 2008, p. 23). UNESCO makes greater mention of peace. 
There are references to ‘peaceful approaches to change… peaceful collective action… active participation 
in the peaceful and sustainable development of their societies’ (UNESCO, 2016, p. 15). While UNESCO 
expends more energy promoting the idea of peace, it is of note that it was last in 2008 that the UK 
Government appeared to even mention promoting peace within the context of countering extremism.  
 
Mentions of non-violence (aside from the numerous mentions of the threat of non-violent extremism) are 
even rarer. Two mentions appeared within the texts. In a speech, David Cameron made the argument that 
‘radical ideology… has often sucked people in from non-violence to violence’ (Cameron, Jul. 20, 2015), 
thus emphasising the importance of countering the ideology, rather than promoting non-violence. The only 
other mention appears within a 2006 strategy document on countering terrorism, which asserted that the 
true meaning of Jihad was non-violent struggle (HM Government, 2006, p. 7). The UNESCO document 
makes one reference to non-violence, promoting ‘non-violent action against extremist arguments’ (2016, 
p. 32). It is interesting to note here, however, that the non-violence is deployed against extremist ideas. The 
argument made in this chapter is that such ideas must be engaged with, not defended against.  
 
The rare instances of peace or non-violence being mentioned in the texts can be placed in context by 
exploring the other ways in which extremism is discussed in the same texts. While Learning to be Safe 
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discusses promoting peace twice, there are sixteen occasions when the text speaks of challenging ideas, 
beliefs, narratives or ideologies (DCSF, 2008). The cornerstone review of the Prevent strategy in 2011 - the 
document in which the notion of fundamental British values is first introduced - makes no mention of peace, 
yet deploys the word ideology 103 times.  
 
In this chapter, I want to make the argument that the promotion of non-violent, agonistic modes of engaging 
with ‘extreme’ ideas offers a far more sustainable and peaceful framework for thinking about educational 
responses to the problem of ‘extremism’. However, three key questions remain. The first is: do ideas 
threaten? The second is: how are violence and non-violence defined? A third is whether extremists 
themselves are capable of debate.  
 
Regarding the first question, it is my claim that, where violence is used instrumentally - as a tool to achieve 
a goal, or to further a set of values or ideas - it is the violence, not the ideas, that threatens. Where perhaps 
there are instances of individuals or groups who see violence as an end in itself - what Selma Gregg calls 
‘apocalyptic warriors’ (2016, p. 348) - an educational approach across society would not offer a suitable 
response.17 Yet, importantly, this is one of three types of religious violence according to Selma Gregg. In 
most other contexts, violence is used instrumentally. For these cases, the following maxim appears solid: 
while one may not agree with the ‘extreme’ ideas that someone holds, it is possible to imagine a context in 
which those ideas could be presented, and engaged with, as ideas that do not come with the immediate 
threat of direct violence.  
 
The second question regarding the nature and definition of both violence and non-violence adds complexity 
to this claim however. What the ‘threat of violence’ might entail should be examined carefully. Violence 
                                               
17 This is not however to argue that there are not non-violent ways of approaching such groups or individuals (see 
Jackson, 2017, pp. 363-365). It is however, an argument to suggest that educational responses are not, in the first 
instance, the right approach in this case. 
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comes in many forms. Johan Galtung (1969) explored multiple forms of violence. Galtung delineates forms 
of ‘direct violence’, which involve an agentic actor inflicting harm on another individual, from ‘structural 
violence’, a form of violence in which harm is inflicted, but where no identifiable actor exists. Galtung 
offers the example of starvation as a result of poverty. Individuals are here harmed by human causes, though 
the cause is systemic. Earlier in the chapter, Gur-Ze’ev’s conceptualisation of epistemic violence was also 
mentioned, adding further complexity to the matrix of violence.  
 
It is easy to imagine an ‘extreme’ idea that might not threaten direct violence, but that would threaten 
structural violence. The idea that white people should be paid more than other ethnicities, for instance. As 
an idea in itself, it may offend, but it does not threaten direct harm.18 Were the idea enforced across society, 
the harm caused by the structural violence within the idea would be enormous (and would likely result in a 
great deal of direct violence too). Moreover, discourses on countering extremism appear unable to 
incorporate contexts in which individuals or groups may hold onto reasonable or non-extreme ideas, but 
choose to promote these ideas through violence; examples such as the use of violence in opposition to 
values themselves considered extreme - the use of torture, denial of rights to children, or political repression. 
Many ‘non-extreme’ ideas have also inflicted structural and epistemic violence, such as ideas or ideologies 
that normalise or naturalise military intervention, poverty, or imperialism for example.  Adopting a non-
violent approach demands all forms of violence - the extreme and the moderate - to be critically examined.  
 
Galtung (1969) not only delineates forms of violence, but also forms of peace. He distinguishes a negative 
peace, which seeks to halt direct violence, from a positive peace, which seeks to eliminate all forms of 
violence and install social justice. An agonistic approach to positive peace, one that accommodates a desire 
to also eliminate epistemic violence, would not seek to impose a blueprint model of a positive peace. Such 
an idea would engender the forms of violence critiqued by Shinko and Cremin above. Instead, the principle 
                                               
18 Of course, the idea itself is often presented in conjunction with other ideas that do threaten direct harm, such as 
inciting people to violently attack counter-protestors, or Islamophobic attacks on individuals wearing the niqab. 
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would be to seek an agonistic, pluralistic approach to positive peace through a critical approach to all 
violence. 
 
Such a discussion taps into a whole series of debates pertinent to the contemporary era: free speech and 
hate speech, the right to not be offended, the legitimacy of state violence, and the links between ideologies 
and violence, to name just a few. When one considers Galtung’s later (1990) inclusion of ‘cultural violence’ 
into the mix, the issues are further complicated. Here, Galtung argues that the rituals, cultural artefacts and 
other communicative acts that normalise or legitimise acts of violence in society are themselves violent. 
The question of whether or not a speech act, in which violent ideas are expressed, is an act of cultural 
violence is incredibly important here when laying out the parameters of a non-violent agonistic encounter. 
Should these ideas be excluded for being violent? 
 
It is evident that within the realm of extremism there exists a complex web of competing claims over 
violence - what violence is legitimate, natural, permissible, desirable and so on. The moderate claims the 
legitimacy of state violence, while rendering all other forms of violence as ‘extreme’. The extremist then 
attempts to challenge that de-legitimacy through acts of violence. It can be said therefore that at the heart 
of the challenge regarding extremism is a set of radical disagreements: disagreements over the way society 
should be run, the values it holds, and the role violence should play within that. Ramsbotham’s (2010) 
frustrations at the field of conflict resolution stem from the desire of conflict resolution practitioners to 
overcome, or sideline, radical disagreements. Ramsbotham seeks to learn from them instead, and to place 
these disagreements at the heart of agonistic encounters.  One way for such a set of disagreements to 
examine opportunities for non-violence is through their inclusion within an agonistic encounter. As such, 
an agonistic approach perhaps sends a challenge to Galtung’s desire to eliminate or exclude these forms of 
culturally or structurally violent ideas. If the battle between moderation and extremism is re-framed as a 




A foundational ethical principle of agonistic non-violence at the heart of a counter-extremism strategy 
presents a very different approach to the contemporary model, in that it avoids pre-determining certain 
forms of violence as legitimate. Furthermore, rather than seeing non-violence as a precondition of an 
agonistic encounter (as perhaps Mouffe’s agonism might), non-violence is seen as a principle to be achieved 
through rigorous debate and encounter with difficult, violent ideas - through their very inclusion rather than 
exclusion. As Shinko notes, ‘We should strive to re-envision peace as a cacophonic and cluttered terrain of 
political struggle, denoted by multilayered and discontinuous sites of emergence’ (Shinko, 2008, p. 490). 
It should be acknowledged that there is not the space here to afford the depth of debate deserved by such 
complex ideas and contestations. Instead, I have attempted to sketch and highlight the various ideas at stake 
within this arena, to begin an examination of how to overcome the issues raised within the thesis. In so 
doing, I argue that an inclusive, agonistic encounter searching for non-violent solutions through the debate 
between ideas some deem extreme and others moderate, would radically transform current counter-
extremism approaches.  
 
Here, one is led to the third question raised above: whether extremists are capable of such debate. Immense 
work has been completed at a discursive level to produce a discourse which dismisses the possibility of 
extremists engaging in debate. Chapter five examined how often extremists would be dismissed as 
irrational, ignorant or simply stupid. The following slide offers a similar example, demonstrating common 






Described as ‘unwilling to compromise’ and ill-informed, it is hardly surprising that at a strategic level, 
little attention is given to the idea of engaging with extreme ideas, and with ‘extremists’ themselves. Yet, 
it is readily apparent that this discourse which excludes the possibility of engagement with extreme ideas, 
plays a vital role in the exclusion of extremism, leaving extremists with few options, other than violence, 
to express themselves and their ideas. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that such complex and far-reaching debates regarding the role of violence 
in society cannot be comprehensively tackled within the remit of a thesis chapter. Instead, it is hoped that 
such a discussion lays out the concepts and ideas at stake, acknowledging their complexity. The remainder 
of this chapter hopes to bring such ideas back down to earth. It does this through examining those examples 
in the corpus of teaching materials which appear to offer instances of agonism at work. Through the 
interplay of conceptual discussion, and practical endeavour, new ways of approaching the problem of 
extremism can be explored. 
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Building Agonistic Principles of Encountering Extremism Education 
The educational approach put forward in this chapter is one focused on transforming the antagonism 
surrounding extremism into an agonism. In particular, it is focused on putting the political back into the 
discussion regarding extremism, so that, as Todd & Sastrom argue, ‘views are conceived on the register of 
we/they instead of on the register of good and evil’ (2008, p. 9). This educational approach is based on the 
principle of allowing extreme ideas the greatest opportunity to be debated openly, within the parameters of 
an education that promotes and engenders non-violence. The corpus in fact offers plenty of examples of 
how to begin. Incorporating relevant examples from the corpus, I offer (a not definitive) list of ways to 
bring to life an agonistic, educational approach to the problem of extremism.   
 
Promoting a Positively-framed Peace  
It is fascinating to see that the teaching materials within the corpus begin to offer insight into how an 
agonistic education based on promoting peace through a critical approach to violence can be constructed. 
The corpus of teaching materials offers many more signs of educational approaches to promoting peace, 
than were evident at a strategic level. A keyword search for ‘peace’ within the teaching materials brought 
up a substantial amount of resources. While some of these examples appeared to fall into the problematic 
frameworks examined in previous chapters, others offered a greater level of deviation from the strategic 
emphasis on challenging ideology. 
 
Some resources offer concerted attempts to promote peace. A resource pack developed by the Tony Blair 
Faith Foundation includes a set of activities geared towards examining the importance of dialogue in 
building peace (T406, p. 12). A resource by the Association for Citizenship Teaching asks students to watch 
a dramatised video in which a meeting between two people helps them challenge their own views. After 
watching, students are asked to explore, ‘how do they go about making peace?’ (T12, p. 5). The 
organisation Since 9/11 developed a resource which examines the justifications of the UK, the US and Al-
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Qa’ida for declaring war. Students are asked to critically examine whether the actions of the three parties 
was done with the intention of restoring peace (T332, p. 2). The resources produced by Extreme Dialogue 
have all been written with a peacebuilding approach. These resources are described as being ‘based on 
equality, engagement and understanding’ (T89, p. 12). Miriam’s Vision offers a set of resources, which 
amongst other objectives, seeks to promote the ‘democratic process as a non-violent alternative for 
dealing with conflict and adversity’ (T171, p. 1). 
 
The promotion of non-violent modes of political participation is to be celebrated if an agonistic education 
based on non-violence is to be constructed. To some extent, this promotion is already present. After all, 
chapter three noted how the current counter-extremism strategy promotes the teaching of ways of (non-
violently) engaging politically. However, a tension remains. The enthusiasm for the counter-extremism 
strategy to see much in the way of change should be approached sceptically. Promoting modes of non-
violent political participation while also promoting a fixed set of liberal values presents the virtue of 
political participation more in terms of a pressure valve than a change agent. It appears that these modes of 
participation become ways of ‘letting off steam’, often expressed in terms of freedom of speech (T365, p. 
5), rather than as modes of catalysing change. After all, as chapter six explored, little room is left for altering 
the fixed, fundamental values, when those values are themselves promoted. 
 
It is noticeable for instance that the word peace often appears in the context of describing Islam. A number 
of resources write that Islam is a peaceful religion. ‘The word “Islam” means “peaceful submission”’, 
writes one example (T395, slide 6). Another argues that many Muslims see Islamic extremism as ‘a warped 
ideology (belief system) that “betrays Islamic values of peace”’ (T333, slide 4; see also, T41, p. 2;, 
T426, slide 14; T398, slide 10). Such a narrative appears to fall well within the discourse of ‘True Islam’ 
which I critiqued in chapter seven, which associated a ‘good’ form of Islam with one that was submissive 
and unchallenging to the status quo. Peace appears to be translated in these examples in a similar way.  
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Furthermore, where peaceful protest was promoted, there was often a caution that is also offered. There is 
a curious sense here that peaceful marches never lose their threat of violence. One example speaks of a 
march passing off ‘relatively peacefully’ where ‘fifteen arrests took place’ (T109, slide 8). Another 
asked students to reflect on the relative moral virtues of various ways of attempting to effect change, 
including ‘someone [who] joins a large and peaceful march’ (T288, slide 11), or a ‘peaceful 
demonstration’ (T285, p. 8). A fourth example offers ‘protests, strikes [and] demonstrations’ as 
peaceful alternatives to terrorism and violence (T253, slide 4). Yet, these peaceful marches might turn 
violent. Discursively, these examples of ‘peaceful marches’ never shake off their opposite. Such a linkage 
appears particularly present in one presentation entitled ‘Balancing the right to protest’ (T49), which 
explores cases where protests have turned violent, and asks how the right to protest needs to be balanced 
with the needs of others who might be affected by the violence. Peaceful protest is promoted, but with some 
level of hesitancy.  
 
At the heart of this tension is an antagonism cited earlier in the chapter - of the reliance on military violence 
at the heart of liberal notions of peace (Jackson, 2018). While these resources appear to embrace peace, 
they do so only if they do not challenge the idea that the state should retain a monopoly of legitimate 
violence. The questions surrounding the (il)legitimacy of state violence are noticeably absent. Such an 
inability to loosen the grip on liberal notions of legitimate violence poses a profound barrier to agonistic 
encounters. A positively-oriented conceptualisation of peace within an agonistic framework must approach 
all violence with equally critical vigour.  
 
Some resources stand out as examples here. The above cited example in which the justifications for war of 
the US and UK are critiqued alongside Al-Qaeda, creates a sense of parity in terms of whose violence is to 
be critiqued. Furthermore, a resource produced by Miriam’s Vision briefly explores how counter-terrorism 
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laws might be used ‘to spy on peaceful protestors’ (T149, p. 1). Another explored a case where police 
unlawfully refused to allow a coachload of protestors to drive to an RAF base where they planned to hold 
a peaceful protest (T145, p. 2). These two examples hint at the idea that peaceful protest might actually 
pose a threat - not to individuals - but to those in authority.  
 
Such a tension reveals a core dynamic of agonistic approaches. As Mouffe writes, ‘The fundamental 
difference between the “dialogical” and the “agonistic” perspectives is that the aim of the latter is a profound 
transformation of the existing power relations and the establishment of a new hegemony’ (2005, p. 52; see 
also Ruitenberg, 2008, p. 278). Peace, and non-violent modes of political participation and resistance cannot 
be promoted agonistically, unless hegemonic change as an idea is fully embraced. This demands, as the 
next section explores,  that the framing of counter-extremism around the defence of values needs to be 
profoundly reshaped. 
 
Being Critical of the ‘Moderate’ 
In this sense of embracing change, agonistic models of education must be vulnerable. As Rosemary Shinko 
notes, ‘In its most comprehensive sense agonism provides for reflexivity and fallibility within a 
pluralistically dynamic political setting where difference and contestation are hallmarks of an engaged and 
democratically active citizenry’ (Shinko, 2008, p. 479). Without being vulnerable to fallibility, an agonistic 
engagement with ‘extreme’ ideas is impossible. Similarly, Sharon Todd writes of a need to ‘relinquish the 
security of those universals into which so much political trust is placed’ (Todd, 2010, p. 217). As such, it 
is the fundamentality of Fundamental British Values that first must be extinguished, should an agonistic 
approach to a counter-extremism education be embraced. It is impossible to conceive of an agonistic 
education that has preordained the correct answers.  
 
Some examples within the corpus appeared to embrace this vulnerability. The use of humour, such as in 
the following example, can aid teachers to introduce the notion of fallibility to students. Here, a presentation 
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In this example, students are not uniformly expected to take on the values without some evaluation. Instead, 
they are offered the opportunity to themselves think of any funny British values that were missing from the 
list in the Prevent strategy (T413, slide 5). A different presentation introducing to students the values, 
teaches about the notion of Britishness, and incorporates ideas such as hooliganism and binge drinking 
alongside cups of tea and red phone boxes (T390, slide 3). One resource asks the question ‘How tolerant 
is the UK?’ (T285, p. 12). The simple inclusion of the word ‘how’, transforms the fundamentality of the 
British value. Similarly, a different presentation offers the chance for fallibility, and asks students: ‘Are 
these sensible suggestions? Are there any problems with them? Should anything be taken away 
or added?’ (T414, slide 4).  
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While a critical approach is thus developed, a tension with the fundamentality of British values persists. 
This criticality in questioning the values is undermined two slides later within the same presentation, where 





The fixed nature of the values has returned. Whether through accountability measures, such as the need to 
prove to school inspectors that your school is promoting Fundamental British Values, or through some other 
mode, it appears that resources struggle to challenge the values in their entirety.  
 
As Ruitenberg (2008, p. 278) notes, Mouffe’s agonism has at its heart a desire to transform current 
hegemony. It is hard to imagine a group of civil servants within the Department for Education at a 
conference table tasked to develop an educational policy to transform the hegemony. However, agonism 
relies on a level of equality and parity between ideas that are engaged with. This cannot happen if certain 
ideas are a priori privileged over others. The fallibility of the ‘moderate’ is key. 
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Embrace Complexity and Contextuality  
A third component of an agonistic educational framework is complexity. Chapter five explored the 
damaging impact of presenting ‘simple’ definitions of extremism that shy away from the complexities of 
the topic. Fortunately, not all resources introduced these definitions or ideas in such a way as to mask the 
complexity and contestation surrounding the terms.  
 
For instance, a number of resources drew upon the question of ‘what does a terrorist look like?’ to 






This narrative appears to have a number of consequences. One of these consequences is that these resources 
contribute to the discourse spoken of in chapter five - the universalisation of the extremist threat. The 
narrative that a terrorist does not have a visual profile contributes to the idea that anyone can be a terrorist, 
and as such, the threat appears to come from many directions. A second consequence, however, is that these 
resources do appear to counter some of the dominant narratives of the contemporary orthodox terrorism 
discourse.   
 
A common criticism is that counter-terrorism strategies have for the past decade and a half focussed 
disproportionately on young, Asian men (e.g. Lynch, 2013; Spalek & Lambert, 2008; Thomas, 2009). 
Lynch describes the discursive process where discourses had transitioned ‘from speaking of a small number 
of violent Muslims, to suspecting radical sects of Islam, to suspecting all Muslim youth as potential radicals, 
[which] had completed a process whereby Muslim youth in the United Kingdom were constructed as 
threatening, different, untrustworthy and dangerous’ (Lynch, 2013, p. 242). These resources, through their 
inclusion of many examples of white terrorists, and the inclusion of some examples of women involved in 
terrorism, challenge this narrative.  
 
Alongside being a young Muslim, the contemporary stereotypical terrorist is also ‘evil’. Unpacking the 
discourse surrounding the attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, Jackson argued that ‘Perhaps the 
most frequent rhetorical construction of the terrorist enemy is that they are “evil”. A subplot of the 
civilisation-barbarism meta-narrative’ (Jackson, 2005, p. 66). Through the inclusion of the example of 
Nelson Mandela, the resources challenge dominant understandings that terrorists are ‘evil’. It appears 
jarring to include an example of what some would consider ‘terrorism’ that was supported by such a large 










Furthermore, other resources appear to concede Jackson’s argument that ‘terrorism is just one among 
several repertoires of political conflict’ (2012, p. 11). In particular, the somewhat cliched expression that 
‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ was deployed regularly within the materials 


























Narratives of good and evil are nice and simple. They are easy to learn, and aid policymakers. They do not, 
however, make good agonistic narratives. As Todd argues: ‘The transformation of antagonism into agonism 
therefore involves understanding my opponent not in terms of moral categories (good and evil, for instance), 
but in specifically political terms’ (Todd, 2010, p. 218). Embracing, rather than shying away from, 
complexity aids students to approach the world afresh, re-politicising apparent simplicities. 
 
One example does this through offering reflective questions for students to explore. This resource explores 
terrorism as one example of a series of ways of looking to effect political change, and then examines 
historical cases of its ineffectiveness. From here the resource asks ‘If it is not effective, then why do 
people still commit acts of terrorism?’ (T285, p. 9).  
 
Complementarily to complexity, not only should students learn that these issues are complex, but also they 
should understand that they are situated within an historical context. Ruitenberg (2008, p. 278) argues that 
political literacy is vital for agonistic politics. In particular, she argues that ‘students must learn to read the 
social order in political terms, that is, in terms of disputes about the interpretation of liberty and equality 
and the hegemonic social relations that should shape them’ (2008, p. 278). To do this without historical 




Since 9/11 is an organisation particularly focused on contextualising terrorism within their resource, ‘Out 
of the Blue - When did 9/11 Begin?’. It is interesting how, in developing an historical context, the 
resource challenges the discourse surrounding ‘new terrorism’. The ‘new terrorism’ discourse refers to a 
common narrative which frames the terrorism after the attacks of September 2001 as being distinct from, 
and more threatening, than older forms of terrorism. This discourse has been challenged by terrorism 
scholars (Crenshaw, 2008). Within their ‘Out of the Blue’ resource, the organisation developed an 
information booklet entitled ‘What caused 9/11?’. In this booklet, a narrative traces this question of the 
causes of 9/11 back through the entire 20th century. It covers early imperial expansion in the region 
searching for oil, Zionism, Arab Nationalism, through to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the Gulf 
War. On the final page of the booklet, it states: ‘By now, you should be convinced that the roots of 
9/11 go very deep, very wide and are very complicated!’ (T318, p. 10). Since 9/11 certainly does not 
shy away from complexity. Such a principle resonates with Lindahl’s plea for terrorism scholars to ‘dare 
to know’, a principle which ‘marks a commitment to explore and question the knowledge and assumptions 
we already hold about terrorism’ (Lindahl, 2017, p. 6).  
 
The importance of grievance 
Ruitenberg’s (2008) exploration of agonism as a mode of ‘radical democratic citizenship education’ offers 
useful assistance in developing an agonistic mode of extremism education. Thus far, Ruitenberg’s 
suggestions of the agonistic desire to change the hegemony, and of the need for political literacy have been 
incorporated. One further suggestion from Ruitenberg is incorporated here, namely, the inclusion of 
emotion in politics (2008, p. 276).  
 
Ruitenberg argues that ‘the emotional education required for political education based on agonistic 
pluralism would focus not on seeing the emotions as a private site of control or means to personal success 
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but rather on understanding the cultural significance and significations of emotions’ (2008, p. 276). In this 
regard, I argue that the role of political grievances within the question of extremism must return from the 
sidelines, and play a central role in agonistic education. 
 
Political grievances are currently dismissed when exploring why individuals turn to political violence. At 
times, as David Cameron did in 2011, it is argued that violence is so endemic to extremist ideology that 
even were grievances explored, violent extremism would still occur (Cameron, Feb. 5, 2011). At other 
times, the grievances themselves are dismissed. Extremists are described as irrational, or ignorant. They do 
not understand the politics of their ‘grievances’. The word ‘perceived’ often prefixes the word grievance in 
strategic literature (DCSF, 2008, p. 13).  
 
Yet, putting those grievances centre stage is vital. Understanding this component of why someone engages 
in political violence should be seen as equally important as any other. Even more importantly, as explored 
further below, examining emotions and grievances promotes empathy and mutual understanding.  
 
Teaching resources offer ways of incorporating grievances into extremism education. In one example, 
students are asked to watch a video in which a character, Khalid, becomes radicalised. Later students are 
asked: ‘What sort of current issues in the UK or elsewhere could have made Khalid angry? Think 
of things that you might have seen on the news over the last few weeks or months’ (T100, p. 5). 
Another presentation examining the reasons why someone might become radicalised suggests: ‘British 
Foreign Policy in Iraq and Afghanistan’ (T400, slide 10). A resource produced by Since 9/11 speaks of 




Putting political grievances back into the debate not only contributes to the re-politicisation of extremism 
and the insertion of emotion into educational processes, but also, as the next section examines, allows for 
greater empathy and mutual understanding.  
 
Understanding the Other  
A core component of mediation and conflict resolution - from playground scuffles to geopolitical disputes 
- is to ‘see the word through the other person’s eyes’. Such a component seems vital if the friend/enemy 
distinction is to be broken down. This does not require agreement. The purpose of an agonistic 
understanding of respect is not consensus, as it might be in more deliberative modes of democracy, but the 
building of a foundation for disagreement. To achieve this, to recognise, and respect the other, this 
understanding is vital. Respect is a key component of Rosemary Shinko’s conceptualisation of ‘agonistic 
peace’: 
It is not merely that I see the other’s face, but that the other puts her face in my face and refuses to 
make way, refuses to not let me see… it occurs again and again, over and over until out of this 
struggle emerges a begrudging recognition, a begrudging acceptance, the begrudging admission of 
a nod towards recognition and the acknowledgement of a respect earned in a struggle borne out of 
the refusal to submit (Shinko, 2008, p. 489). 
 
Once again, the corpus offers examples of how to begin to build this. Since 9/11 incorporates an activity 
asking students to ‘empathise with people directly affected by 9/11’ (T322, p. 6). The examples offered 
demonstrate a conscious desire for students to engage with a variety of perspectives: parents of soldiers 
killed in the resulting invasion of Afghanistan, parents of suicide bombers, victims of the attacks in New 
York and Washington themselves, a Muslim living in New York at the time, and an Afghan villager whose 
livelihood has been destroyed by the invasion (T322, p. 6). Extreme Dialogue, in resources designed to help 
students understand the causes of right-wing extremism, incorporate activities to simulate discrimination. 
This might include splitting a class according to eye colour, and asking them to make judgements about a 
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different group. This aids students to understand how easily discrimination can occur, and what it feels like 
(T92, p. 15).  
 
Extreme Dialogue’s resources emphasise trying to understand the Other. One of the aims of the resources 
is ‘Increasing contact with individuals and their stories, building empathy and association’ (T90, 
p. 4). The resources do this using interviews with former violent individuals (or family members), recorded 
in short videos, exploring why they became involved with violence, and the impact of that. The next step 
for an agonistic approach would perhaps be to develop resources with those who have not rescinded their 
‘extremism’. 
 
A different resource from Since 9/11 examines life in Britain as a Muslim and asks ‘How might [students] 
feel if people supposed they were terrorists because of what they looked like, or because of their 
age, gender or ethnic background?’ (T285, p. 5). It is interesting actually, how these ‘understanding the 
Other’ examples quite often fall into the category of challenging Islamophobia. Miriam’s Vision has a 
similar exercise, asking students how they would feel one month after the bombings if they were, for 
instance, ‘a Londoner of Asian appearance’ (T140, p. 5). Such resources are in danger of falling into the 
trap examined in chapter seven of pinpointing certain modes of Islamophobia while propagating another 
form of Islamophobia by working within an Islamophobic counter-extremism strategy. Yet, developing 
these narratives in an agonistic counter-extremism strategy, which does not promote a fixed set of values 
that engender Islamophobic practices, should help avoid this.  
 
A Question of Language 
As noted in chapter five, one organisation, Miriam’s Vision, rarely mentions the words ‘extremism’ and 
‘terrorism’ during any of their 37 teaching units. Instead, they refer to the 2005 London bombings as ‘7/7, 
an indiscriminate act of violence against ordinary people: people like you and me’ (T229, p. 4). The 
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terms are not entirely eliminated. In their guidance notes, they describe how their teaching materials are 
developed ‘to contribute towards minimising the incidence and scale of violent extremism as part 
of a vision of a safer, more inclusive society’ (T229, p. 1). Moreover, they use the word ‘terrorism’ 
when referring to a coroner’s report of the 2005 bombings. However, this sensitive approach to terminology 
appears to be a vital component to developing a more level playing field - a vital balancing act should 
enemies become adversaries.  
 
This organisation is not alone in displaying a sensitive and critical approach to the terminology in question. 
Above, examples demonstrate the politically complex nature of the term ‘terrorism’. A critical approach to 
the terminology is a far cry from the examples in chapter five in which students were encouraged to copy 
down definitions into their books with no opportunity for questions. The simple act of teaching students 
that the terms terrorism, extremism and radicalisation are contested, subjective terms, will go a long way 
to developing an agonistic framework. 
 
Alongside the importance of approaching the language offered by the discourse with a level of criticality, 
another core question regarding language must be examined. In its current form, regardless of the content 
of the strategy, it is a counter-extremism strategy. At its very foundation therefore, the principle behind this 
strategy is one of defence. Yet, agonism cannot operate under siege, defending something from extremism. 
As such, I argue that an agonistic approach to the problem of extremism must shift from countering 
extremism to encountering extremism – critically encountering not only the various ‘extremisms’ as 
examined in this thesis, but the very shaping of extremism as a political problem, and the exclusion of 
various forms of violence as the non-extreme. What I have hoped to do in this chapter is to develop an 
approach to ‘the problem of extremism’ through an agonistic framework. This thesis has demonstrated that 
the problematic elements of this issue extend beyond the ‘extremism’ itself to the ways it is currently being 




This chapter has deployed a theory of agonism, as predominantly developed by Chantal Mouffe, to offer a 
theoretical foundation for an educational approach to extremism that takes into consideration the critiques 
highlighted throughout this thesis. Agonism has offered a prism through which to critique the current 
consensus-based model of counter-extremism education. It has shown a consensus model to be both an 
impossible never-ending task, and a catalyst of violence. It is a mode of countering extremism that seeks to 
defend its friends, and eliminate its enemies. 
 
Agonism offers a way of transforming those enemies into adversaries. The chapter has attempted to build 
a platform for doing just that. Yet, as Mouffe argues, a level of consensus is required to achieve this. I have 
argued that through decoupling ideology from violence, and seeing extremist violence, not extremist ideas, 
as the source of a violent threat, a consensus built around non-violence, and a critical, pluralist approach to 
all forms of violence, can be developed. This consensus would then allow the once-excluded ‘extreme’ 
ideas to engage agonistically with the moderate, and for new forms of peace to emerge. Kundnani 
recognizes an irony here in that radicalisation, rather than the problem, might in fact pose a solution: 
 
Radicalisation – in the true sense of the word – is the solution, not the problem. Al-Qaeda’s violent 
vanguardism thrives in contexts where politics has been brutally suppressed or blandly gentrified. 
Opening up genuinely radical political alternatives and revisiting the political freedoms that have 
been lost in recent years is the best approach to reducing so called jihadist terrorism. (Kundnani, 
2015, p. 15) 
 
 The chapter has not attempted to provide a comprehensive theory for the implementation of such a theory, 
but instead to highlight a number of the debates, dilemmas and contestations that such an approach would 
need to tackle.  
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The remainder of the chapter sought to examine the corpus of teaching materials for pragmatic insight into 
how to build an agonistic framework. Six principles (as described in the following table) were put forward 
for how this could be achieved. 
 
Principles of Agonistic Education to Encounter Extremism 
Promoting a Positively-
framed Peace 
Agonism relies on foundational, consensual principles to sustain debate. 
It is built from a principle that education should promote a positively-
conceived peace, focused on the elimination of all forms of violence, 
and an openness to change and transformation. 
Being Critical of the 
‘Moderate’  
Debate built on principles of non-violence cannot be conceived should 
one set of ideas be privileged over another. Key to agonism, and to the 
inclusion of the Other, is demonstrating the fallibility and impermanence 
of the current hegemony.  
Embrace Complexity and 
Contextuality 
Simple narratives lead to depoliticised understandings of good/evil. 
Educators must not shy away from exploring the complexity of these 
issues. Including the historical context helps to place issues of extremism 
and terrorism in a political, rather than moral, context. 
The Importance of 
Grievance 
Violence is typically motivated by a sense of injustice. To be included, 
ideas once excluded must be heard. Grievances should be engaged with, 
not dismissed outright. This allows emotion to re-enter the political 
sphere. 
Understanding the Other  Simplistic, exclusionary narratives of good and evil, not only 
depoliticise, but dehumanise. Putting the human back into debates 
regarding extremism allow for greater levels of understanding. 
Educational approaches can allow students to ‘experience life in 
someone else’s shoes’.  
A Question of Language Approach the terminology of the discourse with criticality and openness. 




It is a hope therefore that this chapter can offer a hopeful and optimistic place for the thesis to conclude. 
While the bulk of this thesis has developed substantial critique, it is important to recognise that an 
alternative is possible. The strong, unbreachable walls developed in the UK’s counter-extremist castle have 
been shown for what they are: a sand castle, a product of human construction, and a siege mentality. This 
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chapter sought to present a way of embodying the ocean’s tide that reshapes the sand from its castle form, 






 Looking Beyond the Castle’s Walls 
 
In June 2018, having commissioned a review of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, the UK 
Government released its most recent iteration of the strategy, given the name CONTEST 3.0 (HM 
Government, 2018). Within this document are numerous themes highlighted in this thesis, demonstrating 
the continued embeddedness of what have been argued to be deeply problematic narratives: the promotion 
of ever ‘earlier intervention’ (ibid., p. 10); a promotion of ‘the values that are the foundation of our society’ 
(ibid., p. 23); and the constant emphasis on countering ‘ideology’ (ibid., p. 23).  
 
The definition of extremism within the document appears as confused as ever. Without offering a specific 
definition, the strategy argues ‘there is no precise line between what we have described above as terrorist 
ideology, and what we consider extremist ideology’, adding that ‘extremists of all kinds use malevolent 
narratives to justify behaviour that contradicts and undermines the values that are the foundation of our 
society’ (ibid., p. 23). As such, the government appears to offer little to address the recommendation of the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights who two years earlier reported that, ‘the Government gave us no 
impression of having a coherent or sufficiently precise definition of either “non-violent extremism” or 
“British values”. There needs to be certainty in the law so that those who are asked to comply with and 
enforce the law know what behaviour is and is not lawful’ (JCHR, 2016, p. 32). Instead, it seems extremism 
can cover any behaviour contrary to the fundamental values. Countering radicalisation is one part of what 
the strategy describes as ‘a wider effort to counter broader extremist messages and behaviours’ (HM 
Government, 2018, p. 23). Countering extremism now appears to have broadened out beyond the realm of 
countering violence to ‘wider social harms beyond terrorism’, such as ‘the erosion of women’s rights’ and 
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‘the isolation of communities’ (ibid.). The strategy’s publication in many ways confirms the centrality of a 
consensus-based orientation within British counter-extremism, and the creeping securitisation of various 
areas of communal life.  
 
The document also shared statistics regarding Prevent duty referrals. It reports that 6,093 referrals were 
made in 2016-17. 36% of these were deemed to require no action at all, and 45% of these cases were referred 
to alternative services, outside of the Channel system. Thus, only one in five referrals (19%) led to a 
Channel intervention panel, suggesting that four in five attempts to ‘spot signs of radicalisation’ were 
incorrect. Such a low ‘success’ rate in the identification of individuals requiring support regarding 
extremism and radicalisation clearly indicates the importance of scholarly attention to the murky and 
misunderstood concept of extremism as deployed in public discourses. According to the strategy, of the 
6,093 referrals, only 5.5% ever required intervention specific to extremism or terrorism (ibid., p. 39).  
 
This thesis has focused critical attention onto such discourses, examining the nature of the realms of 
extremism and counter-extremism through the prism of the education sector. This chapter seeks to provide 
a brief summary of the findings and arguments central to this thesis. Furthermore, it hopes to shed light on 
the implications - both theoretical and practical - of the research, to indicate its limitations and to draw 
together suggestions for future directions of research. 
 
Summary of the Research 
The thesis began with a concern regarding an increasing emphasis being given to ideology in terrorism 
discourses since 2001, and in particular, since the attacks on the London transport network in 2005. It also 
began by noting the expanding burden being placed on schools to counter extremism. The investigation 
began to explore what appeared to be a foundational antagonism between the objectives of an education 
system promoting free debate, pluralism and critical thinking, and the need to counter an ideology in order 
to patrol the boundaries of what values and ideas were to be acceptable within a liberal democracy. 
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Chapter two undertook a deeper, conceptual investigation into the nature of extremism and counter-
extremism, the impact of radicalisation discourses on these conceptualisations, and the reasons behind 
education’s centrality in the fight against extremism. Here, I argued that the various components of 
countering extremism appeared in conflict with one another. How could one promote both a fixed set of 
moderate values as well as pluralism? How could one promote non-violence when the legitimacy of state 
violence is at the heart of liberal democracy? 
 
Chapter three’s focus was to examine how this web of contradictory and antagonistic claims, of inconsistent 
empirical support, and of conceptual uncertainty, had materialised at a strategic level. It argued that the 
UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy is contested and contradictory. Three core educational 
components to the strategy were isolated: the development of skills, the promotion of values, and the 
dissemination of knowledge. Not only was it argued that each is contested in that substantial scholarly 
research brings into doubt the claim that such strategies were likely to have any impact on extremism at all, 
but also it appeared that the educational strategy was being dragged in three competing directions. I raised 
the pertinent question of how one was meant to teach the skills of critical thinking while concurrently 
promoting a fixed set of fundamental values. Moreover, I explored the danger of developing a paradigm of 
‘us’ and ‘them’ through promoting a sense of the values that ‘we’ share, while also teaching students about 
‘them’, the extremists. Such a paradigm undermines the promotion of a shared, common foundational 
framework of values at the heart of the logic of values promotion, seemingly excluding the very people to 
be ‘brought in’.  
 
Chapter four developed the research approach to examine the implications of this contested and 
contradictory strategy on classroom teaching. I decided to answer such a question through examining a set 
of teaching materials that had been designed to meet the requirements of the counter-extremism strategy. 
A diverse range of PowerPoint presentations, lesson plans, and student worksheets was compiled. A method 
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of critical discourse analysis was developed. Through examining the strategy at a textual level, the political 
consequences of the various competing discourses within the strategy could be exposed and critiqued. From 
here, the thesis was able to share its findings.  
 
The analysis within these three findings chapters uncovered a ‘siege mentality’ which frames the counter-
extremism strategy. Through taking the three components of the strategy in isolation - the development of 
skills, promotion of values, and dissemination of knowledge - one could examine how each operated in 
coordination with one another. It was argued that each contributed to build an image of a castle under siege. 
Chapter five examined the loose and unclear definitions and examples of extremism within the teaching 
materials. Though examining the vast array of examples of extremism given within the materials, the 
dangers of such a lack of clarity were soon realised. The chapter argued that the threat of extremism 
appeared to have been ‘universalised’ and securitised; there were many threatening extremisms that 
appeared to come from every direction. The chapter raised a fundamental concern resulting from this 
securitisation - the apparent suspension of democracy and pluralism for its own protection.  
 
Through disseminating a certain knowledge regarding extremists, the enemy attacking the castle was 
depicted. Through promoting fundamental British values, the population to be protected within the castle 
walls was envisioned. Chapter six examined the teaching of fundamental British values. Through deploying 
a governmentality approach, the chapter was particularly concerned to examine the various modes of British 
subjectivity deemed permissible within the discourse. Such analysis challenged a central component of the 
justification for the promotion of these values, namely, that it promotes inclusivity. Instead, the chapter 
argued that the values promoted the precise opposite. I argued that the narrow modes of permissible 
subjectivity - the post-political, the entrepreneurial, and the racialised subjects - present a profound 
challenge to the idea of pluralism.  
 
257 
Lastly, through developing critical thinking skills as a mode of protection, these skills were weaponised to 
be deployed in the direction of the attacking extremists. The thesis examined both how the castle was to be 
defended, and how the distinction between the moderate and the extreme was to be constructed. Chapter 
seven focused on the regularity with which materials developed critical thinking skills to challenge 
Islamophobia in particular. The chapter noted how these skills were designed to challenge Islamophobia 
‘out there’ in others, away from the moderate centre. As such, the chapter examined how a critical thinking 
approach to Islamophobia in fact functioned to mask from students the structures of discrimination and 
Islamophobia that underpin the counter-extremism framework itself.  
 
The thesis argues that such a siege mentality and defensive depiction of the problem of extremism as an 
existential threat has two major implications. The first is that it appears to undermine or suspend the very 
values it is hoping to defend: democracy is suspended for its own protection. The second is that the strategy 
relies on a foundational model of consensus which is deeply problematic. 
 
The final major chapter, chapter eight, examined this notion of consensus in depth, and in particular 
deployed the theoretical work of Chantal Mouffe. It argued that a consensus-based model was structurally 
flawed in its attempts to draw the entire population into the realm of the moderate. It argued that such a 
model of inclusion, was in fact predicated on a principle of exclusion. The chapter then deployed the theory 
of agonism to begin to examine how counter-extremism could be done differently. Agonism rests on the 
principles of the accommodation, not removal, of disagreement (Ramsbotham, 2010) or conflict (Mouffe, 
2005), and the promotion of pluralism not conformity. The chapter argued that such an approach could 
radically change the way extremism is problematised. Through promoting a mode of agonism that seeks to 
allow for ‘extreme’ and ‘moderate’ ideas to do battle in debate, the chapter raised a series of profound 
questions regarding the role of violence in discourses of extremism. The chapter presented extremism as 
being a ‘radical disagreement’ (Ramsbotham, 2010) over the legitimacy of certain forms of violence. 
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Within an agonistic approach to extremism, the pre-set boundaries of what violence is legitimate, and what 
is illegitimate would inevitably be challenged.  
 
Contributions of the thesis 
This thesis contributes important findings to a small, if growing, field of study into the implications of the 
recent increase in responsibilities of schools with regards to countering extremism. In so doing, the thesis 
has offered insightful contributions to an understanding of each component of schools’ counter-extremism 
responsibilities - the dissemination of knowledge, promotion of values, and development of skills. It has 
noted the profound dangers of a poorly understood definition of extremism, of an exclusionary mode of 
values-promotion, and of an inability to approach the moderate centre with the same criticality as that which 
is deployed towards the extremes. Furthermore, while chapter five’s findings regarding definitions of 
extremism contribute to a growing field of criticism regarding its uncertainty (e.g. JCHR, 2016), and chapter 
six’s findings regarding values contribute to an established research area on citizenship, belonging and 
Britishness (e.g. Falcous & Silk, 2010; Habib, 2018; Miah, 2017), chapter seven’s examination of critical 
thinking asks searching questions yet to be examined, and make original contributions to an understanding 
of what critical thinking entails in the context of counter-extremism education. No study has yet to examine 
how critical thinking is taught within counter-extremism education. 
 
Yet, this thesis aimed to go beyond these isolated examinations, and offer a holistic examination of the 
impact of Britain’s counter-extremism strategy in schools, when each component is addressed together. It 
was highlighted in chapter three that the vast majority of the work that has been published thus far on this 
issue has focused on either the Prevent duty (e.g. O’Donnell, 2016, 2017; Davies, 2016) or on Fundamental 
British Values, (e.g. Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Revel & Bryan, 2016) and predominantly in isolation from 
the remaining components of the strategy. As such, this thesis has attempted to not only critically examine 
each component in turn, and offer original perspectives drawn from the analysis to an understanding of 
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each component, but also to raise a series of pertinent questions regarding the foundational purposes and 
underlying assumptions regarding the counter-extremism strategy as a whole.  
 
Furthermore, while critical discourse analysis is a very well-established research method within Critical 
Terrorism Studies, this thesis presents an original methodology in the examination of counter-extremism 
education. To date, this method has not been applied to explore the question of the implications of the 
Prevent strategy in schools. As such, this thesis also contributes to the wider body of critical literature on 
terrorism and radicalisation. Chapter five contributes to the now substantial body of work critically 
deconstructing discourses on terrorism as they persist throughout various areas of society (Jackson, 2005; 
2007b; Jackson & Hall, 2016), expanding this work into the conceptual realm of extremism. Furthermore, 
this research supports and strengthens the concerns raised by scholars regarding the poorly-understood 
notion of ‘radicalisation’ and the dangerous implications for individuals wrongly deemed to be vulnerable 
(Baker-Beall et al., 2015). Complementary research has recently been conducted examining the impact of 
such knowledge and discourses on health workers and their safeguarding responsibilities regarding Prevent 
within the NHS, providing similar results. In particular, an extensive study exploring the attitudes and 
opinions of health workers found that ‘the line between mental illness and radicalisation is becoming 
increasingly blurred’ (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2018, p. 3). While in an educational setting, becoming 
politically active appears to be increasingly blurred with radicalisation (see chapter five), these murky lines 
at the borders of understandings of radicalisation are being rendered more visible in various sectors of 
society. 
 
Chapter six offers insight into the racialised nature of terrorism and extremism knowledge. Scholars have 
highlighted how discourses of radicalisation transformed British Muslims into ‘a subjectivity that is 
simultaneously “at risk/risky”’ (Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 411). My exploration of the construction of the 
racialised subject within discourses of Britishness and British values complements this theoretical work, 
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offering empirical examples of the implications of the transformation of British Muslims into ‘suspect 
communities’ (Breen-Smyth, 2014) within terrorism discourses.  
 
Through examining questions regarding inclusion, exclusion and consensus, the thesis offers insight and 
pertinent contributions to work in a number of related fields outside of terrorism studies. It supports and 
strengthens work critical of models of multiculturalism, citizenship and inclusion that emphasise a rise in 
what has been termed ‘multicultural nationalism’, the power dynamics that co-opt diversity and difference 
for national gain, transforming it into what Fortier describes as ‘palatable diversity’ (2005, p. 561; see also 
Falcous & Silk, 2010; Hage, 2000). Taking a governmentality approach, and examining the construction of 
different forms of exclusionary subjectivity within the British Values discourse in chapter six, the thesis is 
able to offer a critical perspective of the implications of the introduction of ‘Fundamental British Values’ 
to critical literature examining the question of belonging in contemporary Britain (e.g. Habib, 2018).  
 
Through exploring the work on agonism, and exploring extremism through a lens of agonistic peace, this 
thesis has also offered important questions for consideration within Peace Studies. It contributes to a 
growing critical (postmodern) literature exploring violence within the promotion of ethnocentric forms of 
peace (Cremin, 2016; Shinko, 2008; Gur-Ze’ev, 2001), and challenges models of liberal peace which rely 
too heavily on consensual modes of peace. The thesis questions the central logic to countering extremism: 
that when everyone agrees with the moderate, there will be no more extremism. In this sense, it builds on 
the post-liberal peace literature (Richmond, 2009), which explores the violence caused in liberal peace 
promotion. When the (il)legitimacy of certain forms of violence is at the heart of the conflict in question, 
how else can this dispute be resolved?  
 
Through such an endeavour, through exploring the siege mentality at the heart of Britain’s counter-
extremism strategy, and critiquing the consensus-based understanding of what the world after extremism 
should look like, the thesis has been able to offer both an original, fundamental critique to the underlying 
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logic of countering extremism, as well as an original and innovative approach for doing education around 
extremism differently. The introduction of an alternative, agonistic approach not only offers a constructive, 
possible resolution to an otherwise critical and deconstructive thesis, but also an opportunity for further 
study, and a positive contribution to the work of practitioners. 
 
Wider Theoretical and Policy Implications 
While attempting to answer a specific question regarding the implications of the UK’s counter-extremism 
strategy in schools, this thesis has also tapped into a series of lively wider philosophical and political 
debates, touching disciplines ranging from political sociology to peace studies to education studies. It is of 
value to make a brief note of these. 
 
The thesis has raised questions regarding what Mouffe (2005) refers to as the post-political promotion of 
liberal values as the benchmark for political participation. Contemporary debates surrounding migration, 
security and citizenship often circulate around the question of shared values. Healy (2018) notes how a lack 
of belonging or cohesion is so often blamed when problems occur. Such a question was recently raised in 
the case of a couple who were denied Swiss citizenship on the basis of the decision of the couple to not 
shake hands with individuals of the opposite gender officiating the citizenship process (BBC News, Aug. 
18, 2018). One official justified the decision arguing that ‘The constitution and equality between men and 
women prevails over bigotry’ (ibid.). This decision to not shake hands was evidence for the citizenship 
panel of a lack of the couple’s integration into Swiss society (ibid.). Similar cases have occurred recently 
also in France, where an Algerian woman was also denied citizenship for the same reason. The ruling was 
evidence, according to French government officials that she ‘had not assimilated into the French 
community’ (BBC News, Apr. 20, 2018). In Sweden, an individual won her appeal against a company who 
ended her job interview at the point at which she refused to shake hands with the interviewer (BBC News, 
Aug. 16, 2018). The prevalence of such cases demonstrates a contemporary antagonism between shared 
values and pluralism. This thesis has attempted to contribute to this debate through exploring how the 
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promotion of a fixed set of values endangers pluralism, as well as setting out new frameworks for embracing 
pluralism, within the context of encountering extremism. It would be fascinating to examine, for instance, 
how agonism could offer a helpful framework to embrace a pluralistic understanding of gender relations 
(within a framework that seeks to reject the structural violence of gender discrimination) to accommodate 
a diverse understanding of gender equality evident in these cases.  
 
Such debates materialise also within education studies, and in particular, debates regarding education, 
values, ideology, and extremism. As Mary Healy (2018) recently noted, national education systems have 
always played a role in the construction and dissemination of norms in the construction of a citizenry. 
Differences emerge here between thinkers who value the sense of loyalty and belonging to a community 
that arises in such an education, and those who see loyalty as potentially endangering critical citizenship 
and the accountability of leaders. Healy notes that the discourse around Fundamental British values ‘may 
be seen by some as suppressing legitimate critique or as justifying arguments that the aim of the policy is 
indeed to create the “uncritical attachments” often associated with patriotic education’ (Healy, 2018, p. 4). 
This thesis adds weight to this critique, and through examining the values in particular, contributes to a 
growing concern of the impact of promoting a fixed set of values on active participation in politics. 
Furthermore, the thesis extends this debate beyond the philosophical realms concerned with citizenship 
education to incorporate postcolonial critiques. Through examining the enforcement of homogeneity in 
such an education, critical voices such as that of Gur-Ze’ev (2001) have been aired, examining counter-
ideological counter-extremism education as a form of epistemic violence, or as what Biccum (2018, p. 7) 
has recent called ‘epistemicide’.  
 
Secondly, the thesis has touched on the question of violence in society, and has critically examined what 
peace might mean. While such debates have sat at the heart of peace studies since its inception with Johan 
Galtung (1969), these debates, while central to questions around terrorism and extremism, have not been 
fully explored in this context. At various moments throughout the thesis, from examining counter-
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extremism as the promotion of non-violence, through to exploring how many diverse forms of violence 
become wrapped up as examples of extremism (though state violence is persistently excluded), to finally 
exploring the question of extremism as a radical disagreement between competing claims over the 
legitimacy of violence as a political strategy, the question of violence is always there. Wrapped up within 
the question of violence is the question of the persistence of the Westphalian state system, and Weberian 
assumptions regarding state violence. This thesis has attempted to offer some supporting contributions to 
Jackson (2017) and Lindahl (2017) who have both begun to explore non-violence as a mode of countering 
terrorism. Through advancing agonism as a framework to build a non-violent mode of encountering 
extremism, the thesis has hoped to begin to critically explore such questions in more depth. 
 
Aside from the various theoretical and political debates into which this thesis has hoped to deposit questions 
and challenges, the thesis has also raised challenges relevant to those who work in policymaking. The thesis 
has taken a critical, and at times quite radical, approach to the problem of extremism. As acknowledged in 
the previous chapter, it is hard to imagine the UK’s Department for Education discussing a policy in which 
an alteration to the hegemony of liberal democracy, and of the current political system, was set as an 
educational objective. This raises, for me, two questions. The first concerns whether it is possible, or indeed 
desirable, to draw out any policy recommendations from the thesis for those in positions of power within 
the current counter-extremism apparatus. The second concerns whether or not a strategy of encountering 
extremism must, unlike the current strategy of countering extremism, simply look beyond the state in its 
implementation, and focus instead on the grassroots and a bottom-up approach.  
 
Richard Jackson (2016b) has been outspoken in his rejection of the importance of policy relevance. Jackson 
argues that ‘it is not too extreme to say that the global counterterrorism regime is, in its philosophy, practice, 
and effects, inherently violent, oppressive, and life-diminishing’ (2016b, p. 121). He continues to argue that 
‘working directly with state counterterrorism is akin to medical professionals who collaborate with torturers 
in an effort to improve prisoner welfare’ (ibid., p. 122). As such, Jackson rejects the importance of ‘policy 
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relevance’, and instead sets alternative goals for critical research, such as contributing to the ‘anti-
hegemonic project’ (ibid., p. 124). While counter-extremism may not be as violent as other aspects within 
the remit of counterterrorism, similar critiques have been levelled at the UK’s counter-extremism strategy 
in this thesis. For instance, it has been argued to be structurally Islamophobic and a profound danger to 
democratic pluralism.  
 
In acknowledging Jackson’s rejection of the idea of working with(in) such violent structures, I would like 
to imagine that ‘policy relevance’ can be understood to be wider than the idea of mere reform. As such, in 
truth the policy relevant implication of this thesis is to suggest that certain aspects of contemporary policy 
are violent, harmful and counter-productive, and should be removed. While accepting Jackson’s rejection 
of attempting to reform current policy, this thesis does remain ‘policy relevant’ in its desire to reject and 
remove current policy. As I have argued elsewhere (Ford, Feb. 19, 2018), two aspects of Britain’s current 
counter-extremism in schools strategy, in particular, have been found wanting. The first is the Prevent duty, 
the second is the fundamentality of a set of British values. When it comes to implications for policy, the 
removal of both of these aspects would demonstrate positive steps to developing an agonistic approach, as 
explored in the previous chapter. Chapter seven noted how the Prevent duty endangered the ‘safe space’ in 
which critical thinking was to take place, if the voicing of an ‘extreme’ view might then leave a student at 
risk of being directed towards an intervention. Chapter six noted the dangers of fixing the boundaries of 
permissible values on the forms of subjectivity that would be deemed permissible within the fundamental 
British values.  
 
The thesis has also developed a substantial critique of the centrality of a distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate violence to understandings of extremism. It has been argued that an agonistic framework would 
thus need to address this distinction in its quest for more pluralist resolutions to the problem of extremism. 
As such, within the realm of policy or practical implications, this raises the question of the role of the state 
in doing agonistic education around extremism. If a state’s existence is predicated on the distinction 
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between that violence which is legitimate, and that which is not, it perhaps seems foolhardy to demand that 
the state’s education system begins to break down such a framework. Furthermore, as Healy notes (2018), 
it is state-based education systems that have played such a vital role in the production of a set of norms and 
values within citizenship education. As such, this thesis hints at the idea that the spaces for agonistic 
approaches to extremism should exist outside of state institutions. Such an approach, I argue, would be 
most effective in changing current hegemonies on extremism. It is interesting to note for example, how 
many of the examples of agonism in practice highlighted in the previous chapter came not from local 
borough council resources, nor from those commissioned by police forces, but by independent, non-
governmental organisations and community groups. The analysis suggests that looking beyond the state for 
new and innovative approaches would be the best way forward. As noted below under areas for future 
research, this is something that I have already begun to investigate. 
 
There is evidently space for resistance against and critique of the counter-extremism strategy, which is 
reassuring. This work has uncovered various forms of resistance. For instance, unions like the National 
Union of Teachers voted in 2016 for a motion calling for a removal of the Prevent duty (Coughlan, Mar. 
28, 2016). A series of human rights organisations have produced reports detailing the many problems with 
the strategy (JUST Yorkshire, 2017; Qureshi, 2016; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016; Rights Watch 
UK, 2016). Furthermore, the UK Labour Party has continued to call for a wide-ranging review into the 
strategy. More grassroots campaigns have emerged such as the ‘Educators not Informants’ campaign, a 
tertiary education campaign to remove the Prevent duty from universities. Alongside the examples of future 
areas of research below, further research could be done to enrich our understanding of how teachers, 
students and school leaders engage in various forms of resistance against the strategy. 
 
Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
It is, of course, important to note what this thesis has been unable to achieve. A major limitation was the 
choice to focus purely on text. By limiting the research to a set of classroom materials in answering a 
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research question about the implications of a strategy for classroom practice, the gate of entry to the 
classroom was severely limited. While this offered certain advantages in terms of access to a wider array 
of resources, and access to multiple classrooms, certain drawbacks had to be conceded. Ide (2017) for 
instance, notes the contested understanding of the impact of school textbooks on the political outlook of 
school students. A debate remains as to whether teacher or text is the more influential. It is undoubtedly 
true that while examining the text has been a revealing and insightful practice, it has not told all that there 
is to tell. 
 
In this regard, one area for future research could be a project that takes a more empirical approach to the 
question, and investigates the strategy in a classroom context through classroom observation, and research 
methods, such as interviews or focus groups, which seek to gather the teachers’ perspective. Through this 
process of observing teachers engaging with these materials, that gap that Ide notes between text and 
teaching could be bridged. 
 
This empirical research could, in fact, head in two directions. One would be to deepen an understanding of 
the critique developed within this thesis, through observing the practice of current approaches to extremism 
in classrooms. The second would be to develop a set of classroom materials that attempt to follow the set 
of principles developed in the previous chapter, and put in place an agonistic approach of encountering 
extremism. This could then be evaluated with teachers and educationalists putting such education into 
practice, examining not just how the problematic aspects of countering extremism are encountered by 
teachers while teaching, but exploring how to engage with the problem of extremism in the classroom more 
fruitfully. The development of such materials is something I have already begun. I have so far developed 
three teaching resources, each aiming to adopt an agonistic approach to the problem of extremism as 
outlined in the previous chapter (Ford, Apr. 28, 2018). The next step would be to evaluate such resources 
with young people.  
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A second aspect is to note that not all schools’ counter-extremism responsibilities are met through resources 
specifically constructed to meet the requirements. As the school values of audits examined in chapter six 
reveal, a great deal of the education to counter extremism exists within existing curricular; it is taught as 
much in a citizenship class on the British Parliament, as it might be in a specific assembly on British values. 
As such, I have recently completed a project to address this limitation. Through exploring a set of school 
textbooks used in British secondary school history, citizenship, politics, and religious education classes, I 
have examined the discourses around terrorism and extremism within these texts (Ford, 2019). Further such 
research can aid in growing an understanding of the ways in which young people receive discourses 
regarding terrorism and extremism in schools.  
 
Lastly, it is important to note the limitations within the scope of the last chapter to examine the theory of 
agonism more deeply. As the chapter hinted, the work of Shinko (2008), Ramsbotham (2010) and Mouffe 
(2005) is diverse, and challenges and contests with one another. As such, within the remit of an individual 
chapter, it was not possible to examine in appropriate depth the theoretical foundations that could underpin 
a new way of encountering extremism in the classroom. I have begun such a project through investigating 
the nature of right-wing populism in New Zealand, particularly in the context of the Christchurch mosque 
shootings in March 2019. In this project, I seek to map out an agonistic approach to the problem of the far-
right in New Zealand, seeking to draw the lessons from this thesis into a new context. 
 
Final Remarks 
At the heart of the thesis appears a warning: that the current approach to countering extremism threatens to 
endanger the very values it seeks to protect. Through writing this thesis, it has been fascinating and 
concerning in equal measure to see news stories emerge which seem to confirm the importance of 
examining questions regarding pluralism, values, democracy, and violence. One such example is the Swiss 
citizenship case cited above. Furthermore, as has been noted throughout the thesis, a series of human rights 
organisations have published reports (JUST Yorkshire, 2017; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016; Rights 
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Watch UK, 2016) detailing the vast array of ways in which young Muslims, some politically active, some 
making jokes, and some just being children, have become swept up in procedures regarding their apparent 
radicalisation. Moreover, it is not just young Muslims, but political activists who have become swept up 
with the extremism brush. The following example reveals for me the danger in which activism is placed in 
the context of countering extremism.  
 
In July 2018, the Greater Manchester Authority released a report commissioned after the attack on the 
Manchester Arena the previous year. The commission was asked to investigate issues around social 
cohesion and extremism. The report included an example case of a fourteen-year-old boy who had been 
referred to the Channel programme because of his ‘extreme beliefs in relation to a form of environmental 
extremism… [and his] periphery to criminal behaviour’ (Greater Manchester Preventing Hateful 
Extremism and Promoting Social Cohesion Commission, 2018, p. 89). Due to the age of the individual 
involved, certain details were changed in the report to protect his identity. Yet, along with these details, the 
report also changed the nature of his actions, and cited that he was an anti-fracking activist. It later transpired 
that this was not the case (Pidd, Jul. 30, 2018). It is fascinating to note that the authors of the report, knowing 
that the individual was not involved in anti-fracking movements, felt that an instance of an anti-fracking 
extremist was a plausible example to use. Such a case is reminiscent of the earlier case of the MP Caroline 
Lucas’ arrest at an anti-fracking demonstration being cited as an example of extremism, and of the many 
cases of criminality or illegality that were drawn into definitions of extremism within chapter five.  
 
It is without doubt that the counter-extremism strategy poses a greater risk to young Muslims, than it does 
to political activists. Yet, what I find so fascinating about the inclusion of such an example is that it indicates 
just how universal the threat to the shared values of the moderate centre appears to be. Such a securitised 
mindset poses profound risk to religious and political diversity, and needs careful and critical revision. In 
this sense, as someone who has engaged in civil disobedience myself, the UK Government thinks I am an 
extremist. Yet, it is not just that behaviour that might makes me an extremist. My support for those others 
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who continue to engage in civil disobedience is itself a reason for why I am an extremist. As I argued in 
2017 (Ford, Jul. 26, 2017), it is not unlikely that you might be one too.  
 
This writing began with a story about castles. Britain’s counter-extremism strategy, I argue, develops a 
siege mentality, depicting moderate liberal values as being bravely defended from a marauding army 
threatening its walls and barricades. Such a siege mentality profoundly impacts the nature of the education 
done, when such analogous imagery infiltrates educational strategy. But the prologue also states that a siege 
mentality is more like a sand castle than a castle built of stone. That, while it may look like a castle, in 
reality it is merely a shaped form of sand. It is a hegemonic form of sand, built with political power as much 
as it is built with the glue made between sand and water. However, that sand can, and will, take many other 
forms yet. When it comes to building a counter-hegemonic project, it is refreshing to think that the shifting 
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19 School website undergone change (updated: 29 January 2018) 
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307 
Provision: April 2015 
A18 Marple Hall School Audit of British Values 
Promotion 
SMSC Audit on British 









     








P2 Lingdale Primary 
School 








P3 Codsall Middle 
School 

















P5 Hook Norton CE 
Primary School 














                                               
21 Alternative policy document now in use (updated 29 January 2018) 
308 








     
 Association of 
Citizenship 
Teaching  
Complete set of resources - 
powerpoint presentations, 
lesson plans and worksheets 




T1    What is a community - 
Lesson 1 - Community 
People FINAL.pptx 
  
T2   Challenges of diversity 




T3   School uniform rules 
information sheet - 
Lesson 2 - Community 
People FINAL.pdf 
  
T4   How do we deal with 
controversial issues - 
Lesson 3 - Community 
People FINAL.pptx 
  
T5   Animal Liberation 
Front information sheet 




T6   Drawing the line card 




T7   PETA information   
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sheet - Lesson 3 - 
Community People 
FINAL.pdf 
T8   Debating a 
controversial issue - 
Lesson 4 - Community 
People FINAL.pptx 
  
T9   The Rules of Debating 




T10   Tips on Writing a 




T11   Guarding against 








T13 Association for 
Citizenship 
Teaching 
Guidance document Deliberative Classroom 





T14 Association for 
Citizenship 
Teaching 
Set of lesson plans Deliberative 
Classroom: Religious 
Freedom teacher 






 Association for 
Citizenship 
Teaching  
Complete set of resources - 
powerpoint presentations, 





T15   Extremism - Lesson 1 -   
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Learning Mat - 
Exploring Extremism 
FINAL.pptx 
T16   Extremism - Lesson 1 - 




T17   What are extremism 
and terrorism - Lesson 


















T21   Opinions handout - 
Lesson 4 - Exploring 
extremism FINAL.pdf 
  
T22   Extreme education - 
Lesson 5 - Exploring 
extremism FINAL.ppt 
  




 Association for 
Citizenship 








                                               
22 This resources is included as the URL to this resource was included in the teaching notes with resource T17. As of 2 February 2018 this URL no longer worked, but the resource 
can be found at https://www.noexperiencenecessarybook.com/axV97m/lesson-title-what-is-extremism-causes-and-examples-age-range.html  
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Teaching lesson plans and worksheets Through Enquiry building-resilience 
T24   Terrorism - Lesson 1 - 





T25   How are we dealing 
with Terrorism - 
Lessons 1-2 -  





T26   How are people 
radicalised - Lesson 2 - 





T27   Young British and 
radicalised BBC article 
- Lesson 2 - How are 
people radicalised.pdf 
  
T28   From Brighton to the 
Battlefield Guardian 
article - Lesson 2 - 
How are people 
radicalised.pdf 
  
T29   Case study of religious 






T30   Are all terrorists the 
same - Lessons 3 and 4 
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T31   Case study of political 
extremism - Lesson 4 - 





T32   Is a Terrorist always a 
Terrorist - Lesson 5 - 





T33   South Africa timeline - 
Lessons 5 and 6 - 





T34   How helpful is govt 
advice to schools in 
meeting challenge of 
radicalisation - Lesson 
6 - Exploring issues of 
extremism and 
radicalisation through 
enquiry - FINAL.pptx 
  
T35   Scheme of work - 





 Association for 
Citizenship 
Complete set of resources - 
powerpoint presentations, 
Extremism and 






Teaching lesson plans and worksheets in the Media  
T36   Extremism - 
Citizenship - Lesson 1 - 
Extremism and 
terrorism as reported in 
the media FINAL 
(1).pptx 
  
T37   Extremism - 
Citizenship - Lesson 2 - 
Extremism and 
terrorism as reported in 
the media FINAL 
(1).pptx 
  
T38   Extremism - 
Citizenship - Lesson 3 - 
Extremism and 
terrorism as reported in 
the media FINAL.pptx 
  
T39   Islamophobia 
Assembly - Extremism 
and terrorism as 
reported in the media 
FINAL.pptx 
  
T40   Lesson plans - 
Extremism and 
terrorism as reported in 
the media FINAL.pdf 
  
T41   Transcripts of Clips 1 
and 2 by 
Anonymous.pdf 
  
 Association of 
Citizenship 
Teaching 
Complete set of resources - 
powerpoint presentations, 












protest - a case study of 
Dover in 2016 
FINAL.pptx 
T43   Intro presentation - 
Lesson 1 - Immigration 
and protest - a case 
study of Dover in 2016 
FINAL 
  
T44   Starter image for 
Lesson 1 - Immigration 
and protest - a case 
study of Dover in 2016 
FINAL.docx 
  
T45   Media - Lesson 2 - 
Immigration and 
protest - a case study of 
Dover in 2016 
FINAL.pptx 
  
T46   Media - Mail Online 
article - Lesson 2 - 
Immigration and 
protest - a case study of 
Dover in 2016.pdf 
  
T47   Media - questionnaire - 
Lesson 2 - Immigration 
and protest - a case 
study of Dover in 2016 
FINAL.pdf 
  
T48   When does Protest 
Cross the Line - Lesson 
3 - Immigration and 
protest - a case study of 
Dover in 2016 
FINAL.pptx 
  
T49   Balancing the right to 




protest - a case study of 
Dover in 2016 
FINAL.pptx 
T50   Newspaper articles for 
police and protest - 
Lesson 4 - Immigration 
and protest - a case 
study of Dover in 2016 
FINAL.pdf 
  
T51   SoW Resilience and 
Prevent - Immigration 
and protest - a case 
study of Dover in 2016 
FINAL 
  
 Association for 
Citizenship 
Teaching 
Complete set of resources - 
powerpoint presentations, 





T52   Ideologies Introduction 
- Lesson 1 - Political 
Ideologies FINAL.pptx 
  




T54   Democracy handout - 
Lesson 2 - Political 
Ideologies.pdf 
  
T55   Dictatorship - Lesson 3 
- Political Ideologies 
FINAL_0.pptx 
  
T56   Theocracies pros and 
cons - Lesson 3 - 
Political Ideologies.pdf 
  
T57   Theocracies sample   
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answer - Lesson 3 - 
Political Ideologies.pdf 




T59   Anarchy in Africa 




T60   Speech planning - 
Lesson 6 - Political 
Ideologies FINAL.pptx 
  
T61   Speech planning sheet - 
Lesson 6 - Political 
Ideologies.pdf 
  
T62   Speech drafting - 
Lesson 7 - Political 
Ideologies FINAL.pptx 
  
T63   Teacher notes - Lesson 
8 - Political 
Ideologies.pdf 
  
T64   Group task and table to 
complete - Political 
Ideologies.pdf 
  
T65   Person outline for 
paired task - Political 
Ideologies.docx 
  




 Centre for Urban 
Education 
Complete set of resources - 
powerpoint presentations, 
lesson plans and worksheets 
Learning Together to 
be Safe 
http://www.preventforschools.org/index.php?category_id=47 31 January 
2018 
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T67   mmu-learning-together-
to-be-safe.pdf 
  
T68   Identified extracts from 
John Boyne The Boy in 
the Striped Pyjamas.pdf 
  
T69   Resource Pack 1  - 
Unicef Rights for Every 
Child.pdf 
  
T70   Resource Pack 1 - 1 - 
UNCRC-CRC1989.pdf 
  
T71   Resource Pack 1 - 1a - 
UNICEF - UNCRC 
document.pdf 
  
T72   Resource Pack 1 - 6 
pictures.pdf 
  
T73   Resource Pack 1 - 
Child Rights06.pdf 
  









T76   Resource Pack 1 - 
What have I learnt 
today.pdf 
  
T77   Resource Pack 1 - 
Worksheet 1 - UNCRC 
Rights of the Child.pdf 
  




T79   Resource Pack 2 - 
Philip becomes the 
devil in a hoodie.pdf 
  
T80   Resource Pack 2 - 
Worksheet 3 - Who am 
I.pdf 
  
T81   Resource Pack 2 - 
Worksheet 4 - Who do 
you think you are.pdf 
  
T82   Resource Pack 3 and 4 
- Information sheet 
2.pdf 
  
T83   Resource Pack 3 and 4 
- Information sheet 
3.pdf 
  
T84   Resource Pack 3 and 4 




T85   Resource Pack 3 and 4 
- Worksheet 6 - 
Consequences.pdf 
  
T86   Resource Pack 3 and 4 
- Worksheet 7 - 
Similarities.pdf 
  
 Extreme Dialogue  Set of lesson plans   http://extremedialogue.org/educational-resources/ 31 January 
2018 
T87   Extreme-Dialogue-
Adams-story-1.pdf 
  
T88   Extreme-Dialogue-
Billys-story-1.pdf 
  
T89   Extreme-Dialogue-   
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Facilitator-Guide.pdf 
T90   Extreme-Dialogue-
Jimmys-story.pdf 
  








T93   Extreme-Dialogue-
Szabolcs-story.pdf 
  





Lesson plan and worksheets British Values, Moving 
Stories 
https://www.geography.org.uk/British-values-and-geography 31 January 
2018 
T95   GA British values 
Lesson1-Fig1.pdf 
  
T96   GA British values 
Lesson1-info1.pdf 
  
T97   GA British values 
Lesson1-info2.pdf 
  
T98   GA British values 
Lesson1-info3.pdf 
  











T100   DOABM_Facilitator_N   
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otes.pdf 
T101   DOABM_Lesson_Plan.
pdf 
  
T102   Lesson_plan_for_Smart
.pdf 
  
 Hammersmith and 
Fulham Council 







T103   ks4_conspiracy_theorie
s_v2_july_2015.doc 
  
T104   ks4_extremism_lesson_
plan_v4_july_2015.doc 
  












T108   ks4conspiracytheories_
july_2015.ppt 
  
T109   ks4extremismpptv2_jul
y_2015.ppt 
  
T110   ks4persuasionandinflue
nce_july_2015.ppt 
  
T111   ks4stereotypingintheme
dia_july_2015.ppt 
  





lesson plans and worksheets 
Prevent-Main.zip 2018 
T112   Safe4me Prevent 
Ppt..ppt 
  
T113   PREVENT - PPT 
OPTION 1 - Facilitator 
Guide Notes.pdf 
  














T117   Prevent - IMRAN 
TASK SHEET.pdf 
  
T118   Prevent - LIAM TASK 
SHEET.pdf 
  
T119   Prevent - MATT TASK 
SHEET.pdf 
  




T121   Prevent - SHAADA 
TASK SHEET.pdf 
  




T123   Prevent - TARIQ 
TASK SHEET.pdf 
  
 Miriam’s Vision  Complete set of resources - 
powerpoint presentations, 
lesson plans and worksheets 
Art Course http://miriamsvision.org/art 1 February 
2018 
T124   MV Art Resource 1.1 
Intro to Pipili Applique 
PP.pptx 
  
T125   MV Art Resource 0.1 
Scheme of Work.pdf 
  
T126   MV Art Resource 1.1 
Intro to Pipili 
Applique.pdf 
  








   Business & Enterprise 
Course 
http://miriamsvision.org/business-and-enterprise 1 February 
2018 
T129   MV B&E Resource 0.1 
Scheme of Work.pdf 
  
T130   MV B&E Resource 1.1 
Role of the MHMT 
PowerPoint.pptx 
  
T131   MV B&E Resource 2.1 
Intro PowerPoint 
  
T132   MV B&E Resource 2.2 
Student skills.pdf 
  
T133   MV B&E Resource 2.3   
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Mindmap activity.pdf 








T136   MV B&E Resource 4.1 
4Ps PowerPoint.pptx 
  








T139   MV B&E Resource 7.1 
Opinion Spectrum.pptx 
  
   Citizenship Course http://miriamsvision.org/citizenship 1 February 
2018 
T140   MV Citizenship 
Resource 0.1 Scheme 
of Work.pdf 
  
T141   MV Citizenship 
Resource 1.1 Intro to 
Human Rights.pptx 
  
T142   MV Citizenship 
Resource 1.1 Intro to 
Human Rights.pdf 
  
T143   MV Citizenship 
Resource 1.2 Human 
Rights Act Articles.pdf 
  
324 
T144   MV Citizenship 
Resource 1.3 You Be 
the Judge student 
sheet.pdf 
  
T145   MV Citizenship 
Resource 1.4 You Be 
the Judge teacher 
sheet.pdf 
  
T146   MV Citizenship 
Resource 1.5 Human 
Rights case studies.pdf 
  
T147   MV Citizenship 




T148   MV Citizenship 




T149   MV Citizenship 




T150   MV Citizenship 
Resource 2.3 Writing a 
speech.pdf 
  
T151   MV Citizenship 
Resource 3.1 Making 
change.pptx 
  
T152   MV Citizenship 
Resource 3.1 Making 
change.pdf 
  
T153   MV Citizenship 




T154   MV Citizenship 
Resource 3.2 Tools of 
change images.pptx 
  
T155   MV Citizenship 
Resource 3.3 Tools of 
change sheet.pdf 
  
T156   MV Citizenship 
Resource 4.1 Heathrow 
case study.pptx 
  
T157   MV Citizenship 
Resource 4.1 Heathrow 
case study.pdf 
  
T158   MV Citizenship 
Resource 4.2 Plan an 
action.pdf 
  
T159   MV Citizenship 
Resource 4.3 No third 
runway.pdf 
  
T160   MV Citizenship 
Resource 4.4 Online 
research sheet.pdf 
  
T161   MV Citizenship 
Resource 6.1 Class case 
study plan an action.pdf 
  
T162   MV Citizenship 
Resource 6.2 Module 
plenary.pdf 
  
T163   MV Citizenship 
Resource 6.2 Module 
plenary.pptx 
  
T164   MV Citizenship   
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Resource 6.3 Student 
feedback form.docx 
T165   MV Citizenship 
Resource 6.3 Student 
feedback form.pdf 
  
T166   MV Citizenship 
Resource 6.4 Teacher 
feedback form.docx 
  
T167   MV Citizenship 
Resource 6.4 Teacher 
feedback form.pdf 
  
   Dance Course  http://miriamsvision.org/dance 1 February 
2018 
T168   MV Dance Resource 
0.1 Scheme of 
Work.pdf 
  
T169   MV Dance Resource 
5.1 Student feedback 
form.pdf 
  
T170   MV Dance Resource 
5.2 Teacher feedback 
form.pdf 
  
   Geography Course http://miriamsvision.org/geography 1 February 
2018 
T171   MV Geography 
Resource 0.1 Scheme 
of Work.pdf 
  
T172   MV Geography 
Resource 1.0 





T173   MV Geography 
Resource 1.1 Intro 
Powerpoint.pptx 
  
T174   MV Geography 
Resource 1.2 Odisha 
maps.pptx 
  
T175   MV Geography 
Resource 1.3 Caste 
stats.pptx 
  
T176   MV Geography 
Resource 2.1 Venn 
diagram slide.pptx 
  
T177   MV Geography 




T178   MV Geography 
Resource 2.2.2 GDP 
Odisha Sudan.jpg 
  
T179   MV Geography 
Resource 2.2.3 Literacy 
rates Orissa.jpg 
  
T180   MV Geography 




T181   MV Geography 
Resource 2.4 Odisha's 
industries slide.pptx 
  
T182   MV Geography 
Resource 2.5.1 HDI 
worksheet.pdf 
  
T183   MV Geography   
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Resource 2.5.2 HDI 
worksheet 
extension.pdf 
T184   MV Geography 




T185   MV Geography 
Resource 3.1 A Day in 
the Life Of.pdf 
  
T186   MV Geography 
Resource 3.2 Odisha's 
Story about Pollution, 
Mining and the 
Environment.pdf 
  
T187   MV Geography 
Resource 4.1 Impacts 
of mining card sort.pdf 
  
T188   MV Geography 
Resource 4.2 Dongria 
Khond tribe.pdf 
  
T189   MV Geography 
Resource 4.3 Word 
mat.pdf 
  
T190   MV Geography 
Resource 4.3 Word 
mat.pptx 
  
T191   MV Geography 
Resource 5.1 Niyamgiri 
v Avatar.pdf 
  













T195   MV Geography 
Resource 6.2 Opinion 
spectrum.pptx 
  
T196   MV Geography 
Resource 6.3 Dongria v 
Vedanta timeline.pdf 
  
T197   MV geography 
Resource 6.4 Vedanta 
article TNC.pdf 
  









T200   MV Geography 
Resource 7.1 Link to 
Miriam's Story.pptx 
  
T201   MV Geography 
Resource 7.2 Structure 
your debate.pptx 
  
T202   MV Geography 
Resource 7.3 Student 
feedback form.pdf 
  
T203   MV Geography 




T204   MV Geography 
Resource 7.4 Teacher 
feedback form.pdf 
  
   History Course http://miriamsvision.org/history 1 February 
2018 
T205   MV History Resource 
0.1 Scheme of 
Work.pdf 
  
T206   MV History Resource 




T207   MV History Resource 




T208   MV History Resource 
1.2 Presentation.pdf 
  
T209   MV History Resource 
1.2 Presentation.pptx 
  
T210   MV History Resource 
2.1 Presentation.pdf 
  
T211   MV History Resource 
2.1 Presentation.pptx 
  
T212   MV History Resource 
2.3 Summary sheet 
Who was involved in 
77.pdf 
  
T213   MV History Resource 
2.4 Info Pack 1 Who 
was involved in 77.pdf 
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T214   MV History Resource 
2.5 Info Pack 2 Who 
was involved in 77.pdf 
  
T215   MV History Resource 
2.6 Info Pack 3 Who 
was involved in 77.pdf 
  
T216   MV History Resource 
2.7 Info Pack 4 Who 
was involved in 77.pdf 
  
T217   MV History Resource 
3.1 Presentation.pdf 
  
T218   MV History Resource 
3.1 Presentation.pptx 
  












T222   MV History Resource 
4.4 Presentation.pdf 
  
T223   MV History Resource 
4.4 Presentation.pptx 
  









T226   MV History Resource 
6.1 Student feedback 
form.pdf 
  
T227   MV History Resource 
6.2 Teacher feedback 
form.docx 
  
T228   MV History Resource 
6.2 Teacher feedback 
form.pdf 
  
   PSHE Course http://miriamsvision.org/pshe 1 February 
2018 
T229   MV PSHE Resource 
0.1 Scheme of 
Work.pdf 
  
T230   MV PSHE Resource 
1.1 Miriam's Story.pdf 
  
T231   MV PSHE Resource 
1.1 Miriam's Story.pptx 
  
T232   MV PSHE Resource 
1.2 Situation report 
table.pdf 
  
T233   MV PSHE Resource 
1.3 Miriam's Story 
video notes.pdf 
  
T234   MV PSHE Resource 
1.4 7-7 Information 
search.pdf 
  
T235   MV PSHE Resource 
1.4 7-7 Information 
search.pptx 
  
T236   MV PSHE Resource 




T237   MV PSHE Resource 
1.6 Diary writing 
frame.pdf 
  
T238   MV PSHE Resource 
2.1 Responding to 7-
7.pdf 
  
T239   MV PSHE Resource 
2.1 Responding to 7-
7.pptx 
  
T240   MV PSHE Resource 
2.2 Definition match 
A4.doc 
  
T241   MV PSHE Resource 
2.2 Definition match 
A4.docx 
  
T242   MV PSHE Resource 
2.2 Definition match 
A4.pdf 
  
T243   MV PSHE Resource 
2.3 React respond sheet 
A4.doc 
  
T244   MV PSHE Resource 
2.3 React respond sheet 
A4.docx 
  
T245   MV PSHE Resource 
2.3 React respond sheet 
A4.pdf 
  
T246   MV PSHE Resource 
2.4 React respond word 
sort A4.doc 
  
T247   MV PSHE Resource   
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2.4 React respond word 
sort A4.docx 
T248   MV PSHE Resource 
2.4 React respond word 
sort A4.pdf 
  
T249   MV PSHE Resource 
2.5 Student feedback 
form.docx 
  
T250   MV PSHE Resource 
2.5 Student feedback 
form.pdf 
  
T251   MV PSHE Resource 
2.6 Teacher feedback 
form.docx 
  
T252   MV PSHE Resource 
2.6 Teacher feedback 
form.pdf 
  
 Prevent for Schools Presentation and Worksheets Act Now http://www.preventforschools.org/index.php?category_id=17 1 February 
2018 




T254   Lesson_1_resource_1a.
pdf 
  
T255   Lesson_1_resource_1b.
pdf 
  
T256   Lesson_1_resource_1c.
pdf 
  
T257   Lesson_2_resource_2a.
pdf 
  
T258   Lesson_2_resource_2b.   
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pdf 
T259   Lesson_2_resource_2c.
pdf 
  
T260   Lesson_4_resource_4b.
pdf 
  
T261   Lesson_4_resource_4d.
pdf 
  
 PSHE Association Complete set of resources - 
powerpoint presentations, 







T262   Extremism Teachers 
Notes.docx 
  
T263   Lesson 1 - Lesson Plan 




T264   Lesson 1 - Presentation 




T265   Lesson 1 - Resource 1 - 
Key Concepts.docx 
  
T266   Lesson 1 - Resource 2 - 
Wanted Poster.pdf 
  
T267   Lesson 2 - Lesson Plan 
- How can language 
divide us.docx 
  
T268   Lesson 2 - Presentation 
- How can language 
divide us.pptx 
  
T269   Lesson 2 - Resource 1 -   
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Perceptions Table.docx 
T270   Lesson 2 - Resource 2 - 
Article.docx 
  
T271   Lesson 2 - Resource 3 - 
Photo Plenary.docx 
  
T272   Lesson 3 - Lesson Plan 
- Influence.docx 
  
T273   Lesson 3 - Presentation 
- Influence.pptx 
  
T274   Lesson 3 - Resource 
1.docx 
  
T275   Lesson 4 - Lesson Plan 
- Community.docx 
  
T276   Lesson 4 - Presentation 
- Community.pptx 
  
T277   Lesson 4 - Resource 1 - 
Pupil script.docx 
  
T278   Lesson 4 - Resource 2 -
Teacher script.docx 
  
T279   Lesson 4 - Resource 3 - 
Then and now self-
assessment.doc 
  
 Since 9/11 Complete set of resources - 
powerpoint presentations, 
lesson plans and worksheets 




T280   A&D_Images_of_911_
memorials_0.pptf 
  





T282   A&D_Images_of_mon
uments_warfare_0.ppt 
  




T284   A&D_Lesson_planning
_0.pdf 
  
   Citizenship Course https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/citizenship 1 February 
2018 
T285   C0 Citizenship 
overview_4.pdf 
  
T286   C1 What does terrorism 
look like_0.ppt 
  
T287   Citizenship_What_does
_terrorism_look_like_0
.ppt 
 1 October 
201723 
T288   C2 Why do people 
commit acts of 
terrorism_0.ppt 
  




T290   C4 How tolerant is the 
UK.ppt 
  
T291   C5 How free are 
citizens of the UK.ppt 
  
T292   C6 How can we 
respond to terrorism in 
the UK.ppt 
  
                                               
23 Since compiling my analysis, Since 9/11 altered this presentation. Some quotations taken from the original presentation have since been removed. 
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T293   ENG Comparing news 
values.pdf 
  
T294   ENG Different 
responses to 911.pdf 
  
T295   ENG How the story 
develops.pdf 
  




T297   English&Drama_Facts
heet_about_911_1.pdf 
  
T298   English&Drama_News
_values_0.pdf 
  




   History https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/history 1 February 
2018 
T300   HIS E1 Experts 
invitation list.pdf 
  
T301   History1_Artefacts.ppt   
T302   History1_Lesson_plann
ing_0.pdf 
  
T303   History1_Shockwave.p
pt 
  




T305   His E2 Mindless 
terrorism.pdf 
  
T306   History E2 Teachers 
guide.pdf 
  
T307   History2_Al-
Qaeda_motives.pdf 
  
T308   History2_Arab_lands_r
ole_play.pdf 
  
T309   History2_Booklet_Min
dless_terrorism.pdf 
  




T311   History2_First_World_
War_Arab_allies_0.ppt 
  
T312   History2_Flash_cards_
What_caused_911.pdf 
  
T313   History2_I've_heard....
pdf 
  
T314   History2_Images_Caus
es_of_911.ppt 
  
T315   History2_Lesson_plann
ing_0.pdf 
  
T316   History2_Palestine_Isra
el_maps_activity.ppt 
  
T317   History2_Tree_roots_di
agram_0.pdf 
  




T319   History2_What_caused
_911_VersionB_0.pdf 
  
T320   His E3 Richards 
blog.pdf 
  
T321   History_Enquiry3_Surv
ey_sheet.xls 
  
T322   History3_Lesson_plann
ing_0.pdf 
  




T324   History3_Robert_Fisks
_reaction_to_911.pdf 
  
   RE Course https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/re 1 February 
2018 
T325   RE 0 Curriculum 
Overview.pdf 
  
T326   RE 1a Stage 1 The 
nature of conflict.ppt 
  
T327   RE 1b Stage 1 Activity 
Sheets.pdf 
  
T328   RE 2a Stage 2 Human 
rights.ppt 
  
T329   RE 3a Stage 3 
Religious attitudes to 
conflict.ppt 
  
T330   RE 3b Stage 3 Activity 
Sheets.pdf 
  




T332   RE 4b Stage 4 Activity 
Sheets.pdf 
  
T333   RE 5a Stage 5 Different 
responses to 911.ppt 
  
T334   RE 5b Stage 5 Activity 
Sheets.pdf 
  




T336   RE 6b Stage 6 Activity 
Sheets.pdf 
  
 Stockton Council Complete set of resources - 
powerpoint presentations, 
lesson plans and worksheets 






T337   01-britishness-cards.pdf   
T338   01-classroom-
powerpoint (1).pptx 
  
T339   01-lesson-plan.pdf   
T340   01-what-people-say.pdf   
T341   02-classroom-
presentation.pptx 
  
T342   02-globingo.pdf   
T343   02-immigration-
timeline-cards.pdf 
  




T345   02-lesson-plan.pdf   
342 
T346   02-multicultural-
signs.pdf 
  
T347   03-lesson-plan.pdf   
T348   04-classroom-
presentation.pptx 
  
T349   04-lesson-plan.pdf   
T350   04-possible-
sentences.pdf 
  
T351   04-response-sheet.pdf   
T352   04-teenage-headline-
cards.pdf 
  
T353   05-classroom-
presentation (1).pptx 
  
T354   05-lesson-plan.pdf   
T355   05-muslim-headline-
cards.pdf 
  
T356   05-traveller-
headlines.pdf 
  
T357   06-additional-words-
and-phrases.pdf 
  
T358   06-classroom-
presentation.pptx 
  
T359   06-lesson-plan.pdf   
T360   06-pyramid-of-hate.pdf   
T361   07-classroom-
presentation.pptx 
  
T362   07-elanor-roosevelt-   
343 
quote.pdf 
T363   07-free-speech-
scenarios.pdf 
  
T364   07-lesson-plan.pdf   
T365   07-picture-cards-and-
statements.pdf 
  
T366   07-possible-
sentences.pdf 
  




T368   08-classroom-
presentation.pptx 
  
T369   08-lesson-plan.pdf   
T370   08-photo-cards.pdf   
T371   08-photos-and-
information.pdf 
  
T372   09-classroom-
presentation.pptx 
  
T373   09-lesson-plan.pdf   
T374   09-prevent-dvd-
observation-sheet.pdf 
  
T375   09-word-definitions.pdf   
T376   10-classroom-
presentation.pptx 
  
T377   10-lesson-plan.pdf   
T378   11-classroom-   
344 
presentation.pptx 
T379   11-lesson-plan.pdf   
T380   11-presentations-
assessment-grid.pdf 
  
T381   12-lesson-plan.pdf   
T382   prevent-teaching-and-
learning-resource.pdf 
  
 TES Resources     










T384   3.-Causes-of-
Extremism.pptx 
  
T385   3.-Terrorist-motivation-
articles.docx 
  
  Presentation, Lesson Plan and 
Worksheet 










T387   PRE5-Combatting-the-
Far-Right-New.pptx 
  




T389  Presentation Extremism https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/extremism-11169403 1 February 
2018 
345 
  Set of Presentations British Values https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/british-values-11117639 1 February 
2018 
T390   British-Values-
Introduction.pptx 
  
T391   1-British-Values-
Democracy.pptx 
  
T392   2-British-Values-Rule-
of-Law.pptx 
  
























T398  Presentation Radicalisation and the 









T399   radicalisation-lesson-
plan.doc 
  
                                               
24 Since removed from TES website 
346 
T400   radicalisation-lp.pptx   




T401   bv-monday-
democracy.pptx 
  
T402   bv-tuesday-The-Rule-
of-Law.pptx 
  
T403   bv-wednesday-
individual-liberty.pptx 
  
T404   bv-thursday-mutual-
respect.pptx 
  




T406 Tony Blair Faith 
Foundation 










T407   1. Propaganda and 
conspiracy lesson.pptm 
  
T408   2. Conspiracy theories 
lesson.pptm 
  
T409   3. Extremism 
lesson.pptm 
  
T410   4. Extremism lesson 
2.pptm 
  
                                               
25 Since removed from TES website 
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T411   5. E-safety lesson.pptm   
T412   6. Faith and hate crime 
lesson.pptm 
  
T413   British values and state 
building lesson.pptm 
  
T414   British_values.pptm   
T415   Citizenship test tutor 
session.pptm 
  
T416   Cyber_bullying_and_e
_safety.pptm 
  
T417   Democracy tutor 
session.pptm 
  
T418   E_safety.pptm   
T419   Extended_assembly_1_
hour_tutorial.pptm 
  
T420   Extremism_and_the_fa
r_right.pptm 
  
T421   Faith tutor session.pptm   
T422   Faith_and_hate_crime.
pptm 
  
T423   Homophobia 
lesson.pptm 
  
T424   Homophobia_assembly
_1.pptm 
  
T425   Immigration tutor 
session.pptm 
  




T427   Islamic_extremism.ppt
m 
  
T428   London tutor 
session.pptm 
  
T429   Media and resilience 
lesson.pptm 
  
T430   Prejudice lesson.pptm   
T431   Propaganda tutor 
session.pptm 
  
T432   Propaganda.pptm   
T433   Stereotypes and sexism 
lesson.pptm 
  
  
 
